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 Problem-solving courts, such as drug and mental health courts, function under the 
model of therapeutic jurisprudence—the idea that legal policies and procedures should 
help and not harm clients, within the confines of the law (Winick & Wexler, 2002). 
Although it would seem that the lack of procedural due process in most problem-solving 
courts is in direct opposition to the best interests of a client, it is possible that observers 
find this more of a problem than do the court clients themselves. This two-experiment 
study applied Igou’s (2008) AIK hypothesis to problem-solving courts’ practice of 
sanctioning in the absence of due process. Specifically, it is possible that observers find 
problem-solving courts’ lack of procedural due process more of a problem than do the 
clients themselves because of differences in perspective and discordant knowledge of the 
coping strategies that problem-solving court clients utilize. This research sought to test 
these ideas. Experiment 1 manipulated the perspective from which participants 
considered a drug or mental health court sanction proceeding, with or without due 
process present. Experiment 1 also explored the moderating and mediating effects of 
participants’ coping knowledge and perceived similarity as it related to their anticipated 
affect and well-being as a result of the sanction. Experiment 2 manipulated coping 
directly to determine whether a discordant coping knowledge would explain the 
 
perspective effects identified in Experiment 1. Taken together, the findings of these 
experiments provided mixed support for traditional self-other effects in affective 
forecasting (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Hsee & Hastie, 2006; 
Igou, 2004; 2008; Van Boven & Lowenstein, 2003; Wiener, Gervais, Allen, & Marquez, 
2013) and even less support for Igou’s asymmetric immune knowledge hypothesis 
(2008). However, several important, legally relevant findings provide an opportunity to 
inform future psycholegal research in the area of procedural fairness, due process, and the 
inherent differences between drug and mental health courts and their clients.  
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 Dedication 
For Ithaca. 
 
When you set out on your journey to Ithaca, 
pray that the road is long, 
full of adventure, full of instruction. 
The Laistrygonians and the Cyclops, 
angry Poseidon – do not fear them: 
such as these you will never find 
as long as your thought is lofty, as long as a rare 
emotion touch your spirit and your body. 
The Laistrygonians and the Cyclops, 
angry Poseidon – you will not meet them 
unless you carry them in our soul, 
unless your soul raise them up before you. 
 
Pray that the road is long. 
At many a summer dawn to enter 
with what gratitude, what joy- 
ports seen for the first time; 
to stop at Phoenician trading centres, 
and to buy good merchandise, 
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony, 
and sensuous perfumes of every kind, 
sensuous perfumes as lavishly as you can; 
to visit many Egyptian cities, 
to gather stores of knowledge from the learned. 
 
Have Ithaca always in your mind. 
Your arrival there is what you are destined for. 
But don’t in the least hurry the journey. 
Better it last for years, 
so that when you reach the island you are old, 
rich with all you have gained on the way, 
not expecting Ithaca to give you wealth. 
Ithaca gave you a splendid journey. 
Without her you would not have set out. 
She hasn’t anything else to give you. 
 
And if you find her poor, Ithaca hasn’t deceived you. 
So wise you have become, of such experience, 
that already you’ll have understood what these Ithacas mean. 
 
 
    -Constantine Cavafy (1863-1933) 
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Introduction 
On April 3, 2007, the State of Tennessee enrolled Brent Stewart in the Dyer 
County Drug Court Program as part of a probation revocation for the crime of burglary. 
During Stewart’s tenure in the court-mandated program, he repeatedly failed to comply 
with some of the agreed upon program requirements (State of Tennessee v. Brent R. 
Stewart, 2010). Specifically, Mr. Stewart failed several drug screenings, repeatedly failed 
to appear for required weekly meetings, violated a house arrest rule, and failed to report 
for a drug screening, among numerous other violations. To address these program 
violations and modify Stewart’s behavior, the judge sanctioned him to significant jail 
terms on six separate occasions. These jail terms ranged from one week to sixty days, 
totaling almost six months of additional jail time, over the sixteen months during which 
the defendant participated in the drug court program. On each of the six occasions, the 
judge denied Stewart basic due process when he sanctioned Stewart to incarceration. 
Further, the record does not indicate that the court attempted less severe forms of 
sanction (e.g., admonition from the judge, increased drug testing, additional home visits, 
etc.) before it sent him to jail. As a result of his wayward participation in the drug court 
program, Brent Stewart was expelled from the program and was subsequently 
considerably worse off, from a punitive perspective, than if he had chosen not to 
participate in the program at all.  
Upon appellate review, the Tennessee Court of Appeals noted that the six months 
of incarceration imposed in this case was “in plain tension with the idea that drug courts 
should adopt a therapeutic, collaborative . . . response to a participant’s noncompliant 
behavior” (State of Tennessee v. Stewart, 2010, p. 16). The Appellate Court also noted 
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that in spite of Mr. Stewart’s lack of success and subsequent expulsion from the program, 
he did credit the Tennessee Drug Court with “saving his life” (State of Tennessee v. 
Stewart, 2010, p. 5). In other words, although Mr. Stewart was unable to comply with the 
program requirements, he seemingly benefited from, or at least appreciated the structure 
and support the program provided. Appreciative statements such as this suggest that 
problem-solving court clients benefit therapeutically and often legally from the strict 
process and oversight of the special court program—even if it is at the cost of a 
recognized liberty interest, such as freedom from lengthy incarceration without due 
process of law.  
Although cases like Stewart may be the exception rather than the rule, this case 
raises an important theoretical and empirical question about whether the non-adversarial 
nature of problem-solving courts fosters a tension between clients’ due process rights and 
the goals of therapeutic jurisprudence. The first chapter of this dissertation briefly 
examines the history of American problem-solving courts and how the philosophy of 
therapeutic jurisprudence informs these special court systems. Then, the dissertation goes 
on to analyze the legal history of procedural due process and evaluates how courts apply 
these protections in modern problem-solving courts, specifically at sanction and 
termination hearings.  
The first chapter also reviews the social-cognitive theory of affective forecasting 
and introduces the psychology of the self-other effect. Further, the dissertation examines 
how the asymmetric immune knowledge hypothesis (Igou, 2008) might clarify the 
general inaccuracies that people demonstrate when anticipating the emotional 
consequences of an event. These psychological theories help explain differences in how 
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problem-solving court participants, compared to those less familiar with problem-solving 
courts, view potential liberty interest violations, such as incarceration without due 
process of law. 
The second and third chapters of this dissertation present a series of experiments 
that join a focused movement toward evaluating the processes and procedures 
characteristic of problem-solving courts (see Quinn, 2009; Wiener, Winick, Georges, & 
Castro, 2010). The research tests whether problem-solving court clients experience 
dissatisfaction with the due process they receive as the court tries to balance the goals of 
therapeutic jurisprudence against the defendant’s legal protections. The paper also offers 
a practical application of the asymmetric immune knowledge hypothesis (Igou, 2008) to 
help explain the difference between psycholegal scholars’ concern about current due 
process practices and clients’ general satisfaction with the sanctioning procedures in 
problem-solving courts.  
Finally, the fourth chapter of this dissertation discusses the theoretical and legal 
implications and limitations of the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, and suggests 
directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Review of the Literature 
Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief History 
 The modern day problem-solving court movement grew out of the recognition 
that the adversarial, criminal court system failed to resolve many of the problems that 
defendants faced in traditional criminal courts, which resulted in a revolving door for 
defendants involved in drug use and for those who suffered from a variety of mental 
health impairments (Lane, 2002). Judges and attorneys felt enormous pressure to 
efficiently clear the daily docket, without specific regard to the victims, communities, or 
defendants they served (Berman & Feinblatt, 2001). As Kathleen Blatz, Minnesota 
Supreme Court Judge articulated, “ . . . you just move ‘em, move ‘em, move ‘em . . . you 
know, I feel like I work for McJustice: We sure aren’t good for you, but we are fast” 
(Berman, 2000, p. 80). Traditional criminal courts typically do not have the resources to 
address the underlying cause of illegal behavior—substance abuse, mental illness, and 
domestic violence, among others (Winick, 2003). For these reasons, problem-solving 
courts have become increasingly popular as caseloads in criminal courts have grown 
larger, and budgets to adjudicate these cases have grown leaner. 
There is no single model for problem-solving court systems, however the unifying 
feature of these courts, and in particular drug and mental health courts, is an identifiable, 
treatable issue that underlies the client’s criminal conduct (Bozza, 2007). A conventional 
drug or mental health court differs from the traditional criminal court’s procedures and 
practices in that the court treatment team refers to offenders as “clients” or “participants,” 
and the judge becomes an active participant in the client’s treatment plan. These court 
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systems utilize a multi-faceted approach to address the legal issues of their clients and the 
court personnel serve as a rehabilitative team to treat the underlying cause of maladaptive 
behavior. This team-focused approach includes an interdisciplinary group of court and 
non-court players, such as a judge, a prosecutor, defense counsel, social workers, 
probation officers, and off-site treatment providers (Berman & Feinblatt, 2001; Winick, 
2000). Most programs employ at least a small group of these key players, especially at 
weekly progress meetings. However, in some jurisdictions attorneys are not frequently 
present and when they are, they play a reduced role in the process (Nolan, 2003).  
Problem-solving courts share a broadly defined set of goals and characteristics, 
such as a non-adversarial collaborative approach to decision making, an individualized 
plan for each client, increased judge/offender interaction, clearly defined rules and goals 
to increase defendant accountability, and an emphasis on improved substantive outcomes, 
including lower recidivism and victim safety (Berman & Feinblatt, 2001; Casey & 
Rottman, 2003; Porter, Rempel, & Mansky, 2010; Watson, Hanrahan, Luchins, & 
Lurigio, 2001). Most importantly, these problem-solving courts have the resources to deal 
with a client’s immediate legal dispute, but also to provide treatment in a way that 
prevents recurring court involvement (Labriola, Rempel, O’Sullivan, & Frank, 2007; 
Nolan, 2003; Winick, 2003).  
Problem-solving court systems are well integrated into the American justice 
system. In 1989, Dade County, Florida created the first problem-solving drug court and 
on July 1, 2007, South Dakota became the 50th state in America to implement a drug 
court (Eckrich & Loudenburg, 2012). Since the creation of the first problem-solving drug 
court, more than 3,000 modern problem-solving courts have emerged across the nation 
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(Porter et al., 2010). Specifically, jurisdictions in all fifty states have created more than 
2,100 drug courts as well as an additional group of problem-solving court systems that 
include more than 200 mental health courts, 200 domestic violence courts, 30 community 
courts, and more than 500 other focused court systems, such as veterans, homeless, teen, 
and sex offense courts (Porter et al., 2010). Further, both federal and state court 
organizations recognize these problem-solving courts as favorable cost and time saving 
approaches to social and mental health problems (Becker & Corrigan, 2002).  
The primary underlying psychosocial and legal model behind the widespread 
proliferation of these special court systems is therapeutic jurisprudence (Wexler & 
Winick, 1996; Winick & Wexler, 2002; 2003). The philosophy of therapeutic 
jurisprudence is one approach to scholarship that attempts to analyze legal practice and 
theory through a set of lenses, specially formed to view the law for not only what it is, but 
more importantly what it ought to be. 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the law’s impact on an individual’s 
psychological well-being (Winick & Wexler, 2002). The concept of therapeutic 
jurisprudence (hereinafter “T.J.”) originated in the late 1980s as an approach to study and 
conceptualize mental health law (Wexler & Winick, 1991; Wexler & Winick, 1996; 
Winick, 2003). Wexler and Winick defined T.J. as an interdisciplinary approach to assess 
the extent to which legal rules and procedures produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic 
consequences, with a focus on how to increase the former and decrease the latter (Wexler 
& Winick, 1991; Winick, 2003; Winick & Wexler, 2002; 2003). The original authors 
intentionally defined “therapeutic” quite broadly, as “anything that enhances the 
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psychological or physical well-being of the individual” (Winick, 1997, p. 192). They 
chose this broad, general characterization to allow scholars and practitioners to fit the 
concept of T.J. to the particular legal practice of interest. Although the original authors 
conceptualized T.J. as a theoretical and scholarly approach to empirically analyze the 
therapeutic influence of legal theory and practice on mental health law, (e.g., right to 
refuse treatment, treatment for incompetency to stand trial, etc.), legal and social science 
scholars have applied the principles of T.J. to a variety of other legal issues. These 
include the role of counsel in drug courts (Winick, 2003), consequences of sex offender 
registration laws (Levenson & Cotter, 2005), involuntary treatment of the mentally ill 
(Glaser, 2003; Winick, 1997), juvenile transfer policies (Mescall, 1999), and domestic 
violence adjudication (Simon, 1995), among many others.  
While problem-solving courts and the T.J. movement are not identical concepts, 
the T.J. movement and the nation’s first problem-solving courts developed in parallel at 
approximately the same time in history. Winick and Wexler (2002) viewed T.J. and the 
proliferation of problem-solving courts as two “vectors” in a growing movement toward a 
more comprehensive, humane, and psychologically optimal way of applying and 
understanding the law (see also Winick, 2003). Therapeutic Jurisprudence serves as a 
philosophy of non-retributive justice in which the goal is “to empower offenders, offer 
them a way to take control of their own treatment, and help them to make judgments that 
are rational in the way that the criminal law defines rational choice” (Wiener & Georges, 
2013, p. 6). Problem-solving courts create “rich and fascinating laboratories” from which 
to “generate and refine therapeutic jurisprudence approaches” (p. 484), but they should 
not be regarded as synonymous terms (Winick & Wexler, 2002). 
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Winick and Wexler, wholly regarded as the founders of the therapeutic 
jurisprudential approach to the law, make very clear that T.J. ought not override other 
competing values in law. That is, legal actors should apply T.J. only so long as its 
practices do not subordinate due process and other related justice values. Specifically, 
Winick (1997) asserted: 
Therapeutic jurisprudence has always suggested that therapeutic goals should be 
achieved only within the limits of considerations of justice . . . that law should be 
applied fairly, evenhandedly, and non-discriminatorily. Legal actors should seek 
to apply the law therapeutically but only when consistent with these values. (p. 
203)  
In other words, proponents of T.J. do not suggest that therapeutic concerns should 
supersede other legal considerations, such as due process—in fact, some situations 
require that societal, legal concerns trump therapeutic ones (Hora, Schma, & Rosenthal, 
1999). Instead, T.J. necessitates legal theorists to consider psychological and mental 
health as one meaningful piece in the analysis of legal practice or theory (Hora et al., 
1999).  
Therapeutic jurisprudence: A thoughtful critique. Proponents of T.J. argue 
that the problem-solving court movement provides a more appropriate way to provide 
services to vulnerable populations than does the traditional criminal court system 
approach. However, the therapeutic jurisprudential model is not without critics. 
Psycholegal scholars have recently called into question whether problem-solving courts 
can reduce the anti-therapeutic consequences of criminal courts without subordinating 
justice values, such as due process (Berman, 2004; Berman & Feinblatt, 2001; 2005; 
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Boldt, 1998; Burke, 2010; Casey, 2004; Castellano & Anderson, 2013; Hoffman, 2011; 
Lane, 2002; Meyer, 2009; Odegaard, 2007; Quinn, 2000; 2009; Seltzer, 2005). Quinn 
(2009) effectively argues that current problem-solving court policy and practice focus 
solely on the benevolent and exciting success stories of these courts; however, these 
successes are only one small part of the story. For example, some critics argue that the 
problem-solving court movement put the cart before the horse, so to speak because some 
systems lack sufficient resources (financial and manpower) to sufficiently treat the high 
volume of participants in their courts (Odegaard, 2007; Seltzer, 2005). Further, where 
resources do exist, these services may include little more than medication and “do 
nothing to address the factors associated with the criminal contact or the individual’s 
need for housing or other health care or vocational services” (Seltzer, 2005, p. 583). This 
lack of available evidence-based treatment services in many areas of the country as well 
as an ineffectiveness of the services that are in place often results in problem-solving 
court participants’ failure to thrive outside of the program.  
State and defense attorneys’ nontraditional roles in problem-solving courts 
systems are also controversial (Burke, 2010; Odegaard, 2007). The collaborative nature 
of problem-solving courts contrasts sharply with the adversarial nature of criminal courts. 
Consequently, Seltzer (2005) and Odegaard (2007) among others, argue that defense 
attorneys may take a more passive role and ultimately fail to advocate on behalf of their 
clients. For example, Burke (2010) articulates that many drug courts utilize pre-hearing 
conferences (where the participant may not be present), to develop legal and treatment 
strategies for the participant. However, if the treatment team, defense attorney included, 
decides beforehand what is going to happen to the participant, the defendant has 
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“completely lost his or her chance to be heard” (Burke, 2010, p. 52) or be adequately 
represented by counsel. In other words, the informal nature of the court may create 
legitimate, legal-duty concerns when a defense attorney works double duty on behalf of 
the judge, the treatment team, and the client.  
Some opponents of the T.J. movement also argue that these courts “coerce 
defendants to choose a guilty plea, drug treatment, and the immediate freedom that 
accompanies the drug court program over waiting in jail to litigate a claim with an 
uncertain outcome” (Blom, Galbo-Moyes, & Jacobs, 2010, p. 36). Blom et al. (2010) also 
note that if an offender fails out of drug court, the criminal court may impose a sentence 
that exceeds the prison term accompanying a standard plea for the same offense. In other 
words, if the offender fails out of the drug court and subsequently faces the full array of 
criminal court punishments, the offender may be punitively worse off than if he had not 
participated in the drug court at all. Though it may appear counterintuitive to the 
therapeutic jurisprudential ideals of the problem-solving court movement, a substantial 
number of courts require a defendant’s guilty plea to participate in the court’s treatment 
program (see Berman & Feinblatt, 2005). This paper reviews a number of these cases and 
its implication for due process protections in the following section. 
Lastly, and most relevant for this paper is the court’s potential denial of 
participants’ procedural due process protections, under the pretense of an informal, 
therapeutic program setting (Berman, 2004; Boldt, 1998; Casey, 2004; Castellano & 
Anderson, 2013; Hoffman, 2011; Lane, 2002; Meyer, 2009; Odegaard, 2007; Quinn, 
2000; 2009; Seltzer, 2005). Some argue that problem-solving courts have become so 
nearsighted by the romanticism of therapeutic jurisprudence, that they have “lost sight of 
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fundamental legal principles like due process and proportionality” (Berman, 2004, p. 
1313). Although some scholars question whether the problem-solving court movement 
has “oversold its innovations” (Quinn, 2009, p. 68), most recognize that these courts, 
along with their therapeutic jurisprudential ideals, serve a necessary purpose as an 
alternative that avoids recycling offenders with drug and mental health problems through 
the criminal court system (see Odegaard, 2007). A more thorough understanding of the 
procedural protections and practical and therapeutic outcomes of problem-solving courts 
requires additional empirical research (see Wiener, Winick, Skovran Georges, & Castro, 
2010). The current dissertation serves as one such empirical effort. The following section 
reviews the constitutionally guaranteed protections of due process, as well as how 
problem-solving courts satisfy or fail to satisfy these protections. 
Procedural Due Process: What Process is Due?
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution describe 
a legal obligation by both federal and state governments to assure that all levels of 
government operate under the principle that no person shall be, “deprived of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law” (U.S. Const. amend. V). While the text of the 
Due Process Clause is broadly stated, the fact that the United States Constitution 
addresses it twice makes it clear that it is of fundamental importance. 
The constitutional guarantee of due process of law traditionally applies to two 
separate categories—substantive due process and procedural due process. Substantive 
due process refers to issues such as privacy, freedom of speech, and the creation of rights, 
whereas procedural due process generally describes the procedures afforded to those who 
find themselves before a criminal or civil court (Chemirinsky, 2006). A thorough 
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procedural due process analysis requires an answer to a three pronged question: 1) Has 
there been a deprivation, 2) of a life, liberty, or property interest, 3) without due process 
of law (Chemirinsky, 2006)? Assuming that the government has deprived a defendant of 
a non-trivial protected interest (see Fuentes v. Shevin, 1972), the court must then answer 
what process of law is due. The analysis of any one individual case does not answer the 
question, “what process is due.” Rather, the answer relies on the application of relevant 
jurisprudence to the facts in any specific case. The United States Supreme Court in 
Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) articulated that, “It has been said so often by this Court and 
others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands” (p. 481).  
The United States Supreme Court considered a number of cases regarding 
required due process procedures in traditional court systems (see Bi-Metallic Investment 
Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado, 1915; Fuentes v. Shevin, 1972; Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 1970; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004; Mathews v. Eldridge, 1975). The most widely 
cited case that addresses due process is the Supreme Court’s ruling in Goldberg v. Kelly 
(1970). The Court held that a termination of federally assisted aid for families with 
dependent children, without proper prior notice and hearing, denied those families due 
process of law. Specifically, the recipient did not have sufficient opportunity to contest 
the reasons that agency used to remove them from the ‘aid eligible’ list. In its ruling, the 
Court enumerated specific procedures that must be provided prior to a potential 
deprivation of a liberty (or property) interest. These are the right to receive adequate 
notice of a [evidentiary] hearing (though not necessarily a judicial or quasi-judicial 
hearing), the right to make an oral presentation, the right to counsel, the right to an 
  13
impartial decision maker, the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses, and an ultimate 
decision based only on legal rules and evidence (Goldberg v. Kelly, 1970).  
Several years later, the United States Supreme Court revisited the issue of due 
process requirements in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976). In this case, the Court outlined a 
more flexible, three-pronged balancing test that lower courts must use to evaluate the 
amount of process due: (1) the importance or value of the interest at stake, (2) the risk of 
error because of the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
alternate procedural safeguards, and (3) the government’s interest, including 
administrative encumbrance and costs of additional procedures. A court must weigh all 
three factors as it decides when, and how much procedural protection to afford a 
defendant (Mathews v. Eldridge, 1976). While the Mathews test is significantly more 
flexible in scope than the specific procedures enumerated in Goldberg, its flexibility 
stems from a recognition “that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for 
the same kind of procedure” (Morrissey v. Brewer, 1972, p. 471). In other words, the 
legal history of procedural due process in traditional court systems clearly articulates 
which procedures must be in place before a court denies a defendant’s property or liberty 
interest. However, the method by which courts impose these procedures depends on the 
specific facts of the case, and a careful balancing of the factors defined in Mathews v. 
Eldridge (1976).  
While there are instances where a problem-solving court may potentially deprive 
a client of a life or property interest, this paper focuses primarily on clients’ potential 
liberty interest violations and the requisite procedural protections that prevent such 
violations. However, the problem-solving courts’ application of these procedural 
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protections is not yet well defined and is significantly less clear than that of the 
traditional criminal court system. Social science and legal scholars (e.g., Berman, 2004; 
Berman & Feinblatt, 2001; 2005; Boldt, 1998; Burke, 2010; Casey, 2004; Castellano & 
Anderson, 2013; Hoffman, 2011; Lane, 2002; Meyer, 2009; Odegaard, 2007; Quinn, 
2000; 2009; Seltzer, 2005) have expressed that the non-adversarial nature of problem-
solving courts fosters a tension with clients’ due process rights. An example is the case of 
State of Tennessee v. Stewart (2010) cited in the beginning pages of this paper. However, 
because modern day problem-solving courts are a relatively new phenomenon, much of 
the relevant case law and psycholegal literature regarding due process in problem-solving 
courts stems from juvenile court jurisprudence—arguably the first type of problem-
solving court in the United States. In fact, the history of the juvenile court foreshadows 
many of the due process challenges faced by modern courts and provides a “cautionary 
tale of the pitfalls” (p. 1464) to the unique, discretionary methods of these relatively new 
special court systems (Casey, 2004). The following section briefly reviews the history of 
due process violations and protections in America’s juvenile court system. 
Due process in the juvenile court. The juvenile court movement began in this 
country when Illinois adopted the first juvenile court in 1899 (Bunch, 2004). Soon after, 
all fifty states adopted a similar system. The goal of the juvenile court system was to act 
en loco parens, or in place of the parent, to benevolently intervene on the behalf of 
wayward youth (Casey, 2004). The courts’ original intent was to look beyond the child’s 
crime or unruly behavior and to “dig deeper,” and ask “what is he, how has he become 
what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save 
him from a downward career” (Mack, 1909, p. 174). This system anchored its practice in 
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rehabilitative and therapeutic ideals, such as individualized treatment of offenders, 
indeterminate sentences and a decision maker’s broad discretion to make adjudication 
and sentencing decisions, much like that of modern problem-solving courts (Gardner, 
2003).
Until the late 1960s, the juvenile court system had insulated itself from an 
analysis of legitimacy and arbitrariness because of the widely accepted discretion deemed 
necessary to provide care in the best interest of the child (Casey, 2004). However, in 
1967, the landmark Supreme Court decision, In re Gault, changed the landscape of 
procedural due process protections for children in the juvenile court system. On June 8, 
1964, an Arizona sheriff took then fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault into custody for making 
lewd phone calls to a neighbor, a charge he denied. The court ultimately sentenced him, 
without witnesses or record of the hearing, to confinement at the state industrial school 
until he reached the age of 21—a near six-year sentence. Ironically, had the court tried 
Gault as an adult, and thus provided him with the procedural protections of the criminal 
court system, he would have received a maximum punishment of two months 
imprisonment and a $50 fine. In an eight to one decision, the United States Supreme 
Court found that Gault’s commitment to the state industrial school violated his 14th 
Amendment’s requirement of due process. Specifically, the Supreme Court ruled that 
juveniles must be afforded most of the same due process protections provided to adults, 
including the right to confront witnesses, the right to counsel, timely notification of 
charges, and the right against self-incrimination (In re Gault, 1967). 
Since Gault, more than 3,000 modern problem-solving courts have grown out of 
the therapeutic jurisprudence movement (Porter et al., 2010). In response, the United 
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States Department of Justice promulgated explicit guidelines for these court systems, but 
left untouched the question of how to balance client rehabilitation, public safety, and 
protection of clients’ due process rights in a non-adversarial system (NADCP, 1997). The 
United States Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to review the level of due process 
that the law owes to defendants in problem-solving courts, as it did for juvenile court 
systems in In re Gault in 1967. As a result, the existing case law comes from state courts 
of appeal.  
The following section examines the current legal landscape regarding problem-
solving court clients’ due process rights—specifically as it applies to two potential losses 
of liberty: termination from a problem-solving court program and the use of incarceration 
as a sanction for noncompliance. These two areas are central to the functioning of 
problem-solving courts for several important reasons. First, problem-solving courts are a 
relatively new phenomenon and as such, the existing due process case law is limited in 
both breadth and depth. However, the case law regarding termination and sanctioning 
practices provides an effective point of comparison to both the juvenile court (In re 
Gault, 1970) and traditional criminal court systems’ analysis of procedural due process. 
Although this paper’s focus on termination and sanction proceedings is somewhat narrow 
in scope, there is room for additional empirical research examining equally important 
sources of liberty interest violations, including equal protection, First Amendment issues, 
and judicial impartiality (Meyer, 2009).  
Due Process in Modern Problem-Solving Courts 
Due process in termination proceedings. Problem-solving courts function as an 
alternative to traditional criminal courts. If a defendant voluntarily chooses to participate 
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in a drug or mental health court, he generally signs an agreement to follow the court’s 
mandated treatment plan. If the participant fails to comply with that plan, the court can 
terminate the client’s participation and remand the case back to criminal court. Once in 
the criminal court system, the offender faces the full panoply of punishments that a 
traditional court may impose. Problem-solving court judges and program staff practice 
wide discretion to determine when, and whether to terminate an offender’s time in the 
problem-solving court.  
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution requires due process protections when there is a chance that a person will 
potentially suffer a loss to a recognized liberty interest (Chemirinsky, 2006).  The State of 
Idaho v. Rogers (2007) provides one of the most thorough termination procedural due 
process analyses. Rogers successfully argued that the local drug court program 
terminated his participation without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. On February 24, 2003, the court charged Rogers with possession of 
methamphetamine and driving without privileges. He entered a plea that required him to 
successfully complete the local county drug court program. If Rogers successfully 
graduated, the state agreed to dismiss the case and drop the charges against him. In 
accordance with the plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine 
and entered drug court on February 11, 2004. Rogers had some success in the program 
and the judge praised him for these successes. However, in June of 2004, the court staff 
accused him of soliciting fellow drug court participants to enter into an “adult 
entertainment business,” a violation of the program requirements (State of Idaho v. 
Rogers, 2007, p. 739). The judge terminated his participation from the drug court 
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program during an informal closed-door “discussion” with the treatment team. This 
discussion did not include Rogers, nor did Rogers have an opportunity to provide a 
statement or evidence on his behalf. 
 The Rogers (2007) case raises two separate, but related issues. The first is 
whether a defendant who pleads guilty in return for admission to a drug court system is 
entitled to due process of law when he or she faces termination from a drug court. The 
second issue is if the court finds that there are due process requirements that must be met 
before a drug court can terminate a client’s participation from the program, what are 
those requirements?  
 To address the first question, the court performed an analysis of whether a 
program participant in Roger’s position has a protected liberty interest under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that Rogers pleaded guilty to the drug 
possession charge as a stipulation of drug court participation. Then, the court likened 
those who have pleaded guilty to an offense and who participate in a “diversionary” 
program such as drug court, to those on probation or parole. The court relied heavily on 
United States Supreme Court case law that recognized the liberty interests of parolees 
(Morrissey v. Brewer, 1972) and those on probation (Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 1973).   The 
Morrissey (1972), opinion held that a court deprives a defendant of due process when it 
revokes the defendant’s parole without a hearing. However, they also articulated that 
although a parolee may not be physically incarcerated and thus subject to the severely 
limited due process rights of incarcerated defendants, a person on parole is still “in 
custody” and “is not entitled to a full adversary hearing such as would be mandated in a 
criminal proceeding” (p. 471).  Due process, as it applies to parolees, requires at least 
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prior notice of a potential revocation, as well as a revocation hearing. This hearing must 
include at least the minimum requirements of due process:  
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee 
of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present 
witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses; (e) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (f) a written 
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking 
parole. (p. 489) 
One year later, the Court addressed due process protections for those on probation and 
found that similar to those on parole, those on probation also have a recognized liberty 
interest and the same minimum due process protections apply (Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
1973).  
Returning to the original issues in State of Idaho v. Rogers (2007), that court held 
that because Rogers participated in a post-plea diversionary program (drug court), he too 
enjoyed a “cognizable liberty interest,” (p. 742) and was entitled to at least minimum due 
process of law at the time of termination from the drug court program. Specifically, at the 
time of his participation, he was living in society, free to move about as he pleased within 
the confines of the drug court’s requirements. After his termination, the court 
incarcerated him, which ended his recognized liberty interest to freely move about 
society as he pleased. After the court terminated his drug court participation, the drug 
court judge criminally sentenced him and a felony conviction appeared on his record. 
Therefore, the court held that Rogers had a liberty interest to remain in the drug court 
program (State of Idaho v. Rogers, 2007).  In regard to the second issue in the case, the 
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Idaho court found that since a drug court participant’s liberty interest is similar to that of 
a person on probation or parole, Rogers should also have benefited from the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973). 
Specifically, the state should have entitled Rogers, at minimum, the same procedural due 
process requirements afforded to those on probation or parole.  
A number of additional cases address when, and how many procedural due 
process protections a court must afford to a defendant if it seeks to terminate participation 
in the program. In each case, the courts relied heavily on the Supreme Court findings in 
Morrissey (1972) and Gagnon (1973). For example, courts must afford minimum due 
process when termination resulted from no written notice (Gosha v. State of Indiana, 
2010; Hagar v. Oklahoma, 1999), no opportunity for a hearing or to present evidence 
(State of Washington v. Cassill-Skilton, 2004), no opportunity to participate in a hearing 
(though one took place), (Harris v. Commonwealth, 2010), no opportunity to cross-
examine adverse witnesses (State of Nebraska v. Shambley, 2011), and inadequate 
counsel (Hunt v. Kentucky, 2010). In each case, clients faced certain liberty interest 
restrictions, however, they were not imprisoned and like parolees or probationers, could 
freely participate in a wide variety of social privileges including gainful employment, 
human attachments, the opportunity to spend time with family, and the opportunity to 
live at home (State of Nebraska v. Shambley, 2011). Termination of program 
participation ultimately revokes these recognized liberty interests, thus, existing case law 
suggests that a court must afford the client at least minimal due process protections as 
recognized in Morrissey (1972) and Gagnon (1973). Of course, the availability of these 
due process rights varies across jurisdictions and will continue to do so unless the 
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Supreme Court takes up the issue of drug court due process obligations as it did for due 
process in juvenile courts (In re Gault, 1970). 
Occasionally, a diversionary court such as a drug or mental health court requires 
participants to sign a waiver of due process rights as a stipulation to participate in the 
program. In each of the cases above, the problem-solving court client did not sign (or 
there was no mention of) a contract that waived due process rights. In the case where a 
problem-solving court client does sign such a contract, at least one court has found that 
minimal due process protections still apply. Specifically, in People v. Kimmel (2009), the 
court found that a client may make an unsworn statement and the court would consider 
any arguments of counsel on behalf of the client, in lieu of a full termination hearing. 
This analysis suggests that while clients may waive their rights to some due process 
protections, in the case where a recognized liberty interest is at stake, at least one court 
found it jurisprudentially appropriate to apply at least minimal due process.  
A distinction between pre-plea and post-plea programs. The major distinction 
between the above and other termination cases is the point during the adjudicative 
process when the drug or mental health court clients voluntarily accepted participation 
into the program. Specifically, when a court requires a plea prior to program 
participation, as in Rogers (2007), case law suggests that the same protections apply as in 
other situations where a defendant has already pleaded guilty (e.g., probation and parole) 
(see also Hagar v. State of Oklahoma, 1999; Hopper v. State, 1989; People v. Bishop, 
1999; Simmons v. State, 2001; State of Ohio v. Stafford, 2001). However, some courts 
have gone so far as to conclude that participants who enter a diversionary program, such 
as drug court, pre-plea are also entitled to the same due process protections as those on 
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probation or parole (State of Washington v. Cassill-Skilton, 2004). For example, an 
Illinois court found that the state wrongfully denied a client a hearing prior to dismissing 
him from the local drug-court program, even though the program did not require the 
defendant to enter a plea prior to participation (State of Illinois v. Anderson, 2005). The 
court held that the distinction between whether the drug-court program took place before 
or after an admittance of guilt was of, “no consequence and is not outweighed by the 
similarities” (p. 1113).  
On the other hand, other jurisdictions have held that due process does not apply 
when a defendant participates in a program pre-plea. For example, the court in Batista v. 
State of Florida (2007) rejected the defendant’s claim that the court denied him an 
evidentiary hearing prior to termination from the drug court program. The court asserted 
that even though there is no record as to why the court terminated Batista’s participation 
in the program, there is, “no basis . . . to require that each time the state elects to 
terminate [pre-trial intervention] . . . the state has the burden to prove . . .that its reasons 
for electing to terminate [pre-trial intervention] . . . are valid” (Batista v. State of Florida, 
2007, p. 1011). In other words, although the pre-trial intervention program required that 
the defendant admit guilt, this admission was not an “official plea” in the case. The client 
would not enter an official plea until he successfully or unsuccessfully completed the 
program. As such, Batista adds to the ambiguous case law of required due process rights 
for clients who participate in pre-trial intervention programs prior to entering an official 
plea for the original charges.  
In summary, some state and local courts of appeal support the proposition that 
should they choose to terminate a client’s participation from a problem-solving court, 
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they ought to afford participants at least some level of due process protections. This 
author believes that the protections that courts afford to parolees or those on probation, as 
recognized in Morrissey (1972) and Gagnon (1973), should serve as a model for 
problem-solving courts. Additionally, the distinction between whether a defendant enters 
a plea prior to or after participation in the program is an important one. In the case where 
a defendant enters a plea prior to participation, the court should award due process if they 
seek to terminate the client’s involvement in the program. However, the case law is 
exceptionally unclear in the situation where a defendant does not first enter a plea. 
Due process in sanction proceedings. A court may also deprive a client of a 
recognized liberty interest, defined under the 14th Amendment, when he or she faces a 
sanction for noncompliance in a problem-solving court. Offenders have an incentive to 
voluntarily participate in drug and mental health courts because these courts will often 
agree to drop the defendant’s original charges upon successful completion of the court 
ordered treatment program. However, court administrators and treatment specialists 
acknowledge that clients often face a bumpy path towards a successful program outcome 
and many clients will “stumble” along the way. In most cases, courts address these 
“stumbles” with a variety of graduated penalties, including but not limited to more 
frequent contact with the court, increased drug testing, home visits by a social worker, 
and even periods of brief incarceration (Boldt, 1998). Many believe that a court’s 
imposition of increasingly severe sanctions is central to a client’s successful treatment in 
problem-solving courts (Bozza, 2007; Griffin, Steadman, & Petrila, 2002; Harrell & 
Roman, 2001). Regardless of the effectiveness of incarceration as a therapeutic tool, the 
current paper is primarily concerned with a court’s use of incarceration as a sanction for 
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noncompliance. Specifically, the paper asks whether incarceration results in a loss of a 
recognized liberty interest and whether procedural protections are, or should be due when 
a court sanctions a client to jail time.   
 Fewer courts have considered the issue of due process in sanction proceedings 
than have considered similar issues in termination cases. Further, the matter of due 
process in sanction proceedings is often secondary to a larger due process claim, thus 
much of the available opinion is in the form of judicial dicta. State of Tennessee v. 
Stewart (2010) provides one of the more troubling examples of incarceration as a 
sanction. Stewart, as cited at the beginning of this paper, claimed the court violated his 
due process rights when the same judge presided over his drug court treatment and his 
probation revocation hearing. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new hearing 
in front of a different judge, but a substantial portion of the judge’s opinion focused on 
the five or six occasions where the drug court sanctioned Stewart to “significant jail time” 
(State of Tennessee v. Stewart, 2010, p. 15). During Stewart’s two-year participation in 
the drug court program, the court sanctioned him to a net total of approximately six 
months of jail time, with sixty-days as the longest single incarceration. Further, when the 
court terminated Stewart from the drug court program, the judge sentenced him to his 
original six-year sentence and Stewart did not receive credit for the six months of time 
served for violating program requirements. The appeals judge noted significant 
discrepancy between this case outcome and the general parameters under which drug 
courts should function. He noted that this defendant’s offenses (repeated noncompliance, 
missed meetings, and positive drug urine tests) were not outside of the types of behaviors 
that clients will struggle with in drug court. Specifically, he found it, “difficult to imagine 
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that the Drug Courts Standards committee envisioned that significant amounts of jail time 
would be added to the sentences of program participants as sanctions for behavior that the 
Committee expressly contemplated would be engaged in by “many” of those same 
participants” (p. 16). 
 The court in Stewart (2010) also noted that the record does not suggest whether 
the drug court team attempted a process of measured, graduated sanctions, such as 
admonishment from the bench and increased testing and monitoring, without success 
prior to substantial incarceration. The appellate judge directed drug courts to impose only 
appropriate responses for continued drug and alcohol abuse, and these courts should 
consider a full array of positive and negative reinforcement steps that utilize a 
“continuum of responses” (p. 16) to noncompliant behavior. Further, the appellate court 
judge suggested that in the case of a repeatedly noncompliant client, the drug court 
should return the offender immediately to the traditional court system, because the 
current practice of jail time as incarceration is too similar to the traditional criminal 
justice system practice as it currently stands. Although Stewart was unable to comply 
with the drug court’s requirements and was subsequently subjected to lengthy 
incarceration, he ironically credited the Tennessee drug court program with saving his 
life. This is a particularly surprising statement from a procedural protection standpoint, as 
the court ostensibly did not allow Stewart any of the traditional due process protections 
when the judge violated his liberty interest and sentenced him to substantial jail time. 
This case poses the curious question of whether sanction proceedings should necessitate 
minimal due process protections, especially if court clients seemingly do not have a 
negative view of the process taken as a whole—and in some cases, have a positive view. 
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In other words, while an outside observer may view a sanction of jail time without due 
process quite negatively, a person more familiar with problem-solving court systems, and 
even a client, may in fact, not take offense with decreased procedural due process 
protections. 
 In direct juxtaposition to Stewart (2010), in the previously cited case, State of 
Idaho v. Rogers (2007), the appellate court found that while drug courts must afford 
clients minimum due process at a termination hearing, the same due process is not 
necessary or required at the time of a sanction imposition. Specifically, the court in 
Rogers (2007) held that required due process protections at a sanction hearing run 
counter to the informal nature of problem-solving courts, although both termination and 
sanction may result in the same outcome—jail time. This is particularly problematic in 
cases where clients will potentially suffer a loss to a recognized liberty interest as defined 
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. When the 
court terminated Rogers from the program, it incarcerated him, ending his liberty to move 
about freely. As such, the judge should have afforded him at least minimum due process 
of the law. Similarly, when a drug or mental health court sanctions a client to 
incarceration, for any number of days, the defendant loses his liberty to move about 
freely in precisely the same manner. This author argues that the distinction between the 
liberty lost through termination (incarceration) or through a sanction proceeding 
(incarceration) is of little consequence. Therefore, courts should afford their clients 
minimal due process at sanctioning proceedings when a recognized liberty interest is at 
stake, that is, if there is a potential for incarceration.  The National Association of Drug 
Court Professionals (1997) agrees. They assert that if a drug court participant claims not 
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to have engaged in the conduct that is subject to incarceration—that is, he or she denies 
the noncompliant behavior—best practice dictates that the court should provide for a 
hearing in accordance with the due process protections awarded to those under probation 
or parole (see Morrissey v. Brewer, 1972 & Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 1973).  
 Incarceration as a sanction: Drug vs. mental health courts. A number of authors 
draw a distinction between the use of incarceration as a sanction in drug courts versus 
mental health courts (Redlich, Steadman, Monahan, Robbins, & Petrila, 2006). While the 
use of incarceration as a sanction for noncompliance in drug courts is fairly routine, (see 
National Drug Court Institute, 2000), the more contentious issue is a court’s use of 
incarceration-as-sanction in mental health courts (Redlich et al., 2006). This author is not 
aware of any existing case law regarding incarceration as a sanction for mental health 
courts, however a number of psycholegal scholars have considered its potential to be in 
contradiction to the therapeutic aims of mental health courts. Some argue that a full 
reliance on a drug court model, which utilizes brief incarceration periods for 
noncompliance, is counter to a therapeutic jurisprudence model and essentially punishes 
people for their mental illness (Odegaard, 2007; Redlich et al., 2006). Furthermore, as 
Redlich et al. (2006) and others point out, the use of incarceration in mental health courts 
creates additional concerns, such as whether it is morally or legally just to sanction a 
person to jail time because of behavior that results from mental illness.  
 Although some believe that mental health courts use incarceration less frequently 
than drug courts, a 2006 survey of adult mental health courts in the United States (n = 
90), found that most (92%) report a willingness to use incarceration as a sanction for 
noncompliance, at least on some occasions (Redlich et al., 2006). At least one program 
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reported using jail as a sanction frequently, while at least six others reported using it 
“rarely,” though each program admitted they did not keep specific records about the 
number of times the court imposed these sanctions. In summary, while the actual number 
of mental health courts that utilize incarceration as a potential sanction for 
noncompliance is unclear, the majority of these courts state that they are at least willing 
to utilize it as part of their treatment plan.  
The questions arise, “Is jail time an effective therapeutic or behavior modifying 
tool and should problem-solving courts use it as such?”  If empirical research can 
demonstrate that jail time is an effective behavior change tool, then its use may not be in 
opposition to therapeutic jurisprudence because the ultimate impact of jail time could be 
to improve the well-being of the offender. However, if there is little evidence that jail 
time is an efficacious intervention, then even drug court personnel will have a difficult 
time defending it based upon the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence that underlie the 
rationale of these courts.  Under a T.J. model, legal intervention should bring about 
improvements in the psychological well-being of participants in the legal system.  While 
the evaluation of the effectiveness of jail time assigned in problem-solving courts is 
beyond the scope of the current review, it remains an important issue in the analysis of 
how much due process the law owes to problem-solving court participants.  
Any analysis of procedural due process in courts must balance the benefits of 
therapeutic jurisprudence (i.e. treatment and problem-solving) against the adversarial 
protections of the criminal justice system. In order to understand this perceived tradeoff, 
we must take into consideration the perspective of the perceiver. For example, in Stewart 
(2010), while the appellate judge expressed serious concern with the lengthy jail time the 
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drug court imposed on Stewart as part of the treatment process, Stewart himself 
ultimately had a positive opinion about his experience in the program. In order to 
understand how people experience the outcome of due process (or the lack of due 
process) in problem-solving courts, we need to take into consideration the perspective of 
the judge who evaluates the adequacy of due process protections. It may be that a client 
who experiences the sanction may not view it as negatively as outside observers view it 
and thus, the offender may be more likely to comply with program requirements because 
of the threatened sanction.  
The following section reviews the literature on affective forecasting and examines 
more generally how the self-other effect may in part, explain how a defendant like Brent 
Stewart might credit a two-year program, wrought with due process violations and 
lengthy jail terms, with ultimately saving his life. Specifically, the following section 
briefly reviews the affective forecasting literature, identifies a number of self-other 
effects in affective forecasting, and evaluates Igou’s (2008) novel asymmetric immune 
knowledge hypothesis as one explanation for the discordant sentiments between problem-
solving court clients’ positive evaluations of their experiences and psycholegal scholars’ 
concerns about the due process practices in these court systems. 
Affective Forecasting 
 People make countless decisions each day: to walk the dog or write a dissertation, 
to drive to Starbucks for a pumpkin spice latte or make coffee at home. Each potential 
choice requires a certain amount of utilitarian decision-making: Does the dog need 
exercise more than I need sleep? Do I have the money to purchase an expensive 
beverage? However, in addition to these utilitarian-type considerations, people want to 
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know whether the decision will make them happy and increase their well-being. Will a 
brisk dog walk make the rest of the day seem less glum? Have I been holding out for a 
latte for just the right occasion? Over the last twenty years, the theory of affective 
forecasting has sought to explain this phenomenon. It addresses why, and under what 
circumstances people over predict the emotional impact of a future event, and how those 
predictions influence decision-making behaviors (Baron, 1992; Baumeister, Vohs, 
DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Georges & Wiener, 2013; Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & 
Wheatley, 1998; Hsee & Hastie, 2006; Igou, 2004; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993; 
Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; 2005; Zeelenberg, 1999; 
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000).  
 Researchers have documented the affective forecasting phenomenon in a wide 
variety of settings including employees’ happiness with a location transfer (Gilbert, 
Brown, Pinel, & Wilson, 2000), clothing purchases (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002), the 
emotional impact of a physical or emotional trauma (Gilbert, Lieberman, Morewedge, & 
Wilson, 2004), and even jury decision-making (Georges & Wiener, 2013; Wiener, 
Georges, & Cangas, in press). These findings illustrate that people can generally predict 
the valence of an anticipated event—a trip to a beach in Mexico will be a positive, 
enjoyable affair and a root canal will be an unpleasant experience. However, people less 
accurately predict how long and how intensely each of these imagined positive and 
negative events would influence their experience (Gilbert et al., 1998; Gilbert et al., 
2004; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; 2005). Affective forecasting errors refer to two general 
inaccuracies that people demonstrate when anticipating the emotional consequences of an 
event. The tendency to over predict the strength or intensity of a forecasted emotion is 
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known as the impact (i.e., intensity) bias and the tendency to overestimate the duration of 
an anticipated emotion is known as the durability bias (Gilbert, Driver-Linn, & Wilson, 
2002). 
 The impact bias. The most common and pervasive finding in affective 
forecasting is the impact bias, or people’s tendency to over predict the peak level of 
intensity of a forecasted event (Hsee & Hastie, 2006; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). 
Researchers have demonstrated this tendency to overestimate the emotional impact of 
future events in a wide variety of populations (e.g., college students, medical patients, 
sports fans, dieters, professors, prospective employees) with a wide variety of potentially 
emotionally provoking events (e.g., relationship problems, medical testing, eating 
behaviors, tenure and hiring decisions). Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom 
(2000) studied the impact (and durability) bias in a study of football fans from two rival 
Virginia universities. Two months prior to a 1995 football game between the two schools, 
participants predicted what their overall level of happiness would be after they viewed 
the important game. Specifically, participants answered, on a 9-point Likert type scale, 
“How happy would you say you are these days?” and predicted how happy they would be 
after the football game if their team lost and if their team won (p. 823). On the day after 
the game, the participants again reported their actual overall level of happiness. The 
researchers found, over the course of five studies, that fans consistently overestimated 
how happy they would feel the day after their team won, demonstrating an impact bias 
(Wilson et al., 2000).  
 Gilbert et al. (1998) also found an intensity bias in their study of college students’ 
romantic relationships. Introductory psychology students completed a brief happiness 
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measure on the first day of fall classes at a large Texas University. Specifically the 
experimenters asked participants whether they had ever experienced the dissolution of a 
close romantic relationship and how long ago the breakup occurred. The students who 
answered ‘yes’ to this question were labeled as “leftovers,” an unfortunate term to be 
sure. Students who answered ‘no’ to this question were labeled “luckies.” All students 
answered the question, “In general how happy would you say you are these days?” on a 
7-point Likert type scale (p. 621). The “luckies” also predicted how happy they would 
feel two months after such a breakup. The researchers found that the “luckies” 
consistently under predicted how unhappy they would be two months after an imagined 
breakup, compared to the “leftovers” measured happiness after they had actually 
experienced a breakup. They found this intensity bias regardless of whether the “luckies” 
were or were not currently involved in a romantic relationship (Gilbert et al., 1998).   
 Gilbert et al. (1998) recognized that the romantic relationship study did not fully 
explain the impact bias, as the “leftovers” and the “luckies” may have self-selected, at 
some level, their relationship situation. Thus, they conducted a single sample, 
longitudinal experiment to study the intensity bias with a phenomenon the participants 
could not control or predict. Researchers approached 57 people who had just voted in the 
1994 gubernatorial election. Each participant completed a ten-item survey and reported, 
on a 7-point Likert type scale how happy they generally were, and how happy they would 
be if their candidate won and if their candidate lost. Approximately one month after the 
election, researchers successfully contacted 25 of the voters and asked them to report 
their general level of happiness. They found that voters did not believe that a win would 
influence their happiness, but believed a loss would decrease their general happiness. In 
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fact, voters did accurately predict how happy they would be if their candidate had won. 
However, after the election voters reported significantly greater happiness than they had 
anticipated if their candidate had lost. This example illustrates an intensity bias for those 
whose candidate lost the election. In other words, voters were significantly less 
disappointed in the loss than they had anticipated they would be. 
  Research shows that people experience an intensity bias for feelings of general 
happiness and well-being, but researchers have also found this effect for specific negative 
emotions, such as regret for a number of behaviors, including jury decision-making 
(Georges & Wiener, 2013), lottery play (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004), casual sexual 
behavior (Richard, de Vries, & van der Plight, 1998), and eating behaviors (Richard, Van 
der Plight, & de Vries, 1996). For example, Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, & Wilson (2004) 
investigated the role of anticipated regret using a game show paradigm. Sixty-four 
participants arranged items in two separate sets in order of price. After arranging the 
items, they chose which set they thought they had arranged correctly. One half learned 
that only the unchosen set was correctly ordered (narrow margin of loss), and the other 
half learned that both the unchosen and chosen sets were incorrectly ordered (wide 
margin of loss).  In a forecasting condition, participants predicted how much regret they 
would feel under these conditions, while those in an experiencing condition actually 
reported how much regret they felt after they made their choices. Gilbert and colleagues 
hypothesized that participants would expect the margin of loss (wide vs. narrow) to 
influence their experiences of regret. They in fact did find support for their hypothesis 
that the size of the margin of loss influenced participants’ forecasted regret, but not 
experienced regret. In other words, participants overestimated how much regret they 
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thought they would feel after not winning a valued prize. They replicated these findings 
in a real-world scenario by stopping people who were late to catch a train and told them 
they missed it by either a small or a large margin. Riders expected more regret when they 
missed the train by a small margin but others who actually did miss the train by a small 
margin experienced no more regret than those who missed the train by a wide margin 
(Gilbert et al., 2004).  Together, these studies illustrate that in general, people 
inaccurately forecast the intensity or impact of a future emotional state. This phenomenon 
is particularly pronounced for negative valence emotions such as unhappiness or regret.  
 The durability bias. The durability bias is the tendency to over predict the length 
of a forecasted emotional experience (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). The durability bias is 
important because, “people typically wish for and work toward events that they believe 
will cause lasting happiness, not just a moment’s pleasure” (Wilson et al., 2000, pp. 821-
822). Researchers have shown that people experience a durability bias with common 
events such as receiving an ‘A’ in a college course, or the dissolution of a romantic 
relationship (Suh, Diener, & Fujita, 1996), as well as for more atypical events, such as 
winning the lottery (Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bullman, 1978), the loss of a loved one 
(Silver & Wortman, 1980; Wortman & Silver, 1989), and cancer patients’ coping 
behaviors (Collins, Taylor, & Skokan, 1990). In the previously cited study by Wilson et 
al. (2000), the researchers also studied the influence of the durability bias on the affective 
predictions of football fans. Utilizing the same methodology, the researchers also asked 
the Virginia football fans to predict how long they would feel happy after their team won 
(measured in days). The fans again, consistently over predicted the length of time (by 
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approximately three days) they would feel increased happiness after the win, 
demonstrating a durability bias (Wilson et al., 2000).  
Gilbert and colleagues (1998), in the previously cited series of studies, also 
investigated the durability bias for college professors’ tenure decision outcomes. The 
researchers recruited a sample of former assistant professors who had achieved or failed 
to achieve tenure, and current assistant professors at a Texas University. Participants 
reported, on a 7-point Likert type scale how happy they generally were. Experiencers 
(those who achieved or who had not achieved tenure) also completed a thirteen-item 
measure that assessed their general satisfaction with life. The forecasters (current 
assistant professors) completed the same thirteen-item scale and then estimated how 
happy they would be at several points during the ten years following a positive tenure 
decision, as well as a negative tenure decision. The researchers found evidence for both 
the durability bias as well as the intensity bias. Specifically, the forecasters predicted that 
they would feel happier during the first five years after achieving tenure than if they had 
not achieved tenure. However, professors who had received tenure were no happier than 
those who had not received tenure in the first five years after the tenure decision, or 
during the following five years. In other words, current assistant professors predicted 
greater happiness in the ten years that follow a positive tenure decision, than professors 
who had achieved tenure actually experienced. Interestingly, former assistant professors 
who had achieved tenure were no happier than former assistant professors who did not 
achieve tenure. 
Georges and Wiener (unpublished paper) recently studied jurors’ anticipated 
feelings of regret about making a verdict mistake in a sexual assault case and found 
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evidence for both the intensity bias as well as the durability bias. Two months prior to an 
in-lab portion of the study, mock jurors completed a pre-trial measure about how much 
regret they would feel if they convicted an innocent person or failed to convict a guilty 
offender during a trial. During the in-lab portion of the study, researchers showed mock 
jurors a reenacted sexual assault trial and participants provided a verdict in the case. 
Then, the researchers presented evidence that the participants may have mistakenly found 
the defendant guilty when he was innocent, or vice versa. Participants then immediately 
reported how much regret they felt about their verdict decision. The researchers 
discovered that participants consistently over predicted how much regret they would feel 
if they made a verdict mistake in the case, providing evidence for an intensity bias. 
Participants also completed the same experienced regret measure two days, and again ten 
days after the in-lab portion of the study. Mock jurors’ levels of experienced regret 
significantly decreased across the ten days following the verdict choice, providing 
evidence for a durability bias. In other words, mock jurors consistently over predicted 
how much regret they would feel if they made a verdict mistake in a sexual assault case, 
and the small amount of regret they did experience decreased significantly over the ten 
days following the verdict. Furthermore, the level of anticipated regret that participants 
expected to feel predicted their verdicts in the case. This study was one of the first to 
study emotion applied to legal decision-making and the very first to apply an affective 
forecasting framework to a juror decision-making paradigm (Georges & Wiener, 
unpublished paper). 
 Although people consistently over predict the duration of common and 
uncommon events, research reveals that these events influence a person’s general well-
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being only for “little more than a few months” (Gilbert et al., 1998, p. 618). For example, 
Suh et al. (1996) conducted a longitudinal study of college students’ well-being and 
found that typical positive and negative events did not significantly influence students’ 
well-being for as long as some might suspect. The researchers followed 115 participants 
across a two-year longitudinal study and participants completed a checklist of a variety of 
positive events (e.g., marriage, acquired a car, improved financial status, made a new 
close friend) and negative events (e.g., divorce, surgery, lost a job, serious illness or 
accident) that they experienced during that time. They also completed a 24-item affect 
measure from which the experimenters calculated positive and a negative affect scales. 
The participants completed these measures at two separate time points during the two-
year period. The researchers found that although the exact duration varied across 
individuals, the study’s list of life events impacted participants’ general positive and 
negative affect for less than six months, and in most cases less than three months (Suh et 
al., 1996). 
 The finding by Suh and colleagues (1996) is particularly relevant to the durability 
bias literature because it provides evidence that a person’s most positive and most 
negative experiences do not significantly impact experienced affect beyond a relatively 
short period of time. In other words, although a person’s emotions ebb and flow, these 
fluctuations equalize much more quickly than people expect. The following section 
reviews two potential sources of the impact and durability biases in affective forecasting.  
Sources of the impact and durability biases. Affective forecasting researchers 
provide a number of explanations for the impact and durability biases and especially in 
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the instance where one would suspect an enduring emotional outcome, such as an 
atypical or tragic event.   
Focalism. One potential explanation is focalism, or the tendency to overestimate 
how much we will think about the impact of a central event (e.g., a football game win), 
and underestimate the influence of other, unrelated experiences (e.g., doing the laundry 
and washing dishes) that will invariably influence our thoughts and feelings (Wilson & 
Gilbert, 2005; Wilson et al., 2000). “Life goes on, and non-focal events do happen and do 
have affective consequences” (Gilbert et al., 1998, p. 619). For example, a person may 
over predict the negative consequences of an upcoming surgical procedure (focal event) 
because they fail to consider less-focal events that will ultimately influence their thoughts 
and feelings, such as increased social support, time off of work, and positive medical 
benefits of the procedure. In other words, people overestimate the duration of their 
emotional response to a focal event because they fail to consider peripheral, non-focal 
events that transpire at the same time or subsequently to the focal event. 
In their college football game study, Wilson et al. (2000) also tested focalism as a 
source of the impact and durability biases. Half of the participants estimated how they 
would spend their time during a specific day later in the semester. These participants 
estimated how many hours they would spend on a variety of activities (e.g., eating meals, 
studying, spending time with friends, etc.). The other half of the participants made no 
such predictions. All participants then predicted how good they would feel after a win, 
and how bad they would feel after a loss. Consistent with the concept of focalism, 
participants who spent time thinking about how they would spend a typical day predicted 
that the outcome of the game would impact their happiness significantly less than people 
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who did not make such predictions (Wilson et al., 2000). In other words, encouraging 
people to consider future, non-focal events, led to more moderate affective forecasts 
subsequent to the focal event (how the participant would feel after his team won or lost 
the game). 
In a related study, Schkade and Kahneman (1998) investigated the focusing 
illusion, a precursor of Wilson et al.’s (2000) theory of focalism. The focusing illusion 
occurs when a “judgment about an entire object or category is made with attention 
focused on a subset of that category” (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998, p. 340). In this case, 
the focal object outweighs the peripheral, or unattended subset of information or objects. 
The researchers asked students from the Midwest and Southern California about their 
overall satisfaction with life, rated on an 11-point Likert type scale, as well as a number 
of specific wellness focused questions. Half of the students answered these questions for 
themselves (self-focused), while the second half answered the questions for a “student 
with your values and interests” at another University (either the Midwest or Southern 
California University). The researchers found that participants in both regions reported 
equal overall life satisfaction. However, students in both regions predicted that a student 
like them would experience greater satisfaction in Southern California than in the 
Midwest. Through a series of mediation analyses, the researchers determined that this 
second effect was driven, in part, by a positive focus on salient differences (focusing 
illusion), specifically the climate-related differences between the two regions (Schkade & 
Kahneman, 1998). In other words, when a person answers a question about his or her 
own general life satisfaction, the evaluator focuses on central and non-central aspects. 
However, when a person considers general life satisfaction for another person, attention 
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focuses on more central, less holistic factors (such as the weather in California) (Schkade 
& Kahneman, 1998).  
Immune neglect. Another source of both the durability and intensity biases in 
affective forecasting for negative events is immune neglect. Immune neglect refers to 
people’s failure to anticipate how much their psychological immune systems will protect 
them and accelerate their recovery in the case of a negative emotional event (Gilbert et 
al., 1998). In other words, people generally do not realize how well their psychological 
immune system will help them overcome an upsetting experience. This psychological 
immune system protects us from incapacitating negativity through a variety of defense 
mechanisms, including coping strategies, dissonance reduction, self-serving biases, and 
self-deception. For example, in the unfortunate event that I should unexpectedly lose my 
beloved dog, Bigs, I would fail to anticipate how effectively my psychological immune 
system would rationalize and minimize the negative affective influence of this event on 
my well-being. I would cope with this loss by persuasively convincing myself that he 
lived a long, fulfilling life and that he is now certainly “in a much better place.” These 
rationalizations exhibit the psychological immune system at work. However, Gilbert et al. 
(1998) suggest that people are actually not aware of the influence of their psychological 
immune system. Further, this phenomenon works most effectively through private, 
internal rationalizations. “The mental machinery that transform adversity into prosperity 
must work quietly if it is to work at all, and successful rationalization typically requires 
that rationalizers not regard themselves as such” (Gilbert et al., 1998, p. 619). In other 
words, the self copes with and rationalizes negative events without conscious awareness 
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of the psychological immune system as it quietly works to lessen the negative influence 
of the event.  
A study by Gilbert et al. (1998) illustrated how easily people use their 
psychological immune systems to rationalize negative feedback. Early in the semester, 
college-age participants completed a personality measure as part of a mass screening 
session. All participants then read that based on their scores, they had been categorized as 
either mundane, good, or extraordinary but they did not know their category. The 
researchers included descriptions of each personality type so participants could 
familiarize themselves with each. Based on the description, the ‘mundane’ personality 
type was least appealing, while the ‘extraordinary’ type was most appealing. Researchers 
then assigned participants to either a forecaster condition or an experiencer condition. 
After reading the descriptions, the researchers told the forecasters that either a computer 
(fallible source) or a pair of trained clinical psychologists (infallible source) evaluated 
their responses to the personality measure. The participants then predicted whether they 
would be classified as mundane, good or extraordinary, and how they would feel five 
minutes after they learned of their classification. The experiencers, however, all learned 
that they had been classified as mundane by either a computer (fallible source) or a pair 
of trained clinicians (infallible source). Please note that the mundane classification was 
consistent across all experiencers and was not based on their completed personality 
inventory. After five minutes, the experiencers also reported how they felt after being 
classified as mundane. The results showed that the forecasters who did not anticipate 
negative personality feedback (classified as mundane) predicted they would feel equally 
bad whether they received that feedback from the computer or trained clinicians. 
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However, experiencers who learned a computer classified them as mundane felt less bad 
several minutes after receiving feedback, than did those who learned that trained 
clinicians classified them as mundane. In other words, participants more easily 
rationalized the negative feedback from the potentially fallible computer than from 
trained, infallible experts. This study demonstrates that we quickly and easily rationalize 
unfavorable feedback, but we underestimate how easily our psychological immune 
systems will help us do so (Gilbert et al., 1998). 
Gilbert et al. (1998) and others have argued that people fall prey to affective 
forecasting errors because they are not aware of how readily their coping mechanisms 
kick in to deal with negative events. A study by Hoerger, Quirk, Lucas, and Carr (2009) 
addressed this theory and found immune neglect to be so pervasive that even when 
participants were aware of their potential coping resources in the face of a negative event, 
they failed to consider them when they made predictions about that event. Similar to 
Wilson et al. (2000), participants at a Midwestern University completed a forecasting 
measure three days before nine separate home football games during a semester. 
Specifically, participants rated their baseline level of happiness and predicted how good 
they would feel two days after a win, and two days after a loss on a nine-point Likert type 
scale. Participants also completed a coping inventory to assess how they generally cope 
with stressful life events. Two days after each game, participants reported their actual 
level of happiness. Consistent with the impact bias findings in Wilson et al. (2000), 
participants consistently overestimated how happy they would feel after a win, and how 
bad they would feel after a loss. Most interestingly, however is that although participants 
made forecasts about a potential win or loss, and completed the coping inventory within 
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minutes of each other, participants “failed to consider these coping factors when making 
predictions, perhaps emphasizing the automaticity and pervasiveness of the impact bias 
(Hoerger et al., 2009, p. 94). This study highlights that even when people think about 
potential coping strategies, they generally discount the influence of their own 
psychological immune systems when they forecast how they expect to feel after a 
negative event.  
Focalism and immune neglect are well-documented sources of affective 
forecasting errors for the self. Research illustrates that we easily fall prey to these errors, 
especially when we consider the negative outcome of a decision or event for the self. 
However, fewer studies have focused on the accuracy and influence of a person’s 
affective forecasts about others beside the self. Just as Schkade & Kahneman (1998) 
found that people use both focal and non-focal information when they make judgments 
about themselves, perhaps a shift in focus from the self to another person influences the 
type of information the self employs (or disregards) in making an affective prediction.  
Self-Other Effects in Social Psychology 
 Self-other differences are well document in social psychology. The following 
section presents a brief overview of several explanations for this discrepant self versus 
other effect and then reviews self-other differences in affective forecasting specifically.  
The fundamental attribution error, or the tendency to infer that a person’s 
behavior corresponds to their personality while failing to take into account the situation, 
is one explanation for the self-other effect (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Heider, 1958; Jones & 
Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977). Several studies have demonstrated this pervasive 
phenomenon, however the most classic is a study by Jones and Harris (1967) in which 
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they asked participants to read essays purportedly written by fellow participants that were 
either in favor of or opposed to Fidel Castro’s rule in Cuba. The researchers told half of 
the participants that the author of the essay freely chose a position (pro vs. anti-Castro) 
for the essay, and told the other half that someone else had assigned a position to the 
author to argue as a participant in the debate. Jones and Harris found that when the 
participant thought that the author had free choice in their essay position, they rated those 
who wrote favorably about Castro as having a more positive attitude toward the dictator. 
Most interestingly, those participants who learned that the author did not have free choice 
in the essay still rated the authors as Castro supporters when those authors wrote 
favorably about the dictator. In other words, even when the participants knew that the 
author had no choice in the content of their essay, they assumed that the essay content 
reflected the author’s true attitudes (Jones & Harris, 1967). 
One reason people fall prey to the fundamental attribution error is because when a 
person attempts to explain someone’s behavior, they usually focus on the person and not 
on the surrounding, related information (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). For example, a person 
not familiar with a typical drug court participant’s lifestyle and struggles may attribute 
repeated drug offenses to the participant’s lack of self-control and not consider other, 
related variables such as their friend group, living situation, and the enormity of a drug 
addiction. Further, if a drug court judge sanctions an offender to jail time, an outside 
observer might view the sanction as unfair and unjust because the observer may not 
consider how quickly and easily the offender can make use of the psychological immune 
system to rationalize the sanction. The fundamental attribution error begins to explain the 
conditions that lead people to make uninformed attributions for others, but it does not 
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clarify why people generally explain their own behavior differently than the behavior of 
others. 
The most interesting characteristic of the fundamental attribution error is that 
people tend to apply it unevenly. This function, or extension of the fundamental 
attribution error is known as the actor-observer bias (Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Nisbett, 
Caputo, Legant, & Marecek, 1973). The actor-observer bias, originally proposed by Jones 
and Nisbett (1971), is the “pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to 
situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable 
personal dispositions” (p. 80).  They explain that one of the underlying reasons for the 
actor-observer phenomenon is the disproportionate information available to the actor and 
to the observer. In other words, while an actor and observer have equivalent information 
about the nature of an act, an observer lacks first-hand knowledge about the actor and the 
context in which the actor performed the behavior. For example, a person may see me 
sitting at a party alone in a corner. That person (observer) would likely judge me as a shy 
introvert, whereas I (actor) have significantly greater insight and information about my 
usual party behavior. For example, I am actually a boisterous, outgoing person but may 
have not been feeling particularly well that day and thus, did not act jovially. I would 
agree, as an actor, that I acted a bit more shy than usual, however my explanation for the 
behavior is far more informed than the observer’s evaluation that I am simply an 
introvert. Consistent with the fundamental attribution error (Jones & Nisbett, 1971), the 
observer explained my behavior utilizing an internal disposition only, whereas I, as the 
actor understood my behavior in terms of the current situation, my temporary health 
condition, and my usual disposition as a merry partygoer. In other words, this discrepant 
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explanation for my behavior is a problem of perspective between the actor and the 
observer.  
Although the actor-observer bias phenomenon generally explains an observer’s 
attributions, there is at least one scenario where a person is more likely to explain one’s 
own behavior with an external attribution instead of the usual internal attribution. When a 
situation or an outcome threatens a person’s self-esteem, the actor may make a self-
serving attribution. For example, a person may use an internal factor to explain success 
on a standardized math exam (“I studied day and night for a month”), but blame external, 
situational factors for poor performance on the exam (“The room was really cold and I 
wasn’t feeling particularly well, and the person next to me repeatedly tapped his pencil 
on the table”) (Miller & Ross, 1975). McFarland and Ross (1982), found evidence for 
this phenomenon in a study of female college students. The participants read a story 
about a person who had encountered a stressful period in life. Then, they answered a 
series of factual questions about the scenario. The researcher then told the participants 
that they either had done well on the recall exam (success) or had not performed well on 
the exam (failure). The participants then focused on task-oriented reasons (external 
attribution) or individual ability reasons (internal attribution) to explain their 
performances. McFarland and Ross (1982) found that successful participants were more 
likely to attribute their performances to ability rather than task-specific characteristics, 
and participants who experienced failure were more likely to attribute their performance 
to task-specific factors, consistent with the idea of using the self-serving bias to preserve 
one’s self-esteem.  
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In general, people will make an effort to maintain their self-esteem, even if that 
means distorting reality to adjust a belief or explanation for that outcome. In the case of a 
positive outcome, people happily attribute their success to dispositional, internal factors. 
However, people will make excuses or provide a situational explanation to explain their 
unsuccessful behavior as an adaptive mechanism to maintain self-esteem (McFarland & 
Ross, 1982). In short, self-other differences are a well-documented phenomenon in social 
psychology, but only recently have scholars considered the question of whether self-other 
effects occur in affective forecasts (Igou, 2008).  
Self-Other Effects in Affective Forecasting 
The vast majority of affective forecasting experiments study emotional 
predictions about the self in a future situation (Gilbert et al., 1998; Igou, 2008; Wilson et 
al., 2000; 2003). We know people do not accurately predict the duration or intensity of 
emotional experiences for themselves; however, researchers have only recently begun to 
study self-other differences in affective forecasting focusing specifically on whether 
people can accurately predict how another person may feel in a given situation. 
Just as we make affective predictions for ourselves (“How will I feel if I don’t 
walk the dog?”), we also make affective predictions for others (“How will my husband 
feel if I don’t walk the dog?”). Van Boven and Loewenstein (2003) studied the 
interesting role of emotional perspective taking through a number of creative studies. 
They argued that emotional perspective taking, that is, imagining how another person 
would feel in a given situation, requires two judgments. The first is how the self would 
feel in the actor’s situation. The second is how they adjust these self-predictions to 
accommodate the perceived difference or similarity between themselves and the actor 
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(Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003). In a two-study experiment, they asked participants to 
imagine what a set of lost hikers were thinking and feeling, two days after they ran out of 
food. They found that the majority of participants considered this situation by mentally 
trading places with the hikers and imagining what their own feelings would be in that 
situation. This suggests that people do consider their own feelings in the judgments of 
others’ feelings. In a second study, participants reported, either before or after they 
exercised vigorously for at least twenty minutes, whether they would be hungrier or 
thirstier after being lost for two days. They then considered whether a hiker, lost for two 
days without food or water, would be hungrier or thirstier. Van Boven and Loewenstein 
found that the participants who had exercised prior to considering the hiker scenario (who 
were likely thirsty themselves) predicted feeling more bothered by thirst than hunger, and 
those participants also projected their feelings onto the hikers, inferring that the hikers 
would also be bothered more by thirst. The authors concluded that the majority of 
participants did not directly consider how that hiker might feel; instead, they considered 
how they themselves would feel in a similar situation, by mentally trading places with the 
hikers in the story. This propensity to project one’s own emotional feelings onto another 
person may be an integral source of biased explanations for others’ behavior (Van Boven 
& Loewenstein, 2003).  
Wiener, Gervais, Allen and Marquez (2013) also investigated this self-other effect 
in affective forecasting utilizing a sexual objectification paradigm. Specifically, they 
investigated whether differential perspective taking may, in part, explain varying 
judgments of objectifying behavior as it applies to hostile work environment sexual 
harassment. The researchers manipulated the role of the complainant in a sexual 
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harassment case and hypothesized that differential perspective taking might explain why 
a woman in a simulated job interview who experiences objectification would experience 
less negative affect, than a predictor or observer of that objectification experience might 
anticipate. 
 Wiener et al. (2013)’s novel perspective taking experiment asked undergraduate 
females to assume one of three perspectives in a sexual objectification paradigm: 
experiencer, observer, or predictor. The experiencers participated in a mock interview 
where a male research assistant systematically objectified the female participant, by 
slowly gazing at the participant’s chest for approximately two seconds. The male 
research assistant did so six separate times during the course of the study. In the observer 
condition, female participants watched a video of another female participant’s interview, 
during which the male research assistant repeatedly gazed at the participant’s chest. In the 
predictor condition, the female participant read the transcript of the interview, which 
included a description of the male research assistant repeatedly gazing at the participant’s 
chest. All participants then completed a measure of their experienced emotions 
(experiencer group) or their prediction about how they think the experiencer would feel 
(observer and predictor groups). Consistent with the impact bias and the self-other effect 
in the affective forecasting literature (Gilbert et al., 1998; Hsee & Hastie, 2006; Igou, 
2004; 2008; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), the researchers found that objectification increased 
forecasted negative emotions for the predictor group, but not for the observer group. 
Further, objectification had no impact on the experiencer’s actual negative emotions. In 
other words, the predictors anticipated that the person subjected to the objectifying gaze 
would experience greater negative emotion than she actually felt.   
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One potential explanation for this finding, as cited by Wiener et al. (2013) is that 
when people experience a negative event, they automatically and quickly utilize their 
psychological immune system to control and adjust their emotional reaction to the event 
(see Gilbert et al., 1998; Hoerger et al., 2009). However, “while the psychological 
immune system allows experiencers a rapid return to equilibrium after positive and 
negative emotional experiences, those who observe and predict their behavior expect the 
targets to experience longer lasting and deeper emotional experiences than targets 
actually experience” (Wiener et al., 2013, p. 209). This phenomenon occurs, in part, 
because predictors and observers fail to consider how efficiently the experiencer’s 
psychological immune system will protect that person from a profoundly negative 
experience. This may occur, in part, because the other and more importantly the other’s 
situation may be an unfamiliar one for the predictor. 
The degree to which the other person’s situation is not a familiar one for the self 
may enhance the tendency to project one’s own emotions onto others. A seminal article 
by Brickman et al. (1978) studied subjective well-being and laid the foundation for future 
research about how much familiarity plays a role in affective forecasts of others. 
Brickman et al. (1978) interviewed paraplegic and able-bodied people and asked them 
about their general overall happiness and about a variety of everyday pleasures (e.g. 
talking with a friend, eating breakfast, hearing a funny joke). They found that while the 
paraplegics noted that their life had significantly changed as a result of their paralysis, 
there were only very small differences in reported life satisfaction between paraplegics 
and able-bodied subjects. 
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Schkade and Kahneman (1998) suspected that familiarity, in part might have 
driven this effect. They asked a sample of able-bodied participants to predict how often 
paraplegics practice a variety of happiness-related behaviors, and how often they 
experienced positive and negative moods. They also asked the participants whether they 
had ever known someone who is a paraplegic. The researchers hypothesized that people 
who knew at least one paraplegic would view them as happier than people who do not. 
The results were, in their words, “unequivocal” (p. 340). Participants who did not know a 
paraplegic predicted significantly more bad moods over good, whereas those who did 
know a paraplegic had the opposite perception (more good moods than bad). According 
to the authors, “The message is clear: The less you know about paraplegics, the worse off 
you think they are” (p. 340). In other words, the self-other effect in affective forecasting 
is potentially stronger when the other is unfamiliar, or encounters an unfamiliar situation.  
These affective forecasting misinterpretations may be “particularly pronounced 
and problematic when it comes to visceral states, with wide-ranging implications for 
everyday social life and public policy” (Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003, p. 1167). For 
example, a judge or some other legal decision-maker might struggle to accurately 
forecast the emotional and behavioral impact of a three or thirty day sanction for a drug 
or mental health court client because of a perspective differential between the judge and 
the client. Further, a person with little to no knowledge of drug or mental health courts 
might predict even less accurately the impact of such a sanction for that client. 
The asymmetric immune knowledge hypothesis. Igou (2008) began with the 
finding that people use their self-predictions as a basis to estimate the emotional state of 
others but then went on to propose a mechanism that might explain why people are 
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inaccurate predictors of others’ emotional reactions to negative experiences. According to 
the asymmetric immune knowledge hypothesis (AIK) (Igou, 2008), people inaccurately 
predict others’ emotional reactions to negative events because they know more about 
their own ability to cope compared to what they know about others’ coping abilities. 
Specifically, Igou (2008) argued that the self-other effect is not a simple disparity in 
perspective taking, as suggested by Van Boven and Loewenstein (2003). Rather, 
forecasting errors occur because of the intimate knowledge that forecasters have about 
their own psychological immune systems and coping strategies (i.e., the ability to 
rationalize and distort negative events), compared to what little they know about the 
coping mechanisms of other people. Underestimating another’s coping ability and 
rationalization capability causes a forecaster to over predict the duration and intensity of 
the negative affect that follows negative outcomes for that person (Igou, 2008). 
Igou established the AIK on the belief that when a person anticipates a negative 
affective experience, the evaluator will recall successful coping strategies used in past, 
similar situations to reduce the negative affect. “Anticipating a negative experience 
facilitates activation of knowledge about one’s own psychological immune system . . .of 
psychological processes that help when battling negative affect . . . such as instrumental 
coping strategies” (Igou, 2008, p. 900). Igou (2008) draws a distinction between the AIK 
hypothesis and Gilbert et al.’s, (1998) immune neglect hypothesis, which suggests that 
people do not have insight into their psychological immune system and their available 
coping strategies to overcome adversity. Instead, Igou (2008) purports that people are at 
least minimally aware of, and do reflect on their own coping strategies when they 
anticipate an adverse event for themselves, even if their insight is inaccurate. In other 
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words, people are at least vaguely aware of their own psychological immune system and 
they utilize it more successfully than they anticipate (i.e., immune neglect). Further, they 
are less aware of the coping ability of others so they will be less accurate forecasting the 
emotional reactions of others as compared to themselves (i.e., the AIK hypothesis).  
 In a series of programmatic studies, Igou (2008) tested the AIK hypothesis by 
evaluating: (1) the accuracy with which people predict the duration of negative affect for 
others, (2) whether people have knowledge of others’ coping strategies, and (3) the 
subsequent effectiveness of those strategies. He tested these general research questions 
through nine separate, programmatic experiments. In the first experiment, Igou examined 
the self-other effect as it relates to the duration of negative events. Participants read and 
reflected on two separate scenarios—one in which the participant did either significantly 
better or significantly worse on an exam than they had expected, followed by a scenario 
in which the participant’s romantic partner was involved with another person and the 
situation ended in a negative way (the significant other ended the relationship) or a 
positive way (the significant other chose to stay in the relationship). Participants also 
considered each situation from either their own perspective (self-focus), or from the 
perspective of another student (other-focus). Participants considered each scenario and 
rated how the outcome of the scenario would influence their well-being (or the fellow 
student’s well-being) and completed a measure of the duration of that impact. Igou 
(2008) found that when participants anticipated a negative experience, they expected the 
duration of the affective response to last longer for other people than for themselves. 
Further, this self-other effect occurred only for negative experiences (poor exam 
performance and dissolution of a relationship), and not for positive experiences 
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(exceptional exam performance and continuation of the relationship). In other words, 
people expected affective experiences for negative events to last longer for other people 
than for themselves.  
 Through a series of additional experiments, Igou (2008) demonstrated that people 
anticipated the shortest negative affect duration for themselves, followed by a familiar 
other (an acquaintance), and the longest for an unfamiliar other (a person they did not 
know). Igou (2008) suspected that a familiarity difference between the self and the 
imagined other drove this forecasted duration effect. To confirm this hypothesis, Igou 
performed a study similar to the first experiment where participants considered three 
separate negative scenarios from a self-focus perspective or from the perspective of a 
familiar, close friend. He found a significant self-other effect even when participants’ 
familiarity with the close friend was high—except for the previously mentioned negative 
relationship scenario. Igou suspected that because close friends are likely to discuss how 
they would feel when a relationship ends, the self has increased knowledge about the 
coping strategies of the friend and this information diminishes the knowledge gap 
between the self and the other. In short, Igou found a pervasive self-other effect even 
when the other was a familiar friend, except in the case where friends may have 
previously discussed potential coping strategies.  
 Igou (2008) further investigated this selective, reduced self-other effect and 
hypothesized that coping knowledge one has for another would mediate this effect. 
Participants considered one of the negative scenarios from the above studies and 
imagined the situation from their own perspective, or the perspective of an acquaintance 
(a familiar other). Participants answered a variety of questions about how either they or 
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the acquaintance would handle this negative situation emotionally and behaviorally.  
Finally, participants predicted the duration of the negative affect. Igou (2008) found that 
participants reported more knowledge about coping strategies for the self, as opposed to 
the other. Further, this asymmetric coping knowledge between the self and the other 
mediated the relationship between the self-other effect for anticipated affect duration. 
That is, statistically controlling the differences in coping knowledge attenuated the self-
other effect in anticipated negative affect.  
 To examine the final hypothesis, that coping efficacy (in addition to coping 
knowledge) contributes to the asymmetric immune knowledge effect, Igou (2008) 
hypothesized that coping efficacy would also mediate the self-other relationship for 
affective forecasts. Igou (2008) assigned the participants to a self-focus condition or an 
other-focus condition in the same manner as the previous studies. Then, the participants 
read a number of scenarios, including a situation where a person studied hard for a 
driver’s license exam. On the day of the exam, the instructor gave the person positive 
feedback to lead the student driver to believe that everything went well. However the 
student ultimately failed the exam. Participants then indicated on a graph their [the 
others’] anticipated negative emotional trajectory over a period of 12 days and how 
intensely the outcome would impact the self or other. He also assessed participants’ 
coping knowledge by asking, “How good do you know whether you have learned how to 
deal with such negative experiences?” and, “How sure are you that you can deal with 
such negative experiences?” on a 7-point Likert type scale. He found that all participants 
anticipated that the intensity of the negative experience would decrease over time, but 
this decrease would occur more quickly for the self than for the other, suggesting a 
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greater insight into their own psychological immune system. Similarly, participants 
reported increased knowledge about their own coping efficacy compared to another, and 
this asymmetric knowledge again mediated the self-other effect. That is, after statistically 
controlling for the knowledge about coping efficacy, the self-other effect again 
attenuated.  
In short, Igou (2008) found that people generally predict the duration of a 
negative affective experience to be longer for another person than for the self, and this 
effect is more pronounced the more dissimilar the other is from the self. Contrary to 
Gilbert et al.’s (1998) notion that people do not have insight into their own psychological 
immune system, Igou (2008) found that people are more aware of coping strategies for 
the self, and more readily consider coping strategies for the self, compared to the other. 
This differential self-other effect suggests that people are at least minimally aware of the 
effectiveness of their own psychological immune system, but because of problematic 
perspective taking and asymmetrical coping knowledge for the other, they are even 
poorer at predicting the emotional consequences of a negative event for another person 
than for themselves. 
Modern Problem-Solving Courts: A Problem of Perspective? 
 Igou’s (2008) asymmetric immune knowledge hypothesis serves as a potential 
explanation for a self-other effect in problem-solving courts. As previously discussed, 
drug and mental health courts function under the model of therapeutic jurisprudence—the 
idea that legal policies and procedures should help and not harm clients, within the 
confines of the law (Winick & Wexler, 2002). Although it would seem that problem-
solving courts’ lack of procedural due process might be in direct opposition to the best 
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interests of a client, it is possible that observers find this more of a problem than do the 
clients themselves. Perhaps this disconnect is simply a problem of perspective and a 
discordant knowledge of the effective coping strategies used by problem-solving court 
clients.  
 In short, casual observers, legal commentators, and even the appellate level judges 
themselves may over predict the negative emotions and consequences that problem-
solving court clients feel after they suffer incarceration for failing to follow their 
treatment plans. That is, offenders have exceptional knowledge about the effectiveness of 
their own coping strategies and the nature of the psychological difficulties that they 
endure but observers do not. Therefore, the observers may over predict the negative 
impact of a sanction for the clients, whereas the clients may view such sanctions simply 
as part of the treatment process itself. This would explain why clients such as Brent 
Stewart (State of Tennessee v. Stewart, 2010) were satisfied with problem-solving courts 
despite the loss of some of their due process rights (see Berman & Feinblatt, 2005; 
Cosden, Ellens, Schnell, Yamini-Diouf, 2005; Freeman, 2002; Gover, Brank, & 
MacDonald, 2007; Poythress, Petrila, McGaha, & Boothroyd, 2002). Although the drug 
court denied Mr. Stewart due process, perhaps his positive sentiment that the drug court 
“saved his life” is not the exception, but rather the norm among drug and mental health 
court clients. If this is indeed the case, the law may need to rethink the best way to protect 
the due process rights of individuals who would prefer to waive some of their rights in 
order to obtain the therapeutic advantages that are inherent in problem-solving court 
treatment.  
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The Current Study: An Overview 
 The goal of this two-experiment research study was to apply Igou’s (2008) AIK 
hypothesis to problem-solving courts’ practice of sanctioning in the absence of due 
process. Psycholegal researchers have only recently begun to study the influence of 
emotion on legal decision-making and this experiment advances research on the study of 
emotion because it was one of the first to consider the self-other effect in affective 
forecasting in a legal decision-making paradigm, and the first to test the effects of the 
AIK in problem-solving courts. The researcher accomplished this in two separate 
experiments. 
 Experiment 1 utilized a similar perspective-taking paradigm as Wiener et al. 
(2013) and applied Igou’s (2008) AIK hypothesis to study the influence of the self-other 
effect by asking participants to estimate the negative impact of incarceration as a sanction 
from their own perspective, from the perspective of a drug [mental health] court client, 
someone familiar with drug [mental health] courts, or someone unfamiliar with drug 
[mental health] courts. The research varied whether due process (see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
1973; Morrissey v. Brewer, 1972) was present at the time the judge imposed the sanction. 
Based on the AIK effect, there should be significant differences between participants’ 
knowledge of coping strategies in each perspective, and that these differences should 
mediate the relationship between the self-other effect and the strength of the anticipated 
negative impact of the sanction.  
 Drug and mental health courts are excellent targets of investigation for several 
reasons. Drug and mental health courts are the two most common types of problem-
solving courts in the United States (Porter et al., 2010) and thus, participants may be 
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more familiar with them, compared to less common problem-solving courts (e.g., 
veterans court, community court, homeless court). Further, compared to other problem-
solving court systems, existing case law and psycholegal research provide a 
comprehensive review of both drug and mental health courts. Lastly, the comparison of 
drug courts to mental health courts creates a fascinating dyad because of societal and 
legal beliefs surrounding drug use and mental health issues. Specifically, court observers 
and participants may view sanctions and a lack of due process very differently for a drug 
court client than for a mental health court client (see Redlich et al., 2006).  
 Due to the fundamental differences between the typical fact patterns of drug and 
mental health courts, as well as the inherent problems faced by their clients, there is an 
acknowledged difficulty in creating symmetric drug and mental health court legal 
scenarios. To avoid potentially confounded comparisons as a manipulated independent 
variable (drug court vs. mental health court), Experiment 1 had two parts. Experiment 1a 
presented participants with a typical drug court fact pattern, whereas Experiment 1b 
presented them with a typical mental health court fact pattern. The dependent measures 
and manipulations were exactly the same for each court type. The researcher collected 
data simultaneously for both Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b and where appropriate, 
made statistical comparisons between the two court type scenarios. 
 Experiment 2 attempted to reduce any observed self-other effects by encouraging 
participants to think about and list problem-solving court clients’ potential coping 
strategies. To further isolate the effect of reported coping strategies on the self-other 
effect, Experiment 2 included only a mental health court condition without due process. 
The original intention was to include the mental health court condition only, due to the 
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potentially more problematic use of sanctions as a prohibited behavior that resulted 
because of mental illness. Based on the findings of Experiment 1, the selection of the 
mental health court condition was appropriate.  
 Both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 utilized an online data collection paradigm 
in which community members served as participants who took the perspective of the 
various actors who interact with a problem-solving court. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Experiment 1 
Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1. Consistent with the self-other effect in affective forecasting, 
participants who review a scenario from the perspective of a person unfamiliar with 
problem-solving courts and their clients (i.e., a predictor) will anticipate the longest 
duration and greatest negative affect impact of a problem-solving court judge 
incarcerating a client for failing to follow the court’s orders. Participants who consider 
the scenario from the perspective of a person familiar with problem-solving courts and 
their clients (i.e., an observer) will anticipate a shorter duration and less extreme impact 
than will the predictor. Those who assume the perspective of the court client (i.e., actor-
referenced experiencer) will anticipate an even shorter and less intense negative affect, 
and finally those who assume the perspective of him or herself, as if he or she was the 
person in the story (i.e., self-referenced experiencer) will report the shortest and least 
intense response. This final group provides the most direct comparison to Igou’s (2008) 
self-forecasting condition.  
 Hypothesis 2. Participants who consider a scenario in which the court awarded 
the client minimal due process rights will anticipate a weaker and shorter negative impact 
than those who consider a scenario in which the judge denied the client adequate due 
process. This finding would reinforce the judge’s argument in State of Tennessee v. 
Stewart (2010) and echoes the perspective of scholars who believe the therapeutic 
jurisprudence movement in problem-solving courts is appropriate, insofar as the court 
does not subordinate a client’s justice rights such as due process.  
  62
 Hypothesis 3. Within Experiment 1a (drug court) and Experiment 1b (mental 
health court), there should be a two-way interaction between perspective and due process. 
Specifically, within each type of problem-solving court scenario, the greatest negative 
emotional impact will occur for participants who consider the scenario from the 
perspective of an outside observer (predictor) without due process. Further, the least 
negative impact will occur for participants who consider the scenario from the 
perspective of him or herself, as if he or she was the person in the problem-solving court 
scenario (self-referenced experiencer), for whom the judge awarded due process. 
 Hypothesis 4. In addition, the participants’ knowledge about their ability or the 
client’s ability to cope with the negative sanction will mediate the relationship between 
perspective and anticipated intensity and duration. Specifically, those individuals who 
respond from the self-referenced experiencer and the actor-referenced experiencer 
perspectives will acknowledge stronger coping knowledge than those who respond from 
either the predictor or observer perspective. Mediation will be strongest for self-
referenced experiencers and weakest for predictors. It is also possible that coping will act 
as a moderator such that those individuals who recognize the coping abilities of others 
will show a different pattern of perspective and due process effects than those who fail to 
recognize the coping strategies of others, as suggested by the AIK hypothesis (Igou, 
2008). 
 It is possible that coping skills reflect no more than perceived similarity between 
the participant and their assigned perspective. To control for this, all participants 
completed a similarity measure that served as a potential mediator. Likewise, it is also 
possible that similarity will act as a moderator such that those individuals who show more 
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similarity to the perspective to which they are assigned will show a different pattern of 
perspective and due process effects than those who score low in similarity to the 
perspective.  
 Finally, it is also possible that participants’ personal familiarity with drug use or 
mental health issues will moderate the relationship between perspective and anticipated 
intensity and duration. Specifically, those who are personally familiar with drug use 
might anticipate a shorter and less intense negative affective experience than those 
personally unfamiliar with drug courts or their clients. Likewise, those who are familiar 
with mental health issues might anticipate a shorter and less intense negative affective 
experience than those unfamiliar with mental health courts or their clients.  
 Hypothesis 5a. Participants who review a scenario in which the offender is a 
mental health court client (Experiment 1b) will anticipate a greater negative impact 
(intensity and duration) than participants who review a scenario in which the offender is a 
drug court client (Experiment 1a). Furthermore, this difference should occur, regardless 
of the participants’ assigned perspective (predictor, observer, actor-referenced 
experiencer, self-referenced experiencer). Remember that although the use of 
incarceration as a sanction for noncompliance in drug courts is somewhat routine (NDCI, 
2000), a mental health court’s use of incarceration is more contentious and likely to raise 
stronger concerns about due process. This finding would support Redlich et al. (2006) 
and others’ beliefs that a court’s use of incarceration as a sanction for mental health court 
clients is counter to the mental health court philosophy and essentially punishes people 
for their mental illnesses. Although this comparison will be somewhat confounded by the 
differences in the fact patterns in the two types of cases, it is nonetheless, interesting to 
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compare the effects of due process in a typical drug court case to a typical mental health 
court case.  
Hypothesis 5b. Furthermore, there should be a three-way interaction between 
perspective, due process, and court type. When problem-solving court type (Experiments 
1a and 1b) is included in the model, the greatest negative emotional impact will occur for 
participants who consider the scenario from the perspective of an outside observer 
(predictor) when the defendant was a client in a mental health court without due process. 
Further, the least negative impact will occur for participants who consider the scenario 
from the perspective of hi, or herself, as if he or she was the person in the drug court 
scenario (self-referenced experiencer) for whom the judge awarded adequate due process.  
Exploratory Hypotheses 
The theory of procedural justice provides another set of lenses from which to 
consider clients’ affective experiences in courts. Procedural fairness focuses on 
“participants’ subjective experience of the case disposition process” (Poythress et al., 
2002, p. 520) and predicts that defendants are as concerned with respectful treatment and 
fair practices as they are about the outcome of their case (Rossman, Willison, Mallik-
Kane, Kim, Debus-Sherrill, & Downey, 2012). Furthermore, satisfaction with the legal 
process and a positive perception of legal authorities (e.g., judge, attorneys, social 
workers) are often independent of case outcomes.  
 According to Lind and Tyler (1988), two important factors affect a client’s 
perceived fairness of a courtroom experience. The first is whether the participant felt as 
though he or she had the opportunity to explain his or her side of the dispute to the judge 
or decision maker (voice). The second is whether the participant perceived that the judge 
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or decision maker treated him or her with dignity and respect. Researchers have found 
that in treatment-focused courts, such as drug or mental health courts, participants who 
experience high levels of perceived procedural fairness generally report greater 
satisfaction with the process, which in turn influences their compliance with the law and 
court ordered treatment plan (Cascardi, Poythress, & Hall, 2000; Lind & Tyler, 1988; 
Poythress et al., 2002; Tyler, 2003).  
 Hypothesis 6. In line with the literature on procedural fairness, the researcher 
theorizes that participants who consider the scenario in which due process was awarded 
will report higher levels of procedural fairness. Similarly, participants who perceive 
greater procedural fairness will anticipate a shorter, less intense negative impact for the 
court client than those who perceive less procedural fairness. This hypothesis is 
exploratory in that the design does not test procedural fairness as measured in the usual 
way (opportunity to be heard, to have a “voice,” etc.), but rather fairness as it relates to 
the presence or absence of due process. 
Method
Design
 Experiment 1 was a 4 (perspective: predictor vs. observer vs. actor-referenced 
experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer) x 2 (due process: present vs. absent) x 2 
(court type: drug court vs. mental health court) between-subjects design.  
Participants 
Five hundred and nineteen people accessed the welcome page of the Experiment 1 
website. Of those 519 potential participants, 103 did not continue past the welcome page 
or answer any questions about the study. Four hundred and fifteen participants completed 
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the study. These participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online 
data collection program and were paid $1.50 for participation. Utilizing community 
participants, as opposed to undergraduate college students provided a clearer sense of the 
views that everyday citizens hold about courts. 
 The mean study completion time was 20.59 (SD = 16.09) minutes. Six 
participants took longer than 68.86 minutes (3 standard deviations above the mean 
completion time of 20.59 minutes) and were subsequently removed from the database. 
Another two participants completed the study in less than five minutes, which seems 
dubious that they gave appropriate attention and thus, were also removed from the 
database.  
 Of the 407 remaining participants, five incorrectly answered at least one of the 
two built-in manipulation check questions and were therefore removed from the database. 
This left a final dataset with 402 participants with a mean age of 32.92 years (SD = 
10.53). Fifty-seven percent of the participants were female and 43% were male. The 
sample was 74.2% Caucasian, 9.3% Asian or Pacific Islander, 9.1% Black and 4.5% 
Hispanic. Less than 3% identified as “other” ethnicity. The sample was primarily well 
educated with 89.6% completing at least some college. The program randomly assigned 
these participants to the 16 conditions in the fully crossed Experiment 1 design. 
Condition cell sizes ranged from 20-29.  
Materials for Experiment 1 Overall 
Case fact questionnaire. Participants completed a short five-item manipulation 
check to measure comprehension of case facts and to ensure they paid sufficient 
attention. The measure included questions about each independent factor (assigned 
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perspective, due process, and court type). For example, “The client in the case summary 
was a (an): a) drug court client; b) mental health court client; or c) arsonist?” and “True 
or False: The client was afforded due process at the time of the review hearing.” The 
questionnaire also required participants to identify the perspective from which they read 
and thought about the case summary to ensure they considered this perspective 
throughout the study.  
 The measure also included the first of several attention-check questions in the 
study. These items, integrated throughout the dependent measures ensured that the 
participants deliberately considered each question as they worked through the study. For 
example, “Please choose ‘true’ for the following question if you have read and paid 
sufficient attention up to this point.”  If a participant missed any these attention check 
questions, the researcher dropped that participant’s data from the study. Appendix A 
includes the full items. 
 Coping skills questionnaire. Similar to Igou’s (2008) coping skills inventory, 
participants completed a knowledge of a variety of coping skills measure for Brent 
[themselves]1. Specifically, the measure instructed participants to “complete the 
following scale about Brent’s [your] coping skills and how Brent [you] would cope with 
the experience after the judge announced the sanction of 30 days in jail.” Then, 
participants rated, on a 7-point Likert type scale from 1 (do not know) to 7 (know very 
well), how Brent [you] would deal with this experience emotionally, psychologically, 
socially, financially, and practically. Then, participants indicated the degree to which 
they know what Brent [you] would do in such a situation on a 7-point Likert type scale 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (much). The composite scores for these questions produced one 

1 Self-referenced experiencers answered these questions for themselves as the defendant. 
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scale for coping knowledge for the client [self]. Igou (2008) found adequate internal 
consistency reliability for a similar measure with a coefficient alpha of .83. See Appendix 
B. 
 Similarity questionnaire. To control for the possibility that coping skills reflect 
no more than a perceived similarity between the participant and their assigned 
perspective, participants also completed a similarity measure. Participants denoted how 
similar they think they are to their assigned perspective, on a 7-point Likert type scale 
from 1 (very dissimilar) to 7 (very similar). Specifically, participants indicated their level 
of similarity as it applies to physical characteristics, personality, emotional reactions, 
motivations, social life, and overall. See Appendix C for the full questionnaire. 
 PANAS-X revised (intensity). The dependent measures in the study included a 
modified Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form (PANAS-X) measure, a 
standardized measure of experienced positive and negative affect (Kercher, 1992; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Participants were instructed to “think about how Brent 
[you] would feel about the sanction outcome (jail time) described in the above scenario.” 
They then indicated the extent Brent [you]2 would feel each emotion after the judge 
announced his sanction in the scenario. Participants rated, on a 5-point Likert type scale 
from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely) the extent they would feel each of 8 
positive emotions (inspired, alert, excited, enthusiastic, determined, happy, surprised and 
relaxed) and 8 negative emotions (angry, distressed, scared, nervous, upset, afraid, 
embarrassed, and ashamed).  This modified scale expands on the PANAS-X short form 
(Kercher, 1992), which has a reported alpha reliability of .78 and .87, for the negative and 
positive scales, respectively (Mackinnon, Jorn, Christensen, Korten, Jacomb, & Rodgers, 

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1999). This measure produced a positive and negative summary scale for intensity of 
anticipated affect, which allowed a test of the impact bias. Appendix D includes a full 
description of the scale.  
 PANAS-X revised (duration).  Participants next went back to each of the 
emotions on the PANAS-X (revised) and indicated how many days Brent [you]3 would 
experience each of the 16 emotions after the judge announced the sanction.  Participants 
supplied an answer ranging from 0 days (the emotion would last less than a day) to 35 
days (the emotion would last even after Brent [you] was released from jail). The answers 
to these items formed duration scales for both positive and negative emotions, which 
allowed a test of the duration bias.  See Appendix E. 
 Well-being questionnaire. Participants also completed an overall evaluation of 
Brent’s [your] anticipated well-being after the sanction experience. From their assigned 
perspective, participants were asked to “think about how Brent [you]4 would feel about 
the situation and outcome (jail time) described in the legal summary.” Then, participants 
rated, on a 7-point Likert type scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 7 (extremely), 
how intensely Brent’s [your] well-being would be negatively influenced by this 
experience. Specifically, participants rated emotional, psychological, social, financial, 
and overall wellbeing using this scale. Together the items formed a scale to measure 
forecasted well-being intensity.  
 Participants also rated, on a 7-point Likert type scale from 1 (very short amount of 
time or not at all) to 7 (very long time), how long Brent’s [your]5 well-being would be 
negatively influenced by this experience. Specifically, participants rated emotional, 

3 Self-referenced experiencers answered these questions for themselves as the defendant. 
4 Self-referenced experiencers answered these questions for themselves as the defendant. 
5 Self-referenced experiencers answered these questions for themselves as the defendant.
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psychological, social, financial, and overall wellbeing on this scale. Together the items 
formed a scale to measure forecasted well-being duration. Participants also provided a 
numerical answer to the question, “How many days would Brent’s [your] overall well-
being be negatively influenced by this experience?”  
 The well-being scale included an additional attention-check question to ensure the 
participant paid sufficient attention. See Appendix F. 
 Procedural fairness questionnaire. Participants then completed a brief, five-
question perceived procedural fairness measure, based in part on the original scale by 
Cascardi et al., (2001) and Poythress et al., (2002). Each participant rated on a Likert type 
scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal) the degree to which they believe Brent [they]:6 
(1) was [were] treated with respect by the judge, (2) had the opportunity to share 
information about Brent’s [your] personal and legal situation, (3) thought the judge 
seemed genuinely interested in Brent [you] as a person, (4) was [were] treated fairly by 
the judge, and (5) was [were] satisfied with how the judge treated them and dealt with 
their case. Cascardi et al., (2001) and Poythress et al., (2002) successfully used the items 
both as a scale and as individual dimensions of procedural fairness. In this study they 
served as a composite scale of procedural justice.  
 Participants also completed a one-item evaluation of whether Brent [they]7 was 
[are] satisfied with the hearing outcome, “As you consider the case as a whole, should 
Brent be [are you] satisfied with the Judge’s decision today to sanction Brent [you] to 
thirty days in jail?” rated on the same 7 point Likert-type scale. See Appendix G for the 
full questionnaire.

6 Self-referenced experiencers answered these questions for themselves as the defendant. 
7 Self-referenced experiencers answered these questions for themselves as the defendant.
  71
 Demographic survey and drug court familiarity questionnaire. Finally, 
participants completed a demographic survey, including basic questions such as gender, 
race, age, and political ideology, among other relevant self-report items. In addition, 
participants also answered three questions about their familiarity with drug use and drug 
courts. Specifically, participants rated on a Likert type scale from 1 (no problems) to 7 
(many problems) the degree to which they personally experienced problems with drug 
use (“Have you personally experienced problems with drug use?”) or whether they have a 
close friend or family member who has experienced problems with drug use (“Do you 
have a close friend or family member who has experienced problems with drug use?”). 
Next, the participants reported whether they have ever been personally involved with a 
drug court, and if so, in what capacity (e.g., client, social worker, etc.). Finally, three 
questions (for self mental illness and friend mental illness) asked whether the participants 
had experience with mental illness (had a friend who has experienced mental illness) and 
whether they (their friend) had experienced problems as a result of that mental illness. 
They also reported whether they have ever been personally involved with a mental health 
court, and if so, in what capacity (e.g., client, social worker, etc.). The full demographic 
survey can be found in Appendix H. 
Preliminary Analyses 
 The following section includes preliminary analyses that evaluate the attention 
checks, scale construction and reliabilities for Experiment 1 overall.  
 Attention check. 
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Case fact questionnaire. The Case Fact Questionnaire (CFQ) served as a validity 
check, to determine whether participants paid sufficient attention to the online stimulus 
materials. CFQ scores ranged from a minimum of 3 correct, to a maximum of 5 correct 
(M = 4.78, SD = .46). Thus, the study respondents answered over 95% of the questions 
correct, verifying that they had paid close attention to the study materials.  
 Of particular interest were the participants’ responses to the perspective and due 
process manipulation check questions. Only 2.7% of participants missed the perspective 
manipulation check question and 2.5% of participants missed the due process 
manipulation check. Because of the small percentage of participants who incorrectly 
answered these questions and to maximize sample size across Experiment 1, they were 
included in all analyses. 
 Scale construction and reliabilities. 
Coping skills questionnaire. The coping skills questionnaire demonstrated an 
acceptable internal alpha reliability of .91 (M = 3.44, SD = 1.45, N = 402) for Experiment 
1 overall. Higher scores indicate greater perceived coping skills. See Table 1 for alpha 
reliabilities, means, and standard deviations of the coping skills questionnaire, as well as 
all other measures for Experiment 1.  
Similarity questionnaire. The similarity questionnaire (M = 3.31, SD = 1.63, N = 
401) showed high internal reliability ( = .95) for Experiment 1. High scores indicate 
greater perceived similarity between the self and the assigned perspective. Table 1 
illustrates reliabilities and descriptive statistics of the similarity questionnaire.
PANAS-X revised (intensity). An exploratory factor analysis on the 16 emotion 
ratings collected on the PANAS-X revised intensity survey with a varimax rotation 
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produced four factors with Eigen values greater than 1.00 and accounted for 63.10% of 
the variance. Applying a .60 cutoff on the loadings in the rotated factor matrix produced 
four dimensions. Loading on factor 1, the negative affect intensity scale were angry (.76), 
upset (.74), surprised (.70), scared (.63), distressed (.62), afraid (.60) and nervous (.59). 
The second factor, the positive affect intensity scale included happy (.79), enthusiastic 
(.78), inspired (.78), and relaxed (.74). The emotions ashamed (.87), and embarrassed 
(.82) created a third factor. Alert (.83) independently loaded on a fourth factor. Excited 
and determined did not reach the .60 cutoff score on any single factor. Table 2 shows the 
factor loadings for the PANAS-X intensity measure. The derived positive affect intensity 
scale (happy, enthusiastic, inspired, and relaxed) showed  = .81 (M = 1.14, SD = .38, N 
= 399) for Experiment 1 overall. The derived negative affect intensity scale (angry, upset, 
surprised, scared, distressed, afraid, and nervous) resulted in an alpha reliability of .86 for 
Experiment 1 overall (M = 3.63, SD = .79, N = 399). See Table 1 for a summary of the 
means and standard deviations. 
 PANAS-X revised (duration).  An exploratory principal components factor 
analysis on the 16 emotion ratings collected on the PANAS-X revised duration survey 
with a varimax rotation produced 5 factors with Eigen values greater than 1.00 and 
accounted for 65.59% of the variance. Applying a .60 cutoff on the loadings in the rotated 
factor matrix produced five dimensions. Loading on factor 1 were scared (.86), afraid 
(.85), nervous (.81), and distressed (.60). The second factor consisted of happy (.84), 
enthusiastic (.81), excited (.74), and relaxed (.68). The emotions ashamed (.90) and 
embarrassed (.91) created a third factor. A fourth factor resulted from angry (.85) and 
upset (.75), and finally a fifth factor included determined (.83) and inspired (.66). Finally, 
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alert and surprised did not reach the .60 cutoff score on any single factor. See Table 3 for 
the factor loadings for the PANAS-X duration measure. The derived positive affect 
duration scale (happy, enthusiastic, excited, and relaxed) revealed  = .79 (M = 2.20, SD 
= 3.79, N = 398) for Experiment 1 overall. The derived negative affect duration scale 
(scared, afraid, nervous, distressed, angry, and upset) resulted in an alpha reliability of 
.82 for Experiment 1 overall (M = 20.01, SD = 8.87, N = 399). See Table 1 for means and 
standard deviations. 
 Embarrassed and ashamed scale. The PANAX-X factor analyses cited above 
revealed that embarrassed and ashamed (on both the intensity and duration scales) loaded 
onto an independent factor. In lieu of creating a scale of two items, the researcher 
standardized these four, highly correlated emotion measures (embarrassed intensity, 
ashamed intensity, embarrassed duration, and ashamed duration) and created an 
embarrassed and ashamed scale (M = .00, SD = .82, N = 399). See Table 4 for the 
bivariate correlation matrix. The scale resulted in an alpha reliability of .84 for 
Experiment 1 overall. See Table 1 for means and standard deviations. 
Well-being questionnaire (intensity). The well-being intensity questionnaire 
demonstrated a high internal alpha reliability of .89 for Experiment 1 overall (M = 5.13, 
SD = 1.30, N = 397). Higher scores indicate a greater anticipated negative well-being 
impact. See Table 1 for means and standard deviations. 
 Well-being questionnaire (duration). The well-being duration questionnaire 
demonstrated an acceptable internal alpha reliability of .86 for Experiment 1 overall (M = 
4.60, SD = 1.25, N = 398). Higher scores indicate a longer anticipated negative well-
being impact. See Table 1 for means and standard deviations. 
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 Procedural fairness questionnaire. The procedural fairness questionnaire (M = 
4.04, SD = 1.60, N = 398) showed acceptable internal reliability ( = .89) for Experiment 
1 overall. High scores indicated greater perceived procedural fairness. See Table 1 for 
means and standard deviations. 
 Tests of the emotion and well-being hypotheses for Experiment 1 made use of the 
positive affect intensity, negative affect intensity, positive affect duration, negative affect 
duration, the combined embarrassed and ashamed intensity and duration scale, well-being 
intensity, well-being duration, and procedural fairness scales described in Tables 1, 2, and 
3.  
Experiment 1a—Drug Court 
Method
Participants 
 Two-hundred and four participants with a mean age of 33.32 (SD = 10.76) 
completed Experiment 1a. Fifty-four percent of the participants were female and 45% 
were male. The sample was 73.8% Caucasian, 9.8% African American, 9.4% Asian or 
Pacific Islander, 3.9% Hispanic and 3% identified as “other” ethnicity. Condition cell 
sizes ranged from 23-29.8  
 
Materials 
Drug court description. The AIK hypothesis (Igou, 2008) posits that the more 
familiar another person is to the forecaster, the more knowledge the forecaster should 
have about that role and should consider more information when anticipating the client’s 

8 The 204 Experiment 1a participants are a subset of the 402 Experiment 1 participants described in the 
Experiment 1 overall methods section. 
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affective responses to a negative event. In order to familiarize participants with problem-
solving courts, and specifically drug courts, participants in the observer and experiencer 
conditions (but not the predictor condition) first read a one page description about drug 
courts to provide them with a basic knowledge of and familiarity with a typical drug 
court and its clients. This description, titled “What is a Drug Court?” summarized the 
background, basic components, and therapeutic jurisprudential goals of a drug court, and 
was based in part on information that the Center for Court Innovation (Porter et al., 2010) 
and the National Association of Drug Courts (see www.nadcp.org) have gathered and 
disseminated. See Appendix I for the full description. 
 Participant perspective instructions.  Similar to the perspective-taking 
procedures used by Igou (2008) and Wiener et al., (2013), participants read and 
considered a legal case, State of Nebraska v. Brent Kahler (2012) from one of four 
perspectives: 1) a random person who is unfamiliar with drug court clients (predictor); 2) 
a person who interacts frequently with drug court clients (this could be a social worker or 
case worker) (observer); 3) Brent, the drug court client portrayed in the legal case (actor-
referenced experiencer); or 4) the participant him or herself, as if the respondent was the 
drug court client in the legal case (self-referenced experiencer). To encourage the 
participants to focus on their assigned perspective, the instructions read, “take several 
minutes before you move on to put yourself in the place of this person and think about 
what he may be like.” As a reminder to the participant, the assigned perspective appeared 
at the top of each page of the experimental materials in the online survey. Please see 
Appendix J for the full participant perspective instructions. 
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 Legal case summary (drug court). A two-page written summary of the case 
facts of State of Nebraska v. Brent R. Kahler (2012) (loosely modeled after State of 
Tennessee v. Brent R. Stewart (2010) presented at the beginning of the paper) served as 
the stimulus case for the measurement tasks in this study.  
 Participants read the drug court summary from their assigned perspective. 
Specifically, those in the predictor, observer, or actor-referenced experiencer condition 
read the name ‘Brent Kahler’ as the actor in the scenario. Participants in the self-
referenced experiencer condition read the summary with the word ‘you’ in place of 
‘Brent Kahler’. All participants were instructed to “please read the summary carefully as 
you will answer questions about this case at the end of the study.” 
  The case facts described Brent Kahler as an individual who had a history of drug 
problems and as a result, he committed a series of felony offenses, which resulted in his 
voluntary participation in the drug court program. Brent signed a waiver that described 
the rules and obligations of the drug court program. Specifically, Brent agreed to abstain 
from using drugs and alcohol, provide regular and random samples for drug testing, 
attend weekly Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings and weekly meetings with the 
court treatment team. The court also explained that any violation of the agreement would 
result in a variety of sanctions, including increased drug testing, additional court 
appearances, and potentially brief periods of incarceration. Brent was particularly 
motivated to do well in the program because he understood the judge could send the case 
back to criminal court for repeated noncompliance.  
 During Brent’s time in the drug court program, he failed to comply with the basic 
program requirements. Specifically, he failed to appear in court on two separate 
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occasions and failed random drug tests on three separate dates. Finally, two days prior to 
the current hearing, Brent purportedly missed a weekly-required drug test and came 
before the judge for review. The judge called a hearing and explained that he was 
disappointed in Brent’s performance in the program. The judge determined that Brent 
was using drugs and alcohol, which is in violation of the drug court agreement. However, 
Brent insisted that the drug test was scheduled for the following day and thus, Brent did 
not believe there was evidence of a missed required test. He explained that he wrote 
down the date and time of the scheduled drug test on a card, and he could show the court 
the date if he could retrieve the card and present it as evidence. He also wanted to share 
with the court why he had missed and failed previous drug tests.  
 The court then awarded or did not award Brent due process protections at the 
hearing (see the due process manipulation description below). Brent explained his desire 
to continue in the program and promised Judge Zubrod that the court would see 
improvement if he gave him another chance. Ultimately, because of Brent’s repeated 
offenses, the judge sentenced him to thirty days in jail as a sanction. Officers of the court 
immediately took Brent into custody. See Appendix K for the full case fact summary. 
 Due process manipulation. Half of the participants read that the judge provided 
Brent with traditional due process protections and the other half read that the judge did 
not provide Brent with those protections. These due process protections were modeled 
after those awarded to parolees and those on probation, as defined by the Supreme Court 
in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 1973 and Morrissey v. Brewer, 1972.  
Participants in the due process rights awarded condition read: 
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At this time, Judge Zubrod enacted several protections to honor Brent’s [your] due 
process rights. Specifically, the judge gave Brent [you] a written notice of the 
claimed violations of the program and a written disclosure of the evidence against 
him [you].  The statement explained that Judge Zubrod was seeking jail time for 
Brent [you] to help him [you] appreciate the seriousness of the violated drug court 
agreement.  At that point, Judge Zubrod left the bench and a different, neutral 
judge presided over the remainder of the hearing. The new judge called several 
drug court staff to testify that Brent [you] had failed drug testing and did not show 
up for one of the drug testing sessions. The judge then allowed Brent [you] to 
question the drug court staff, show the judge his appointment card with the next 
day’s date written on it, and give a statement about why he [you] failed previous 
drug tests. 
Participants in the due process rights not awarded condition read: 
In drug court, judges do not give clients the same due process rights as they would 
in a criminal court.  Judge Zubrod did not provide Brent [you] with a written 
notice of the claimed violations of the program or a written disclosure of the 
evidence against him [you].  The judge gave no reason why he was seeking jail 
time for Brent [you] other than that Brent [you] had failed the drug tests and 
failed to attend a drug testing session. Several drug court staff reported to the 
judge that Brent [you] had failed several drug tests and did not show up for one of 
the drug testing sessions. Judge Zubrod did not allow Brent [you] to question the 
drug court staff, he did not examine Brent’s [your] appointment card, or allow a 
statement about why Brent [you] failed previous drug tests.  
  80
Please see Appendix L for the full due process description. 
 Perspective manipulation booster. Participants wrote a short, manipulation-
boosting paragraph about their assigned perspective (predictor, observer, actor-referenced 
experiencer, or self-referenced experiencer) to encourage them to consider the dependent 
measures from that perspective. Specifically, in the provided space, each participant was 
asked to “put yourself in the place of [assigned perspective]. From this perspective, 
briefly write what you [Brent] know[s] about drug courts and the services they provide.” 
See Appendix M for a full summary of the manipulation booster instructions from each 
assigned perspective. 
Design and Procedure 
 Experiment 1a was a 4 (perspective: predictor vs. observer vs. actor-referenced 
experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer) x 2 (due process: present vs. absent) 
between-subjects design.  
 Participants who freely chose to participate in the study through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk program linked to a website that randomly assigned them to one of the 
eight research design conditions. All experiment materials were posted to a website 
created through Qualtrics, an internet survey design and data collection program.  
 Upon accessing the online survey via Qualtrics, participants completed an 
informed consent form. Then, those in the observer and experiencer conditions (not the 
predictor condition) read the one-page drug court summary titled, “What is a Drug 
Court?’’ The instructions directed participants to, “Please read the following description 
carefully…Soon, you will see a number of questions about a specific drug court case. 
This information will help you understand that case.” This description was particularly 
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important for participants in the observer and experiencer conditions to help them 
effectively role-play their assigned perspective. 
 Then, similar to the perspective-taking procedures used by Igou (2008) and 
Wiener et al., (2013), participants read and thought about the legal summary from one of 
the four randomly assigned perspectives described above (predictor, observer, actor-
referenced experiencer, or self-referenced experiencer). To further encourage the 
participants to focus on their assigned perspective, the participants were encouraged to, 
“take several minutes before you move on to put yourself in the place of this person and 
think about what he or she may be like.” The description of the participant’s assigned 
perspective also appeared at the top of each subsequent page and section in the online 
survey to remind participants of their task.  
 The website then directed participants to the legal case summary, State of 
Nebraska v. Brent R. Kahler, 2012. The instructions read,  “Please read the following 
summary carefully…from the perspective of [insert assigned perspective]…as you will 
answer questions about this case at the end of the study.” Then, those in the condition 
without due process rights read that the court did not afford the client due process at the 
time of the sanctioning hearing. The other half of the participants read that the judge 
carefully informed the client about his due process rights at the time of the sanctioning 
hearing, as defined in Appendix L. 
 Participants then completed the perspective manipulation booster to encourage 
them to consider the legal case and subsequent dependent measures from their assigned 
perspective. After they wrote the manipulation booster paragraph, they completed the 
case fact questionnaire, which served as an attention check and a comprehension 
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measure. Then, participants completed the coping skills questionnaire, similarity 
questionnaire, the anticipated affect PANAS-X surveys (intensity and duration), the well-
being questionnaire, and the brief survey about procedural fairness. Again, participants 
considered each of these surveys from their randomly assigned perspective (predictor, 
observer, actor-referenced experiencer, self-referenced experiencer). Finally, participants 
completed the demographic survey.  
 Participants then read a thank you and debriefing statement. Upon completion, the 
Mechanical Turk website paid the participants directly for their participation.  
Results
Overview
The results are organized into four sections. The first section summarizes the 
measures, scale construction, and variable construction for Experiment 1a. Section two 
includes tests of hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and part of 4 using basic, moderation, and mediation 
analyses for coping and similarity for each of the dependent variables in Experiment 1a. 
Section three tests the relationship of familiarity with drug use as a potential moderator 
with each of the dependent variables (hypothesis 4). Finally, section four tests the 
mediating relationship of due process through procedural fairness on the participants’ 
anticipated negative impact of a court-imposed sanction (exploratory hypothesis 6). 
Section I: Measures and Variable Construction 
 Scale construction and reliabilities. Table 1 includes a summary of the alpha 
reliabilities, means, and standard deviations for all scales in Experiment 1a, including the 
coping skills questionnaire, similarity questionnaire, PANAS-X intensity scale (positive 
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and negative affect), PANAS-X duration scale (positive and negative affect), 
embarrassed and ashamed scale, well-being intensity and duration scales, and the 
procedural fairness questionnaire. The method section of Experiment 1 overall describes 
each measure and the construction of each scale. 
 Variable construction.  
Drug use familiarity and problems. The researcher was interested in whether the 
study results of Experiment 1a (drug court) would be influenced by participants’ 
familiarity with self or friend drug use. Two questions (for self drug use and friend drug 
use) asked whether the participants had used drugs in the past (had a friend who used 
drugs in the past) and whether they (their friend) had experienced problems as a result of 
that drug use. See Appendix H for the relevant questions.  
 The first step in creating a composite continuous variable as a measure of those 
who used drugs themselves was to code participants who noted they had not used drugs 
in the past with a score of 0. All other participants received the scale value derived from 
the second question, measuring any problems with drug use for those who admitted to 
using. Sixty-two percent of participants reported no experience with self-drug use, 
whereas 37% reported at least some experience with drug use. Creating a composite 
continuous variable for a measure of those whose friends used drugs followed the same 
pattern, assigning a zero to all who did not have friends who used drugs. All other 
participants received the scale value derived from the second question, regarding any 
problems that friends who used had with drugs. Here, 41% of participants reported not 
having a friend who had used drugs and 57% reported knowing a friend who had used.  
The mean scores for the newly derived self drug problems variable were .51 (SD = .90) 
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and 2.41 (SD = 2.59) for the friend drug problems variable for Experiment 1a. Table 5, 
which displays the correlations between the self and friend drug problems variables and 
each dependent variable shows no relationship between these two indices and the 
dependent variables of interest.9 No further analyses involved self or friend drug problem 
measures.   
Section II: Basic, Moderation, and Mediation Analyses for Experiment 1a (Drug 
Courts)
Section two includes tests of hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and part of 4 for drug court 
participants. Specifically, section two is organized by each dependent variable (positive 
affect duration and intensity, negative affect duration and intensity, embarrassed and 
ashamed scale, well-being duration and intensity, and procedural fairness). For each 
dependent variable, the author tested a basic general linear model to identify whether 
there was a hypothesized perspective effect (hypothesis 1), due process effect (hypothesis 
2), or a two-way perspective by due process effect (hypothesis 3). A between-subjects 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with perspective as a four-level 
manipulated factor (predictor vs. observer vs. actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-
referenced experiencer) and due process as a two-level manipulated factor (due process 
present vs. due process absent) with each of the dependent variables in the section below 
is the basic model that tests the major hypotheses throughout Experiment 1a.  
 Following the basic model tests are tests of the moderating and mediating effects 
of coping knowledge and similarity (hypothesis 4), respectively. Mediation tests only 

9 There was some skewness and kurtosis in the self and friend drug problem variables, which suggested the 
need for a log transformation. The correlations did not differ between the transformed and untransformed 
variables so that Table 5 reports the original, untransformed variables. 
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follow where there were main effects for due process or perspective or the interaction 
between these two factors in the basic or moderation analyses.  
 Positive affect duration and intensity.  The 4 (perspective: predictor vs. 
observer vs. actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer) by 2 (due 
process: present vs. absent) MANOVA design with positive affect duration and positive 
affect intensity serving as dependent variables revealed no multivariate effect for due 
process, F(2, 194) = .78, p = .50, p2 = .01, perspective, F(6, 388) = 1.31, p = .25, p2 = 
.02, and no interaction, F(6, 388) = 1.06, p = .38, p2  = .02. Furthermore, there were no 
univariate effects for positive affect duration or positive affect intensity. See Tables 6 and 
7 for a summary of the means and standard deviations of each dependent variable by 
perspective in the due process present condition (Table 6) and in the due process absent 
condition (Table 7) for Experiment 1a. 
Coping knowledge moderation. Adding coping knowledge (a measured, 
continuous factor) along with all interactions between coping and the manipulated factors 
tested the moderating effects. This was a 4 (perspective) x 2 (due process) general linear 
model with coping as a continuous factor and positive affect duration and positive affect 
intensity as dependent variables. There was no significant multivariate main effect for 
coping, F(2, 186) = .77, p = .47, p2 = .01, nor were there any significant coping 
univariate effects. There were also no significant multivariate main effects or univariate 
effects for due process, F(2, 186) = .34, p = .71, p2 = .004, or perspective, F(6, 374) = 
1.06, p = .30, p2 = .02. There were also no significant multivariate interactions or 
significant interaction univariate effects.  
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 Similarity moderation. Adding perceived similarity (a measured, continuous 
factor) along with all interactions between similarity and all the manipulated factors 
tested the moderating effects. This was a 4 (perspective) x 2 (due process) general linear 
model with similarity as a continuous factor and positive affect duration and positive 
affect intensity as dependent variables. There was a significant multivariate main effect 
for similarity, F(2, 186) = 4.57, p = .01, p2 = .05, and significant univariate effects for 
similarity on positive affect duration, F(1, 187) = 4.84, p = .03, p2 = .03,  = .22, and 
positive affect intensity, F(1, 187) = 7.72, p = .01, p2 = .04,  = .27. This shows that 
increases in similarity resulted in significant increases in positive affect duration and 
positive affect intensity. 
 There was also a significant multivariate main effect for due process, F(2, 374) = 
3.78, p = .03, p2 = .04, and a significant univariate effect for due process on positive 
affect duration, F(1, 187) = 7.39, p = .01, p2 = .04, where participants anticipated longer 
positive affect when due process was absent (M = 2.39, SD = .3.36) than when due 
process was present (M = 2.05, SD = 2.69). (Note: for all GLM and ANCOVA models, 
the means reported in the text are estimated at the intercept of the continuous variable in 
the model.) The univariate effect for due process on positive affect intensity was not 
significant, F(1, 187) = 2.23, p > .05. The multivariate main effect for perspective was 
not significant, F(6, 374) = 1.50, p = .18, p2 = .03, nor were there significant univariate 
perspective effects. 
   Similarity interacted with due process, F(2, 186) = 4.61, p = .01, p2 = .03, to 
qualify the due process multivariate main effect. The univariate interaction for positive 
affect duration was significant, F(1, 187) = 8.74, p = .004, p2 = .05.  Figure 1 displays 
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the results of the interaction. Follow up tests using simple slope analyses (Dawson, 2014) 
showed that increases in similarity led to longer positive affect duration when due 
process was absent, ( = .47, p = .02), however, the effect of similarity when due process 
was present was not significant ( = .02, p > .05). The univariate interaction for positive 
affect intensity was not significant, F(1, 187) = 3.34, p > .05. 
 There was also a multivariate interaction approaching significance between 
similarity and perspective, F(6, 374) = 2.03, p = .06, p2 = .03. Follow up univariate 
analyses showed that the univariate interaction for positive affect duration was not 
significant F(1, 187) = .36, p > .05, nor was the univariate interaction for positive affect 
intensity F(1, 187) = 2.18, p > .05. 
 Coping knowledge mediation. The correlations between similarity and positive 
affect duration (r = .12, p = .09) and intensity (r = .06, p = .37) were not significant. 
Because mediation requires a significant relationship between the mediator (perceived 
similarity) and the dependent variable of interest, there was no need to pursue a more 
formal analysis testing whether coping knowledge mediated the due process effect on 
positive affect.  
 Negative affect duration and intensity. The basic MANOVA model with 
negative affect duration and negative affect intensity as dependent variables resulted in 
non-significant multivariate effects for due process, F(2, 194) = 2.22, p = .11, p2  = .02, 
and perspective, F(6, 390) = .83, p = .55, p2  = .01. The interaction was also not 
significant, F(6, 388) = .48, p = .82, p2  = .007. Furthermore, the univariate effects for 
negative affect duration and negative affect intensity were not significant. 
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 Coping knowledge. Adding coping knowledge (a measured, continuous factor) 
along with all the interactions between coping and all the manipulated factors tested the 
moderating effect and found no significant multivariate main effects for coping, F(2, 186) 
= .06, p = .95, p2 = .001, due process, F(2, 186) = .14, p = .87, p2 = .001, or perspective, 
F(6, 372) = .57, p = .75, p2 = .01. The univariate effects for negative affect duration and 
negative affect intensity were also not significant. There were also no significant 
multivariate interactions or univariate interaction effects.   
 Similarity moderation. Including perceived similarity in the basic model to test 
for moderation revealed no significant multivariate main effects for similarity, F(2, 186) 
= 1.41, p = .25, p2 =  .02, due process, F(2, 186) = .20, p = .82, p2 = .002, or 
perspective, F(6, 372) = .43, p = .86, p2 = .01. The univariate effects for negative affect 
duration and negative affect intensity were also not significant. There were also no 
significant multivariate interactions or univariate interaction effects. 
 Embarrassed and ashamed scale. An ANOVA similar to the basic multivariate 
model used the embarrassed and ashamed scale as the dependent variable. The results 
indicated no significant main effect for due process, F(1, 195) = .50, p = .48, p2  =.003. 
However the main effect for perspective was significant, F(3, 195) = 3.79, p = .01, p2  = 
.06, whereby those in the self-referenced experiencer condition (M = .33, SD = .86), 
anticipated feeling significantly more embarrassed and ashamed than participants in the 
predictor (M = -.12, SD = .80, p = .01), observer (M = -.06, SD = .85, p = .01), and actor-
referenced experiencer groups (M = -.15, SD = .78, p = .004). The interaction between 
due process and perspective was not significant, F(3, 195) = 1.85, p = .14, p2  = .03. 
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 Coping knowledge moderation. Adding coping knowledge to the basic ANOVA 
model to test for moderation resulted in no significant main effect for coping, F(1, 187) = 
.18, p = .67, p2 = .001, due process, F(1, 187) = .78, p = .38, p2 = .04, or perspective, 
F(3, 187) = .22, p = .88, p2 = .004. There were also no significant interactions. 
 Coping knowledge mediation. The correlation between coping knowledge and the 
embarrassed and ashamed scale (r = .09, p = .20) was not significant. Therefore, coping 
knowledge was likely not a potential mediator of the relationship between perspective 
and feelings of embarrassment and shame.  
 Similarity moderation. Adding perceived similarity to the basic ANOVA model 
tested for moderation and found the main effects for similarity, F(1, 187) = .11, p = .75, 
p2  = .001, due process, F(1, 187) = .02, p = .88, p2   = <.001, and perspective, F(3, 187) 
= 1.64, p = .18, p2  =.03, were not significant. There were also no significant interactions. 
 Similarity mediation. The correlation between perceived similarity and the 
embarrassed and ashamed scale (r = .22, p = .09) was not significant. Therefore, coping 
knowledge was likely not a potential mediator of the relationship between perspective 
and shame. 
 Well-being duration and intensity. The basic MANOVA model with well-being 
duration and well-being intensity as dependent variables revealed no significant 
multivariate main effect for due process, F(2, 194) = 1.32, p = .27, p2 = .01, perspective, 
F(6, 388) = 1.43, p = .20, p2 = .02, or the multivariate interaction, F(6, 388) = 1.28, p = 
.27, p2 = .02. Furthermore, the univariate effects for well-being duration and well-being 
intensity were not significant. 
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 Coping knowledge moderation. Adding coping knowledge as a potential 
moderator produced no significant multivariate main effects or univariate effects for 
coping knowledge, F(2, 186) = .86, p = .43, p2 = .01, due process, F(2, 186) = .38, p = 
.9, p2 = .01, or perspective, F(6, 372) = 1.21, p = .30, p2 = .02.  
 The due process by perspective multivariate interaction was significant, F(6, 372) 
= 2.62, p = .02, p2 = .04. Specifically, the univariate interaction for well-being duration 
was significant, F(3, 187) = 3.99, p = .01, p2 = .06. When due process is absent, those in 
the predictor condition (M = 4.26, SD = .99) anticipated that their well-being would be 
negatively impacted for a shorter amount of time than those in the self-referenced 
experiencer condition (M = 4.91, SD = .291, p = .05). There were no other significant 
pairwise comparisons. When due process is present, those in the observer condition (M = 
3.76, SD = 1.17) anticipated that their well-being would be negatively impacted for a 
significantly shorter amount of time than those in the predictor condition (M = 4.81, SD = 
1.51, p = .01) or the self-referenced experiencer condition (M = 4.80, SD = 1.83, p = .01). 
There were no other significant pairwise comparisons.  The univariate interaction for 
well-being intensity was not significant, F(3, 187) = .69, p > .05. 
 There was also a significant three-way multivariate interaction between coping, 
due process, and perspective, F(6, 372) = 3.19, p = .01, p2 = .05. The univariate 
interaction on well-being duration was significant, F(3, 187) = 4.68, p = .004, p2 = .07. 
Tests of the interaction of coping and due process at each perspective level and found 
significant effects for the predictor condition, F(1, 53) = 6.57, p = .013, p2 = .11, and the 
actor-referenced experiencer condition, F(1, 43) = 6.76, p = .01, p2 = .14. The 
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interactions for the observer condition, F(1, 45) = .01, p > .05, and the self-referenced 
experiencer condition, F(1, 46) = .08, p > .05, were not significant. 
Figure 2 displays the coping by due process interaction for the predictor 
perspective. Follow up tests using simple slope analyses (Dawson, 2014) showed that 
increases in coping led to longer negative well-being duration when due process was 
present, ( = .47, p = .02), however, the effect of coping when due process was absent 
was not significant, ( = -.13, p > .05).   
Figure 3 displays the coping by due process interaction for the actor-referenced 
experiencer perspective. Follow up tests using simple slope analyses (Dawson, 2014) 
showed that under high coping at one standard deviation above the mean, participants in 
the due process absent condition predicted longer negative well-being than those in the 
due process present condition,  =. -44, t(43) = -2.18, p = .04. Under low coping at one 
standard deviation below the mean, there were no significant differences between those 
in the due process present and due process absent conditions,  = .31, t(43) = 1.55, p = 
.13. 
 The univariate interaction on well-being intensity was not significant, F(3, 187) = 
.27, p = .85. 
 Coping knowledge mediation. The correlations between coping knowledge and 
well-being duration (r = .12, p = .10) and well-being intensity (r = .06, p = .42) were not 
significant. Therefore, coping knowledge was likely not a potential mediator of the due 
process or perspective effects. 
 Similarity moderation. Adding perceived similarity as a potential moderator 
produced no significant multivariate main effects for similarity, F(2, 186) = .25, p = .78, 
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p2 = .003, due process, F(2, 186) = .37, p = .69, p2 = .004, or perspective, F(6, 372) = 
.94, p = .46, p2 = .02. The univariate effects for well-being duration and well-being 
intensity were not significant. There were also no significant multivariate interactions or 
univariate interaction effects.  
 Procedural fairness. The basic ANOVA model with the procedural fairness scale 
as a dependent variable indicated a significant main effect for due process, F(1, 195) = 
40.80, p < .001, p2  = .17, whereby those in the due process present condition (M = 4.83, 
SD = 1.35) experienced greater procedural fairness than those in the due process absent 
condition (M = 3.57, SD = 1.46). The main effect for perspective approached 
significance, F(3, 195) = 2.48, p = .06, p2  = .04. Specifically, those in the predictor 
condition (M = 4.54, SD = 1.54) experienced greater procedural fairness than those in the 
actor-referenced experiencer (M = 3.95, SD = 1.58, p = .04) and the self-referenced 
experiencer conditions (M = 3.94, SD = 1.40, p = .03). There were no other significant 
pairwise comparisons. The interaction between due process and perspective was not 
significant, F(3, 195) = .16, p = .92, p2  = .002. 
 Coping knowledge moderation. When coping knowledge was added to the basic 
model to test for moderation, the model revealed a non-significant main effect for coping 
knowledge, F(1, 187) = .15, p = .70, p2 = .001. The due process effect main effect was 
significant, however, F(1, 187) = 3.80, p = .05, p2 = .02, whereby those in the due 
process present condition experienced significantly greater procedural fairness (M = 4.77, 
SD = 1.35) than those in the due process absent condition (M = 3.73, SD = 1.45). The 
perspective main effect was not significant, F(3, 187) = 1.65, p = .18, p2 = .03.  
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 Coping also interacted with due process and perspective, qualifying the due 
process main effect, F(3, 187) = 3.18, p = .03, p2 = .05. The researcher calculated the 
interaction of coping and due process at each perspective level and found a significant 
effect for the predictor condition, F(1, 53) = 11.62, p = .001, p2 = .18. The interactions 
for the observer, F(1, 45) = .37, p > .05,  actor-referenced experiencer, F(1, 43) = .34, p > 
.05, and self-referenced experiencer conditions, F(1, 46) = .11, p > .05, were not 
significant. Figure 4 displays the coping by due process interaction for the predictor 
perspective. Follow up tests using simple slope analyses (Dawson, 2014) showed that 
increases in coping led to greater procedural fairness when due process was absent, ( = 
.53, p = .001), however, the effect of coping when due process was present was not 
significant ( = -.29, p > .05). Further, under low coping at one standard deviation below 
the mean, participants in the due process present condition experienced greater 
procedural fairness than those in the due process absent condition,  = .82, t(53) = 5.26, p 
<.01. Under high coping at one standard deviation above the mean, there were no 
significant differences between those in the due process present and due process absent 
conditions,  = .06, t(53) = .36, p > .05. 
 Coping knowledge mediation. The correlation between coping knowledge and 
procedural fairness (r = .05, p = .51) was not significant. Therefore, coping knowledge 
was likely not a potential mediator of the due process or perspective effects.  
 Similarity moderation. When similarity was added to the basic model to test for 
moderation, the similarity main effect was not significant, F(1, 187) = .01, p = .94, p2 = 
.003. The due process main effect was significant, however, F(1, 187) = 4.87, p = .03, p2 
= .03. As in the basic model, those in the due process present condition (M = 4.63, SD = 
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1.35) experienced significantly greater procedural fairness than those in the due process 
absent condition (M = 3.61, SD = 1.46). The perspective effect was not significant, F(3, 
187) = .18, p = .92, p2 = .003. There were also no significant interactions. 
 Similarity mediation. The correlation between perceived similarity and 
procedural fairness (r = .13, p = .07) was not significant. Therefore, similarity was likely 
not a potential mediator of the due process or perspective effects.  
Section III: Familiarity with Drug Use 
Hypothesis 4 explored a potential moderating effect of familiarity with drug use 
on the manipulated factors as they impacted the dependent variables. More specifically, it 
is possible that participants familiar with drug use reacted differently to the dependent 
measures than did those unfamiliar with drug use.  
 Self drug use. A series of correlations between the self drug problems continuous 
variable and each of the dependent variables (positive affect duration and intensity, 
negative affect duration and intensity, embarrassed and ashamed scale, well-being 
duration and intensity, and procedural fairness) measured the potential influence of 
familiarity on the major dependent measures in Experiment 1a. Table 5 shows that self 
drug problems was not significantly correlated with any of the dependent variables and 
therefore required no further analyses involving self drug problems as a familiarity 
measure. 
Friend drug use. The same series of correlations between the friend drug 
problems continuous variable and each of the dependent variables again showed no 
significant correlations with any of the dependent variables. Thus, there was no need to 
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conduct further analyses involving friend drug problems as a familiarity measure. See 
Table 5 for a summary of the correlation analyses. 
Section IV: Exploratory Procedural Fairness Mediation Analyses 
 Exploratory hypothesis 6 concerned the relationships between due process, 
procedural fairness, and a participant’s anticipated negative reaction to a sanction. A 
between-subjects MANOVA with due process as a two-level manipulated factor and each 
of the measures of interest (positive affect duration and intensity, negative affect duration 
and intensity, embarrassed and ashamed scale, and well-being duration and intensity) as 
dependent variables showed a significant multivariate effect.  See Table 8 for a summary 
of the results. The significant multivariate model, F(1, 201) = 4.58, p < .001, p2 = .19, 
showed a significant effect of due process on negative affect duration, F(1, 201) = 3.82, p 
= .05, p2 = .02, such that those in the due process present condition anticipated a shorter 
duration of negative affect (M =18.73, SD = 8.18) than those in the due process absent 
condition (M = 21.11, SD = 9.08). There was also a significant effect for procedural 
fairness, F(1, 201) = 41.47, p < .001, p2 = .17, such that those in the due process present 
condition experienced more procedural fairness (M = 4.85, SD = 1.35) than those in the 
due process absent condition (M = 3.58, SD = 1.46) There were no other significant 
effects. 
 The significant effects for procedural fairness and negative affect duration in the 
MANOVA model leave open the possibility that procedural fairness might have mediated 
the effects of due process on negative affect duration. The mediation analyses followed 
Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping approach rather than the traditional Baron and 
Kenny (1985) mediation procedure, the latter of which makes use of ordinary least 
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squares regression and the Sobel (1982) test of mediation to examine indirect effects. The 
Preacher and Hayes procedure calculates standards of error for the regression weights 
using a bootstrapping procedure, which does not make normality assumptions and which 
increases the power of the test statistic. 
 The Preacher and Hayes (2008) test, calculated with an SPSS sub-program in the 
regression routine, produces an OLS path analysis and a matrix of indirect effect 
coefficients of the independent variable (due process) on the dependent variable (negative 
affect duration). It also calculates coefficients for the potential mediator (procedural 
fairness). The program calculates the indirect path coefficients and their standard errors 
simultaneously with a bootstrapping procedure that estimated 50,000 bootstraps thereby 
reducing the bias in the estimators that result from deviations from normality 
assumptions. 
 Figure 5 illustrates the results from the Preacher and Hayes mediation analysis. 
The rectangles represent the cause (due process) and effect (negative affect duration) 
variables. The oval is the potential mediator (procedural fairness). The arrows are the 
path coefficients that emerged in the Preacher and Hayes analysis. The figure represents a 
simple model in which procedural fairness served as a direct mediator between due 
process and negative affect duration. Figure 5 shows the mediation model such that the 
direct path before mediation ( = -2.38, p = .05) is significant but drops to a non-
significant association after including the mediator (procedural fairness) ( = -1.63, p = 
.22). Due process present decreases anticipated negative affect duration and increases 
procedural fairness. However, procedural fairness did not contribute to the participants’ 
anticipated duration of negative affect ( = -.58, p = .12). 
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 Table 9 lists the indirect path effects and the 95th percent confidence intervals for 
those parameters. The confidence interval for the indirect path coefficient for procedural 
fairness contains zero, so the coefficient for procedural fairness is not significantly 
different from zero. Thus, procedural fairness did not mediate the effect of due process on 
negative affect duration. 
Experiment 1b—Mental Health Court 
Method
 Recall that the overall objective of Experiment 1 was to investigate problem-
solving court clients’ and anticipated affective experiences and well-being after a 
sanction, as it relates to participant perspective and procedural due process in both drug 
courts and mental health courts. Although the overarching objectives (decreased 
offending) in both types of courts and the general philosophy of therapeutic jurisprudence 
are similar, the typical court client and treatment goals differ. Thus, because of the 
confounded comparison between drug and mental health courts as a manipulated 
variable, there were two parts to Experiment 1.  
 Experiment 1b is a conceptual replication of Experiment 1a. Experiment 1a 
investigated the impact of participant perspective and due process on anticipated emotion 
and well-being for drug court clients, whereas Experiment 1b employed an identical 
design for mental health court clients. The legal summaries of the cases (drug v. mental 
health court) in the two experiments mirrored each other as closely as possible.  This 
allowed for comparisons between the two cases on the overall effects of the AIK 
hypothesis, recognizing that the drug court and mental health court cases are inevitably 
different with regard to court process and some of the case facts. Thus, the data from 
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Experiments 1a and 1b represent replications rather than an experimental manipulation. 
Experiment 1a and 1b data were collected simultaneously. 
Participants 
 One-hundred and ninety-eight participants with a mean age of 32.52 (SD = 10.30) 
completed Experiment 1b. Fifty-nine percent of the participants were female and 41% 
were male. The sample was 74.7% Caucasian, 9.3% Asian or Pacific Islander, 8.2% 
African American, 5.2% Hispanic and 2.5% identified as “other” ethnicity. Condition cell 
sizes ranged from 20-28.10 
Materials 
 Mental health court description. As in Experiment 1a, in order to familiarize 
participants with problem-solving courts, and specifically mental health courts, 
participants in the observer and experiencer conditions first read a one page description 
about mental health courts to provide them with a basic knowledge of and familiarity 
with a typical mental health court and its clients. The description closely mirrored that of 
the drug court summary. The description, titled “What is a Mental Health Court?” 
summarized the background, basic components, and therapeutic jurisprudential goals of a 
mental health court, and was based in part on information that the Urban Institute 
(Rossman et al., 2012) and the Center for Court Innovation (Porter et al., 2010) have 
gathered and disseminated. See Appendix N for the full description. 
 Legal case summary (mental health court). The mental health court case 
summary mirrored the drug court case summary in most ways. The basic fact pattern, 
court’s procedures, and client outcome (incarceration as a sanction) were identical. 

10The 198 Experiment 1b participants are a subset of the 402 Experiment 1 participants described in the 
Experiment 1 overall methods section.
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However, the case featured a client who struggled with mental illness instead of drug 
addiction.  
 A two-page written summary of the case facts of State of Nebraska v. Brent R. 
Kahler (2012) (loosely modeled after State of Tennessee v. Brent R. Stewart (2010) 
presented at the beginning of the paper) served as the stimulus case for the measurement 
tasks in this study.  
 Participants read the mental health court summary from their assigned perspective 
(see Appendix O). Specifically, those in the predictor, observer, or actor-referenced 
experiencer condition read the name ‘Brent Kahler’ as the actor in the scenario. 
Participants in the self-referenced experiencer condition read the summary with the word 
‘you’ in place of ‘Brent Kahler’. All participants were instructed to “please read the 
summary carefully as you will answer questions about this case at the end of the study.”  
   The facts describe Brent Kahler as an individual with a history of mental illness 
and as a result, he committed a series of felony offenses, which resulted in his voluntary 
participation in the mental health court program. Brent signed a waiver that described the 
rules and obligations of the drug court program. Specifically, Brent agreed to attend 
regular psychological counseling sessions, adhere to a prescribed medication regimen, 
attend weekly National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) support group meetings, take 
regular drug and alcohol tests, and attend weekly meetings with the court treatment team. 
Court personnel explained that any violation of the agreement would result in a variety of 
sanctions, including increased psychological counseling, additional court appearances, 
and potentially brief periods of incarceration. Brent was particularly motivated to do well 
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in the program because he understood the Judge could send the case back to criminal 
court for repeated noncompliance.  
 During Brent’s time in the mental health court program, he failed to comply with 
the basic program requirements. Specifically, he failed to appear in court on two separate 
occasions and failed to attend scheduled psychological counseling sessions on three 
separate dates. Finally, two days prior to the current hearing, Brent purportedly missed a 
scheduled medical check-in to ensure he had adhered to his prescribed medication 
regimen and came before the judge for review. Finally, two days prior to the current 
hearing, Brent purportedly missed a weekly-required drug test and came before the judge 
for review. The judge called a hearing and explained that he was disappointed in Brent’s 
performance in the program. The judge determined that he had not adhered to his 
prescribed medication regimen or psychological counseling schedule, which is in 
violation of the drug court agreement. However, Brent insisted that the medical check-in 
was scheduled for the following day and thus, Brent did not believe there was evidence of 
a missed appointment. He explained that he wrote down the date and time of the 
scheduled medical check-in on a card, and could show the court if he was allowed to 
retrieve it and present it as evidence. He also wanted to share with the court why he had 
missed previous counseling sessions.  
 The court then awarded or did not award Brent due process protections at the 
hearing (see the due process manipulation below). Brent explained his desire to continue 
in the program and promised Judge Zubrod that the court would see improvement if he 
gave him another chance. Ultimately, because of Brent’s repeated offenses, the judge 
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sentenced him to thirty days in jail as a sanction. Officers of the court immediately took 
Brent into custody. See Appendix P for the full case fact summary. 
 Due process manipulation. Half of the participants read that the judge provided 
Brent with traditional due process and the other half read that the judge did not provide 
Brent with those protections. As in Experiment 1a, these due process protections were 
modeled after those awarded to parolees and those on probation, as defined by the 
Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 1973 and Morrissey v. Brewer, 1972.  
See Appendix Q for the due process rights manipulation for the mental health case. 
 Experiment 1b included a similar perspective booster as in Experiment 1a (See 
Appendix R, which is the booster manipulation for the mental health court case).  The 
dependent measures for Experiment 1b were the same as those for 1a (Appendices A 
through H). None of the measures identified the court case as either a drug case or a 
mental health case.  
Design and Procedure 
 Experiment 1b utilized the same design as Experiment 1a, a 4 (perspective: 
predictor vs. observer vs. actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer) x 
2 (due process: present vs. absent) between-subjects design. The researcher collected the 
data simultaneously with and in exactly the same manner as described in Experiment 1a.  
Results
Overview
 The results are organized into the same four sections as Experiment 1a. The first 
section summarizes the measures, scale construction, and variable construction for 
Experiment 1b. Section two includes tests of hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and part of 4 through 
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basic, moderation, and mediation analyses for coping and similarity for each of the 
dependent variables in Experiment 1b. Section three tests the relationship of familiarity 
with mental illness as a potential moderator with each of the dependent variables 
(hypothesis 4). Finally, section four tests the mediating relationship of due process 
through procedural fairness on the participants’ anticipated negative impact of a court-
imposed sanction (exploratory hypothesis 6). 
Section I: Measures and Variable Construction 
 Scale construction and reliabilities. Table 1 includes a summary of the alpha 
reliabilities, means, and standard deviations for all scales in Experiment 1b, including the 
coping skills questionnaire, similarity questionnaire, PANAS-X intensity scale (positive 
and negative affect), PANAS-X duration scale (positive and negative affect), 
embarrassed and ashamed scale, well-being intensity and duration scales, and the 
procedural fairness questionnaire. 
 Variable construction 
Mental health familiarity and problems. The researcher was interested in 
whether the participants’ experience with self or friend mental illness would influence the 
results of Experiment 1b (mental health court). Two questions (for self mental illness and 
friend mental illness) asked whether the participants themselves had experience with 
mental illness (had a friend who has experienced mental illness) and whether they (their 
friend) had experienced problems as a result of that mental illness. See Appendix H for 
the relevant questions.  
 The first step in creating a composite continuous variable as a measure of those 
who had mental health problems themselves was to code participants who noted they had 
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not experienced mental illness in the past with a score of 0. All other participants 
received the scale value derived from the second question, measuring any problems with 
mental illness for those who admitted having mental health issues. Seventy-nine percent 
of participants reported no experience with self-mental illness, whereas 19% reported at 
least some experience with mental illness. Creating a composite continuous variable for a 
measure of those whose friends had mental health problems followed the same pattern, 
assigning a zero to all who did not have friends with mental illness. All other participants 
received the scale value derived from the second question, regarding any problems that 
friends who had mental illness reported.  Here, 65% of participants reported not having a 
friend who has experienced mental illness and 33% reported knowing a friend who has 
experienced mental illness. The mean scores for the newly derived self mental illness 
problems variable were .53 (SD = 1.50) and 1.57 (SD = 2.54) for the friend mental illness 
problems variable for Experiment 1b. Table 10, which displays the correlations between 
the self and friend mental health problems variables and each dependent variable.11  
Section II: Basic, Moderation, and Mediation Analyses for Experiment 1b (Mental 
Health Courts) 
Section two includes tests of hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and part of 4 for mental health 
court participants. Specifically, section two is organized by each dependent variable 
(positive affect duration and intensity, negative affect duration and intensity, embarrassed 
and ashamed scale, well-being duration and intensity, and procedural fairness). For each 
dependent variable, the author tested a basic general linear model to identify whether 
there was a hypothesized perspective effect (hypothesis 1), due process effect (hypothesis 

11 There was some skewness and kurtosis in the self and friend mental health issue variables, which 
suggested the need for a log transformation. The correlations did not differ between the transformed and 
untransformed variables so that Table 10 reports the original, untransformed variables. 
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2), or a two-way perspective by due process effect (hypothesis 3). A between-subjects 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with perspective as a four-level 
manipulated factor (predictor vs. observer vs. actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-
referenced experiencer) and due process as a two-level manipulated factor (due process 
present vs. due process absent) with each of the dependent variables in the section below 
is the basic model that tests the major hypotheses throughout Experiment 1b. 
 Following the basic model tests are tests of moderating and mediating effects of 
coping knowledge and similarity (hypothesis 4), respectively. Mediation tests only follow 
where there were main effects for due process or perspective or the interaction between 
these two factors in the basic or moderation analyses.  
 Positive affect duration and intensity.  The 4 (perspective: predictor vs. 
observer vs. actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer) by 2 (due 
process: present vs. absent) basic MANOVA design with positive affect duration and 
positive affect intensity serving as dependent variables showed no multivariate effect for 
due process, F(2, 186) = 1.79, p = .17, p2 = .02, perspective, F(6, 372) = .83, p = .55, p2 
= .01, or the interaction, F(6, 372) = 1.00, p = .42, p2 = .02. Furthermore, univariate 
effects for positive affect duration and positive affect intensity were not significant. See 
Tables 10 and 11 for a summary of the means and standard deviations of each dependent 
variable by perspective for the due process present condition (Table 11) and the due 
process absent condition (Table 12) for Experiment 1b. 
 Coping knowledge moderation. Adding coping knowledge (a measured, 
continuous factor) along with all the interactions between coping and the manipulated 
factors tested the moderating effects. This was a 4 (perspective) x 2 (due process) general 
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linear model with coping as a continuous factor and positive affect duration and positive 
affect intensity as dependent variables. There were no significant multivariate main 
effects for coping, F(2, 178) = .84, p = .43, p2 = .01, due process, F(2, 178) = .55, p = 
.58, p2 = .01, or perspective, F(6, 356) = .20, p = .98, p2 = .003. The multivariate 
interactions were not significant, nor were any of the univariate effects for positive affect 
duration or positive affect intensity. 
 Similarity moderation. Adding perceived similarity (a measured, continuous 
factor) along with all interactions between similarity and the manipulated factors tested 
the moderating effects. The multivariate main effect for similarity was significant, F(2, 
178) = 4.29, p = .02, p2 = .05, The univariate effect for positive affect duration was not 
significant, F(1, 179) = 1.93, p > .05, however, the univariate effect for positive affect 
intensity was significant, F(1, 179) = 7.65, p = .01, p2 = .04,  = .23. This shows that 
increases in similarity resulted in significant increases in positive affect intensity.  
 The multivariate main effect for due process was not significant, F(2, 178) = 1.49, 
p = .23, p2 = .02. However, the perspective multivariate main effect approached 
significance, F(6, 356) = 1.84, p = .09, p2 = .03. The univariate effect for perspective on 
positive affect duration was not significant, F(3, 179) = .86, p > .05, but the univariate 
effect for perspective on positive affect intensity was, F(3, 179) = 3.11, p = .03, p2 = .05. 
Specifically, those in the actor-referenced experiencer condition (M = 1.42, SD = .60) 
anticipated significantly greater positive affect than those in the predictor (M = 1.15, SD 
= .31, p = .01), observer, (M = 1.14, SD = .36, p = .002) and self-referenced experiencer 
conditions (M = 1.14, SD = .32, p = .002). There were no other significant pairwise 
comparisons.  
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 Similarity interacted with due process, F(2, 178) = 3.36, p = .04, p2 = .04, to 
qualify the similarity multivariate main effect. The univariate interaction for positive 
affect duration was not significant, F(1, 179) = .01, p > .05, however, the univariate 
interaction for positive affect intensity was significant, F(1, 179) = 6.68, p = .01, p2 = 
.04. Figure 6 displays the results of the interaction. Follow up tests using simple slope 
analyses (Dawson, 2014) showed that the effect of similarity when due process was 
present was not significant, ( = .02, p > .05), nor was the effect of similarity when due 
process was absent, ( = .05, p > .05).   Despite the significant interaction, the simple 
slope effects for similarity were not significant under either due process condition.  
 Similarity also interacted with perspective, F(6, 356) = 3.04, p = .01, p2 =.05 to 
qualify the perspective multivariate main effect. The univariate interaction for positive 
affect duration was not significant, F(3, 180) = .63, p > .05, however the univariate 
interaction for positive affect intensity was significant, F(3, 180) = 5.98, p < .001, p2 
=.09. Follow up tests of the interaction between similarity and perspective used planned 
comparisons to test each of the manipulated perspective conditions (predictor, observer, 
actor-referenced experiencer) against the self-referenced experiencer condition and the 
interaction of similarity with each of those planned comparisons. They resulted in 
significant interactions between similarity and the predictor vs. self-referenced 
experiencer comparison, t(180) = -2.52, p = .013, and the actor-referenced experiencer 
vs. self-referenced experiencer comparison, t(180) = 4.15, p < .001. The interaction 
between similarity and the observer vs. self-referenced experiencer comparison was not 
significant, t(180) = -1.52, p > .05. 
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 Simple slope effects (Dawson, 2014) further examined the significant 
interactions. Figure 7 displays the interaction between similarity and the comparison of 
predictor vs. self-referenced experiencer. Under low similarity at one standard deviation 
below the mean, there were no significant differences between those in the self-
referenced experiencer or predictor conditions,  = .14, t(98) = .86, p = .39. Further, there 
were no significant differences between the self-referenced experiencer or predictor 
conditions under high similarity at one standard deviation above the mean,  = -.12, t(98) 
= -1.13, p = .26.  
 Figure 8 displays the interaction between similarity and the comparison of actor-
referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer. Under low similarity at one 
standard deviation below the mean, participants in self-referenced experiencer condition 
anticipated more intense positive affect,  = -.30, t(94) = -2.33, p = .02, than those in the 
actor-referenced experiencer condition. On the other hand, under high similarity at one 
standard deviation above the mean, those in the actor-referenced experiencer condition 
experienced a more intense positive affect,  = .54, t(94) = 4.053, p < .001, than those in 
the self-referenced experiencer condition. 
 There were no other significant interactions or univariate interaction effects. 
 Similarity mediation. The correlation between similarity and positive affect 
duration (r = .03, p = .65) was not significant. However, the correlation between 
similarity and positive affect intensity (r = .14, p = .05) was significant. A MANOVA in 
which perspective was the independent variable and both similarity and positive affect 
intensity served as dependent variables resulted in a significant multivariate effect, F(6, 
192) = 10.51, p < .001, p2  = .14. While, there was a significant univariate effect for 
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similarity, F(3, 192) = 21.46, p < .001, the effect of perspective on positive affect 
intensity as not significant, F(3, 192) = .20, p = .90. Therefore, there was no need to 
conducted further mediation analyses with similarity as the mediator because the effect of 
perspective on positive affect intensity was not significant 
 Negative affect duration and intensity. The basic MANOVA model with 
negative affect duration and negative affect intensity as dependent variables revealed no 
multivariate main effect for due process, F(2, 187) = 2.07, p = .13, p2  = .02, or 
perspective, F(6, 374) = .74, p = .62, p2  = .01. The interaction was also not significant, 
F(6, 374) = .74, p = .62, p2  = .01. Furthermore, the univariate effects for positive affect 
duration or positive affect intensity were not significant. 
 Coping knowledge moderation. Adding coping knowledge to the basic model to 
test for moderation produced no significant main effects for coping, F(2, 179) = 1.16, p = 
.31, p2 = .01, due process, F(2, 179) = .50, p = .61, p2 = .01, or perspective, F(6, 358) = 
1.52, p = .17, p2 = .03. The univariate effects for negative affect duration and negative 
affect intensity were not significant. The multivariate interactions and univariate 
interaction effects were not significant. 
 Similarity moderation. Adding perceived similarity in the basic model to test for 
moderation resulted in non-significant multivariate main effects for similarity, F(2, 179) 
= 1.11, p = .33, p2 =  .01, and due process, F(2, 179) = .44, p = .65, p2 = .01. The 
multivariate main effect for perspective was significant, F(6, 358) = 2.66, p = .02, p2 = 
.04. However, univariate effects for perspective on negative affect duration, F(3, 180) = 
2.22, p > .05, and negative affect intensity, F(3, 180) = 2.14, p > .05, were not significant.  
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 The multivariate interaction between perspective and similarity was significant, 
F(6, 358) = 2.94, p = .01, p2 = .05, which qualified the perspective main effect. 
Specifically, the univariate effect for negative affect duration was significant, F(3, 180) = 
3.45, p = .02, p2 = .06. Follow up tests of the interaction between similarity and 
perspective used planned comparisons to test each of the manipulated perspective 
conditions (predictor, observer, actor-referenced experiencer) against the self-referenced 
experiencer condition and the interaction of similarity with each of those planned 
comparisons. They resulted in a significant interaction between similarity and the 
predictor vs. self-referenced experiencer comparison, t(180) = 2.36 p = .02. The 
interactions between similarity and the observer vs. self-referenced experiencer 
comparison, t(180) = -1.59, p > .05, and the actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-
referenced experiencer comparison, t(180) = -1.80, p > .05, were not significant. 
 Simple slope effects (Dawson, 2014) further examined the significant interaction 
between similarity and the comparison of predictor vs. self-referenced experiencer. 
Figure 9 shows that for those in the self-referenced experiencer condition, ( = 1.51, p = 
.01), and those in the predictor condition, ( = 1.81, p = .04), increases in similarity led to 
a longer negative affect duration. However, under low similarity at one standard 
deviation below the mean,  = -.12, t(98) = -.74, p > .05, and under high similarity at one 
standard deviation above the mean,  = -.01, t(94) = -.03, p > .05, there were no 
differences in negative affect duration between the predictor and self-referenced 
experiencer conditions. 
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 The univariate perspective effect for negative affect intensity was not significant, 
F(3, 180) = 1.80, p > .05. There were no other significant multivariate interaction effects 
or univariate interaction effects. 
 Embarrassed and ashamed scale. A similar basic ANOVA included the 
embarrassed and ashamed scale as the dependent variable. The results indicated no 
significant main effect for due process, F(1, 188) = .03, p = .87, p2  < .001, however the 
main effect for perspective approached significance, F(3, 188) = 1.50, p = .08, p2  = .04, 
whereby those in the self-referenced experiencer condition (M = .23, SD = .82), 
anticipated feeling significantly more embarrassed and ashamed than participants in the 
predictor (M = -.12, SD = .74, p = .03), or observer conditions (M = -.14, SD = .87, p = 
.02). There were no other significant pairwise comparisons. The interaction between due 
process and perspective was also not significant, F(3, 188) = .65, p = .58, p2  = .01. 
 Coping knowledge moderation. Adding coping knowledge to the basic ANOVA 
model tested for moderation and found no significant main effects for coping, F(1, 180) = 
.01, p = .94, p2 < .001, due process, F(1, 180) = .26, p = .61, p2 = .001, or perspective, 
F(3, 180) = .45, p = .72, p2 = .01. The interactions were also not significant.  
 Similarity moderation. Adding perceived similarity to the basic ANOVA model 
to test for the moderating effects of perceived similarity yielded no significant main 
effects for similarity, F(1, 180)= .69, p = .19, p2  = .03, due process, F(1, 180) = .49, p = 
.48, p2 = 003, or perspective, F(3, 180) = 1.61, p = .19, p2  = .03.  
 The interactions were also not significant.   
 Well-being duration and intensity. The basic MANOVA model with well-being 
duration and well-being intensity as dependent variables revealed no significant 
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multivariate main effects for due process, F(2, 185) = 1.59, p = .21, p2 = .02, 
perspective, F(6, 370) = 1.57, p = .20, p2 = .03, or the multivariate interaction, F(6, 370) 
= 1.78, p = .10, p2 = .03. Furthermore, the univariate effects for well-being duration and 
well-being intensity were not significant. 
 Coping knowledge moderation. Adding coping to the model to test for 
moderation revealed no significant multivariate main effects or univariate effects for 
coping knowledge, F(2, 177) = .29, p = .75, p2 = .03, or due process, F(2, 177) = .01, p = 
.99, p2 < .001. However, the multivariate main effect for perspective was significant, 
F(6, 354) = 3.11, p = .01, p2 = .05. Univariate effects for perspective on well-being 
duration, F(3, 178) = 4.51, p = .004, p2 = .08, revealed that those in the self-referenced 
experience condition (M = 4.98, SD = 1.19) anticipated that their well-being would be 
negatively impacted for significantly longer than those in the observer (M = 4.29, SD = 
1.56, p = .02) and actor-referenced experiencer conditions (M = 4.44, SD = 1.23, p = .04). 
Univariate effects for perspective on well-being intensity, F(3, 178) = 5.40, p = .001, p2 
= .08, also revealed that those in the self-referenced experience condition (M = 5.58, SD 
= 1.21) anticipated that their well-being would be more negatively impacted than those in 
the observer (M = 5.03, SD = 1.54, p = .06) and actor-referenced experiencer conditions 
(M = 4.91, SD = 1.22, p = .01). There were no other significant pairwise comparisons. 
 A significant perspective by coping knowledge interaction, F(6, 354) = 2.2 p = 
.05, p2 = .01, qualified the perspective multivariate main effect. Specifically, the 
interaction was significant for well-being duration, F(3, 178) = 3.12, p = .03, p2 = .05. 
Follow up tests of the interaction between coping and perspective used planned 
comparisons to test each of the manipulated perspective conditions (predictor, observer, 
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actor-referenced experiencer) against the self-referenced experiencer condition and the 
interaction of similarity with each of those planned comparisons. They resulted in non-
significant interactions between coping and the predictor vs. self-referenced experiencer 
comparison, t(177) = -.62, p > .05, the observer vs. self-referenced experiencer 
comparison, t(177) = 1.35, p > .05, and the actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-
referenced experiencer comparison, t(177) = 1.61, p > .05. 
 The univariate interaction was also significant for well-being intensity, F(3, 178) 
= 3.97, p = .01, p2 = .06. Follow up tests of the interaction between coping and 
perspective used planned comparisons to test each of the manipulated perspective 
conditions (predictor, observer, actor-referenced experiencer) against the self-referenced 
experiencer condition and the interaction of similarity with each of those planned 
comparisons. They resulted in a significant interaction between coping and the actor-
referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer comparison, t(176) = 2.22, p = .03. 
The interactions between coping and the predictor vs. self-referenced experiencer 
comparison, t(176) = -.41, p > .05, and the observer vs. the self-referenced experiencer 
comparison, t(176) = -.91, p > .05, were not significant.  
 To further examine the significant interaction, the researcher conducted simple 
slope effects (Dawson, 2014). Figure 10 displays the interaction between coping and the 
comparison of actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer. Under low 
coping at one standard deviation below the mean, those in the self-referenced experiencer 
condition anticipated a more intensely negative well-being than those in the actor-
referenced experiencer condition,  = -.54, t(91) = -3.81 p < .001. However, under high 
coping at one standard deviation above the mean, there were no significant differences 
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between the actor-referenced experiencer and self-referenced experiencer conditions on 
well-being intensity,  = .10, t(94) = .75, p = .45.  
 There were no other significant interactions or univariate effects. 
 Coping knowledge mediation. The correlations between coping knowledge and 
well-being duration (r = -.02, p = .83) and well-being intensity (r = -.02, p = .83) were 
not significant. Therefore, coping knowledge was not a potential mediator of the 
perspective main effect. 
 Similarity moderation. Adding similarity to the basic model to test for 
moderation revealed no significant multivariate main effects for similarity, F(2, 177) = 
1.01, p = .37, p2 = .01, due process, F(2, 177) = .52, p = .37, p2 = .01, or perspective, 
F(6, 354) = .83, p = .46, p2 = .01. The univariate effects for well-being duration and 
intensity were not significant. The multivariate interactions and univariate interaction 
effects were also not significant.
 Similarity mediation. The correlations between similarity and well-being duration 
(r = -.07, p = .33) and well-being intensity (r = -.06, p = .43) were not significant. 
Therefore, similarity was likely not a potential mediator of the perspective main effect. 
 Procedural fairness.  The basic ANOVA model with the procedural fairness 
scale as a dependent variable produced  a significant main effect for due process, F(1, 
187) = 31.19, p < .001, p2  = .14, whereby those in the due process present condition (M 
= 4.48, SD = 1.47) experienced greater procedural fairness than those in the due process 
absent condition (M = 3.29, SD = 1.59). There was also a significant main effect for 
perspective, F(3, 187) = 7.38, p < .001, p2  = .10. Specifically, those in predictor 
condition (M = 4.43, SD = 1.59) experienced significantly greater procedural fairness 
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than those in the actor-referenced experiencer (M = 3.39, SD = 1.39, p = .001) and self-
referenced experiencer conditions (M = 3.39, SD = 1.63, p < .001). Further, those in the 
observer condition (M = 4.33, SD = 1.69) also experienced significantly greater 
procedural fairness than those in the actor-referenced experiencer condition (p = .002) 
and the self-referenced experiencer condition (p = .002). There were no other significant 
pairwise comparisons.  
 The interaction between due process and perspective was not significant, F(3, 
195) = .16, p = .92, p2  = .002. 
 Coping knowledge moderation. When coping knowledge was added to the basic 
model to test for moderation, there were no significant main effects for coping 
knowledge, F(1, 179) = .36, p = .55, p2 = .002, or due process, F(1, 179) = 2.53, p = .11, 
p2 = .01. There was, however, a significant perspective main effect, F(3, 179) = 4.79, p = 
.003, p2 = .07, whereby those in predictor condition (M = 4.36, SD = 1.59) experienced 
significantly greater procedural fairness than those in the actor-referenced experiencer (M 
= 3.50, SD = 1.40, p = .009) and self-referenced experiencer conditions (M = 3.28, SD = 
1.63, p = .001). Further, those in the observer condition (M = 4.24, SD = 1.69) also 
experienced significantly greater procedural fairness than those in the actor-referenced 
experiencer condition (p = .026) and the self-referenced experiencer condition (p = .003). 
There were no other significant pairwise comparisons.  
 Coping also interacted with perspective, F(3, 179) = 3.29, p = .02, p2 = .05, 
qualifying the perspective main effect. Follow up tests of the interaction between coping 
and perspective used planned comparisons to test each of the manipulated perspective 
conditions (predictor, observer, actor-referenced experiencer) against the self-referenced 
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experiencer condition and the interaction of similarity with each of those planned 
comparisons. They resulted in a significant interaction between coping and the actor-
referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer comparison, t(177) = -2.14, p = 
.03. The interactions between coping and the predictor vs. self-referenced experiencer 
comparison, t(177) = .14, p > .05, and the observer vs. self-referenced experiencer 
comparison, t(177) = -.63, p > .05, were not significant. 
 Simple slope effects (Dawson, 2014) further examined the significant interaction, 
for coping knowledge with the actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced 
experiencer comparison. Figure 11 displays that under low coping at one standard 
deviation below the mean, those in the actor-referenced experiencer condition 
experienced greater procedural fairness than those in the self-referenced experiencer 
condition,  = .30, t(91) = 2.09, p = .04. On the other hand, under high coping at one 
standard deviation above the mean, those in the actor-referenced experiencer condition 
experienced less procedural fairness than those in the self-referenced experiencer 
condition,  = -.32, t(91) = -2.21, p = .03.  
 No other interactions were significant. 
 Coping knowledge mediation. The correlation between coping knowledge and 
procedural fairness (r = -.01, p = .88) was not significant. Therefore, coping knowledge 
likely was not a potential mediator of the significant perspective effect. 
 Similarity moderation. When similarity was added to the basic model to test for 
moderation, the similarity main effect, F(1, 179) = .49, p = .48, p2 = .003, and due 
process main effect were not significant, F(1, 179) = .91, p = .34, p2 = .01. The 
perspective main effect however, was significant, F(3, 179) = 2.80, p = .04, p2 = .05. 
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Specifically, those in the predictor condition (M = 4.57, SD = 2.60) experienced 
significantly greater procedural fairness than those in the actor-referenced experiencer (M 
= 3.54, SD = 1.40, p = .01) and the self-referenced experiencer conditions (M = 3.49, SD 
= 1.63, p = .002). Similarly, those in the observer condition (M = 4.30, SD = 1.69) 
experienced significantly greater procedural fairness than those in the actor-referenced 
experiencer (p = .04) and self-referenced experiencer conditions (p = .01). There were no 
other significant pairwise comparisons.  
 There were no significant interactions in the moderation model. 
 Similarity mediation. The correlation between perceived similarity and 
procedural fairness (r = .17, p = .02) was significant. A 4 (perspective) by 2 (due process) 
between-subjects analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with perceived similarity as a 
covariate and procedural fairness serving as the dependent variable revealed  
a non-significant effect for similarity, F(1, 186) = .17, p = .70, p2 =  .001. However, 
there was a significant main effect for due process, F(1, 186) = 31.00, p < .001, p2 =  .14, 
whereby those in the due process present condition (M = 4.48, SD = 1.47) experienced 
significantly greater procedural fairness than those in the due process absent condition (M 
= 3.30, SD = 1.59). Similarly, there was a significant perspective main effect, F(3, 186) = 
5.05, p = .002, p2 =  .08. As in the moderation model, those in the predictor condition (M 
= 4.40, SD = 1.60) experienced significantly greater procedural fairness than participants 
in the actor-referenced experiencer (M = 3.42, SD = 1.39, p = .004) and self-referenced 
experiencer conditions (M = 3.42, SD = 1.63, p = .002). Likewise, those in the observer 
condition (M = 4.31, SD = 1.69) also experienced significantly greater procedural fairness 
than those in the actor-referenced experiencer (p = .007) and self-referenced experiencer 
  117
conditions (p = .004). Mediation requires a significant relationship between similarity and 
procedural fairness after taking into account the effects of the manipulated variables. No 
further mediation analyses were necessary because there was no significant relationship 
between similarity and procedural fairness. 
Section III: Familiarity with Mental Illness 
Hypothesis 4 explored a potential moderating effect of familiarity with mental 
health issues on the manipulated factors as they impacted the dependent variables. More 
specifically, it is possible that participants familiar with mental health issues reacted 
differently to the dependent measures than those unfamiliar with mental health issues. 
 Self mental illness. A series of correlations between the self mental illness 
problems continuous variable and each of the dependent variables (positive affect 
duration and intensity, negative affect duration and intensity, embarrassed and ashamed 
scale, well-being duration and intensity, and procedural fairness) measured the potential 
influence of familiarity on the major dependent measures in Experiment 1b.  Table 10 
shows that self mental illness problems was not significantly correlated with any of the 
dependent variables eliminating the need for any further analyses involving self mental 
illness problems as a familiarity measure. 
Friend mental illness. The same series of correlations between the friend mental 
illness problems continuous variable and each of the dependent variables produced a 
moderate correlation with only one of the dependent variables, negative affect intensity (r 
= .20, p = .01). See Table 120. A 4 (perspective) by 2 (due process) between-subjects 
general linear model with friend mental illness problems as a continuous factor, including 
the interactions between friend mental illness and the manipulated factors using negative 
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affect intensity as the dependent variable failed to provide any evidence of moderation. 
The main effects for friend mental illness, F(1, 193) = 3.47, p = .08, p2 = .03, due 
process, F(1, 193) = 2.10, p = .15, p2 = .01, and perspective, F(3, 193) = .31, p = .82, p2 
= .005, were not significant. There were also no significant interactions.  
Section IV: Exploratory Procedural Fairness Mediation Analyses 
 Exploratory hypothesis 6 concerned the relationships between due process, 
procedural fairness, and a participant’s anticipated negative reaction to a sanction. A 
between-subjects MANOVA with due process as a two-level manipulated factor and each 
of the measures of interest (positive affect duration and intensity, negative affect duration 
and intensity, embarrassed and ashamed scale, and well-being duration and intensity) as 
dependent variables showed a multivariate effect, tested any potential relationships 
between due process and the dependent variables, the researcher ran. See Table 13 for a 
summary of the results. The model revealed a significant multivariate effect, F(1, 191) = 
4.13, p < .001, p2 = .17, and specifically a significant effect for procedural fairness, F(1, 
191) = 30.50, p < .001, p2 = .14, such that those in the due process present condition 
experienced more procedural fairness (M = 4.51, SD = 1.48) than those in the due process 
absent condition (M = 3.29, SD = 1.60). There were no other significant effects. Because 
the MANOVA model did not reveal any significant effects for any of the dependent 
variables, the researcher did not pursue further mediation analyses.  
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Experiment 1 Overall—Drug and Mental Health Court 
Method
Design and Procedure 
 Experiment 1 was a 4 (perspective: predictor vs. observer vs. actor-referenced 
experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer) x 2 (due process: present vs. absent) x 2 
(court type: drug court vs. mental health court) between-subjects design.  
 The Experiment 1 Overall analyses include the combined data from Experiment 
1a and Experiment 1b. See Experiment 1 methods section above for a description of the 
participants and Experiments 1a and 1b for a summary of the materials and procedure. 
Results
Overview
 The results section includes additional tests of hypotheses 5a and 5b for 
Experiment 1 overall, comparing drug and mental health courts. The results are organized 
by each dependent variable (positive affect duration and intensity, negative affect 
duration and intensity, embarrassed and ashamed scale, well-being duration and intensity, 
and procedural fairness).  
 For each dependent variable, the researcher tested a basic general linear model to 
identify whether there was a hypothesized perspective effect (hypothesis 1), due process 
effect (hypothesis 2), or a two-way perspective by due process effect (hypothesis 3). 
Further, each analysis also includes court type as an independent variable to test for the 
hypothesized court type main effect (hypothesis 5a) and a three-way perspective by due 
process by court type interaction (hypothesis 5b). A between-subjects multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) with perspective as a four-level manipulated factor 
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(predictor vs. observer vs. actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer), 
due process as a two-level manipulated factor (due process present vs. due process 
absent), and court type as a two-level manipulated factor (drug court vs. mental health 
court) is the basic model that tests the major hypotheses for Experiment 1 overall. 
 Positive affect duration and intensity.  The 4 (perspective: predictor vs. 
observer vs. actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer) by 2 (due 
process: present vs. absent) by 2 (court type: drug court vs. mental health court) 
MANOVA design with positive affect duration and positive affect intensity serving as 
dependent variables resulted in no significant multivariate main effect for due process, 
F(2, 381) = 1.77, p = .17, p2 = .01, perspective, F(6, 762) = .91, p = .248, p2 = .01, or 
court type, F(2, 381) = .29, p = .75, p2 = .001. 
 There were no significant interactions. Furthermore, there were no significant 
univariate effects for positive affect duration or positive affect intensity. 
 Negative affect duration and intensity. The same basic MANOVA model with 
negative affect duration and negative affect intensity as dependent variables revealed a 
significant multivariate effect for due process, F(2, 382) = 3.62, p = .03 p2  = .02. 
Univariate tests of due process on negative affect duration revealed a significant main 
effect, F(1, 383) = 7.25, p = .01, p2  = .02, whereby those in the due process absent 
condition anticipated significantly longer negative affect (M = 21.14, SD = 9.15) than 
those in the due process present condition (M = 18.77, SD = 8.39). There was no 
significant univariate main effect for due process on negative affect intensity, F(1, 383) = 
1.54, p = .22, p2  = .004.  
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 The multivariate main effect for perspective was not significant, F(6, 764) = .90, 
p = .50, p2  = .01. There was, however, a significant multivariate main effect for court 
type, F(2, 382) = 3.34, p = .04, p2  = .02. Univariate tests of court type on negative affect 
duration were not significant, F(1, 383) = .02, p > .05, however the univariate effect for 
negative affect intensity was significant, F(1, 383) = 5.75, p = .02, p2  = .02. Specifically, 
those in the drug court condition anticipated less intense negative affect (M = 3.53, SD = 
.75) than those in the mental health court condition (M = 3.73, SD = .82).   
 There were no significant interactions, nor were there any additional significant 
univariate effects. 
 Embarrassed and ashamed scale. A basic ANOVA with the embarrassed and 
ashamed scale as the dependent variable yielded no significant main effect for due 
process, F(1, 383) = .37, p = .54, p2  =.001. However, the main effect for perspective was 
significant, F(3, 383) = 5.55, p = .001, p2  = .04, whereby those in the self-referenced 
experiencer condition (M = .28, SD = .83), anticipated feeling significantly more 
embarrassed and ashamed than participants in the predictor (M = -.12, SD = .77, p < 
.001), observer (M = -.11, SD = .86, p = .001), and actor-referenced experiencer groups 
(M = -.06, SD = .84, p = .004). There were no other significant pairwise comparisons. 
 The main effect for court type was not significant, F(1, 383) = 1.88, p = .17, p2  = 
.01, nor were there any significant interactions. 
 Well-being duration and intensity. The basic MANOVA model with well-being 
duration and well-being intensity as dependent variables revealed a non-significant 
multivariate main effect for due process, F(2, 380) = 2.51, p = .08, p2 = .01. However, 
the multivariate main effect for perspective was significant, F(6, 760) = 2.59, p = .02, p2 
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= .02. Specifically, a significant univariate main effect for well-being duration, F(3, 381) 
= 3.92, p = .01, p2 = .03, revealed that those in the self-referenced experiencer condition 
(M = 4.93, SD = .08), anticipated a significantly longer negative impact on their well-
being than participants in the predictor (M = 4.58, SD = 1.21, p = .05), observer (M = 
4.35, SD = 1.43, p = .001), and actor-referenced experiencer groups (M = 4.51, SD = 
1.20, p = .02). There were no other significant pairwise comparisons for well-being 
duration. Similarly, a significant univariate main effect for well-being intensity, F(3, 381) 
= 4.26, p = .01, p2 = .03, revealed a similar pattern whereby those in the self-referenced 
experiencer condition (M = 5.51, SD = 1.31), anticipated a significantly greater negative 
impact on their well-being than participants in the predictor (M = 5.10, SD = 1.34, p = 
.02), observer (M = 4.95, SD = 1.46, p = .002), and actor-referenced experiencer groups 
(M = 4.96, SD = 1.32, p = .003). There were no other significant pairwise comparisons 
for well-being intensity. 
 The multivariate main effect for court type was not significant, F(2, 380) = .49, p 
= .61, p2 = .003, nor were there any significant multivariate interactions or any 
additional significant univariate effects for well-being duration or well-being intensity. 
 Procedural fairness. The basic ANOVA model with the procedural fairness scale 
as the dependent variable indicated a significant main effect for due process, F(1, 382) = 
71.39, p < .001, p2  = .16, whereby those in the due process present condition (M = 4.69, 
SD = 1.42) experienced greater procedural fairness than those in the due process absent 
condition (M = 3.43, SD = 1.53). There was also a significant main effect for perspective, 
F(3, 382) = 9.34, p < .001), p2  = .07. Specifically, those in the self-referenced 
experiencer condition (M = 3.66, SD = 1.52) experienced significantly less procedural 
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fairness than those in the predictor (M = 4.48, SD = 1.56, p < .001) or observer conditions 
(M = 4.32, SD = 1.63, p = .001). Similarly, those in the actor-referenced experiencer 
condition (M = 3.65, SD = 1.52) experienced significantly less procedural fairness than 
those in the predictor (p < .001) or observer conditions (p = .001). There were no other 
significant pairwise comparisons. 
 The main effect for court type was also significant, F(1, 382) = 4.87, p = .03, p2  
= .01. Specifically, those who were in the drug court condition (M = 4.85, SD = 1.35) 
experienced greater procedural fairness than those in the mental health court condition (M 
= 4.51, SD = 1.48). 
 There were no significant interactions. 
Experiment 1 Discussion 
 The goal of Experiment 1 was to apply Igou’s (20008) AIK to drug and mental 
health courts’ practice of sanctioning in the absence of due process. Specifically, 
participants considered a drug or mental health court scenario, with or without due 
process, from a number of different perspectives. Further, the researcher predicted that 
knowledge about how the person would cope with the sanction would mediate or 
moderate these perspective and due process effects, similar to Igou’s (2008) findings. 
Hypotheses 
Experiment 1 (Experiment 1a, 1b, and 1 overall) was guided by six overarching 
hypotheses, as described in Chapter 2. The following section discusses the results of 
Experiment 1, organized by each hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 stated that consistent with the self-other effect in 
affective forecasting (Gilbert et al., 1998; Hsee & Hastie, 2006; Brickman et al., 1978; 
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Igou, 2004; 2008; Van Boven & Lowenstein, 2003; Wiener et al., 2013) those unfamiliar 
with problem-solving courts and their clients (i.e. predictor) would anticipate the longest 
and most intense negative impact of a sanction, whereas those most familiar with 
problem-solving courts and their clients (i.e. self-referenced experiencer) would predict 
the shortest and least intense negative impact  
 Hypothesis 1 received mixed support across Experiment 1a (drug court), 
Experiment 1b (mental health court) and Experiment 1 overall (drug and mental health 
court). The following section considers each court type across each of the dependent 
variables. 
 For those who considered the sanctioning scenario for drug court participants only 
(Experiment 1a), there were no perspective effects for positive affect, negative affect, or 
well-being. However, there was a perspective effect for anticipated embarrassed and 
ashamed feelings, such that those who took the perspective of themselves anticipated 
feeling significantly more ashamed than those in the predictor, observer, or actor-
referenced experiencer conditions. This suggests that while there were perspective 
differences for embarrassed and ashamed, the direction is contrary to the self-other effect 
identified by Igou (2008) and Wiener et al. (2013). According to the AIK hypothesis 
those in the predictor condition should anticipate more embarrassed and ashamed feelings 
than those in the observer or experiencer conditions. Instead, the results show that a self-
referenced perspective encouraged participants to use themselves as a comparison point 
and elevate how ashamed and embarrassed they would be if they were in the position of a 
drug court client who was sanctioned for breaking the rules of the program. This shame 
  125
and embarrassment did not translate for an unfamiliar other. This finding is further 
discussed in the general discussion in Chapter 4. 
 There was also a perspective effect for procedural fairness in the opposite of the 
hypothesized direction for the drug court condition. Specifically, those unfamiliar or 
minimally familiar with mental health courts and their participants experienced greater 
procedural fairness compared to those who considered the scenario from the perspective 
of the drug court client, or themselves. Perhaps these participants experienced jail time as 
a negative event and provided a situational explanation (a less procedurally fair process) 
to describe that unsuccessful outcome. This self-protecting, adaptive effect that the 
process was less fair (regardless of whether the court awarded due process) for the self is 
similar to the findings by Miller and Ross (1975) and McFarland and Ross (1982). They 
found that in general, people will make an effort to maintain their self-esteem, even if 
that requires a distortion of reality (situational attribution) to justify a reason for the 
outcome, in this case jail time. It is possible that mental health problems carry a greater 
stigma and threat to one’s self-esteem than drug use and thus, the participants were more 
attuned to the effect of this stigma on their self-esteem and self-worth. Future research 
should compare self-stigma and stigma attributed to participants in drug and mental 
health courts. 
 For those who considered the sanctioning scenario for mental health court 
participants only (Experiment 1b), there were again no perspective effects for positive 
affect, negative affect, or well-being. There was, however, was an identical pattern of 
findings as described in the drug court condition for feelings of embarrassment and 
shame. Specifically, those who considered the scenario from their own perspective 
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anticipated the greatest embarrassment and shame and those unfamiliar or minimally 
familiar with mental health court clients anticipated the least. Again, this supports a self-
referenced perspective effect but not an AIK effect.  
 Further, there was an identical pattern of results as described in the drug court 
condition for procedural fairness. Those unfamiliar or minimally familiar with mental 
health courts and their participants experienced greater procedural fairness compared to 
those who considered the scenario from the perspective of the mental health court client, 
or themselves. 
 For Experiment 1 overall (drug and mental health court conditions combined), 
there was a perspective effect for embarrassed and ashamed in an identical manner to the 
drug and mental health court conditions above. However, there was a novel negative 
well-being effect such that those who considered the sanctioning scenario from the 
perspective of themselves anticipated a more intense and a longer negative well-being 
than those in the predictor, observer, or actor-referenced conditions. Again, while this 
finding may align with a common-sense approach that endorses a self-referencing 
perspective, it is contrary to the hypothesized self-other effect. There was also a 
significant perspective effect for procedural fairness, in the same direction as the drug 
and mental health court conditions. 
 Overall, the findings produced mixed support, at best, for Hypothesis 1. While 
positive and negative affect did not reveal significant perspective differences, feelings of 
shame and embarrassment as well as feelings of well-being did reveal some novel, albeit 
mixed effects. The procedural fairness relationship is considered further through 
Hypothesis 6. 
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 Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 predicted that participants who considered a scenario 
in which the court awarded due process would anticipate a less intense and shorter 
negative impact than those who considered a similar scenario without due process. 
Hypothesis 2 received very little support. 
 There was no due process effect across any of the dependent variables in 
Experiment 1a (drug court), except procedural fairness. As hypothesized, participants 
who experienced due process also experienced greater procedural fairness than those for 
whom due process was absent.  
 There was an identical pattern of due process effects for Experiment 1b (mental 
health court). 
 For Experiment 1 overall, there was, however, a hypothesized significant due 
process effect for negative affect duration such that participants (regardless of court type) 
anticipated a longer negative experience as a result of the sanction when due process was 
absent than when due process was present. This is important because although the 
sanction (jail time) was identical for all participants, the simple addition of basic due 
process provided for a shorter anticipated duration of negative affect for the participants.  
 The interpretation of this main effect is difficult. First, comparisons between the 
mental health and drug courts are clouded by differences in the fact patterns and 
collapsing across these fact patterns is equally cloudy. The addition of the main effect for 
due process on anticipated duration of negative affect is likely a result of the increase in 
power that resulted from increasing the sample size.  
Nonetheless, to the extent that psycholegal researchers and practitioners value 
problem-solving court participants’ emotional well-being as a therapeutic jurisprudential 
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outcome, this basic finding is paramount. Specifically, if participants are less negatively-
impacted when due process is present, and the courts abide by a T.J. framework, it would 
behoove the courts to provide these basic due process rights to all problem-solving court 
participants. As in the drug and mental health court conditions, there was also a 
significant due process effect for procedural fairness such that those who experienced due 
process experienced greater procedural fairness than those who did not experience due 
process. The legal, practical implications of these findings are further discussed in the 
general discussion section in Chapter 4. 
 Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 stated that there would be a two-way interaction 
between perspective and due process within each court type. The greatest negative impact 
should be for those who considered the scenario from the predictor perspective without 
due process, and the least negative for those in the self-referenced experiencer 
perspective for whom the judge awarded due process. The researcher did not find support 
for hypothesis 3. 
 For Experiment 1a (drug court), there were no perspective by due process 
interaction effects. This was also the case for Experiment 1b (mental health court) and 
Experiment 1 overall. While disappointing, in light of the relatively few (and mixed) 
main effects for perspective and due process across court types, this is not surprising. 
 Hypothesis 4.  
Coping. The researcher hypothesized that the above relationships would be 
qualified by the participants’ knowledge about the client’s ability to cope with the 
sanction. Specifically, coping would either moderate or mediate the relationship between 
perspective or due process and anticipated affect. 
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 Experiment 1a (drug court) produced mixed, inconsistent results across the 
dependent variables. Although coping knowledge did moderate the relationship between 
due process and well-being duration and procedural fairness for several of the perspective 
conditions (predictor and actor-referenced experiencer), the pattern of findings makes a 
meaningful interpretation difficult. In short, there was no consistent agreement within or 
across dependent variables about how coping influenced the strength of the relationship 
between perspective or due process and the dependent variables. This finding is not 
surprising given that the hypothesized AIK effects were absent in the due process by 
coping interactions. It is doubtful that the respondents considered the coping abilities of 
the defendants in the scenarios, therefore the hypothesized moderating effects of coping 
knowledge could not have emerged from the results of Experiment 1.  
 The moderated relationship between due process and procedural fairness for those 
in the predictor condition provided an interesting finding. Specifically, for those who 
considered the drug court scenario from the perspective of an unfamiliar other and for 
whom due process was absent, increased coping knowledge resulted in greater perceived 
procedural fairness. However, for those for whom due process was present, there was no 
such effect. This might suggest that when people consider a negative event for an 
unfamiliar other, those who have a greater knowledge about how that person would cope 
perceive the process to be more fair. However, this is only the case when due process is 
absent. When due process is present, the effect is attenuated, suggesting that coping only 
plays a role in the experience of procedural fairness when other external, regulating 
factors (such as due process) are not present.   
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 Coping did not mediate any of the identified effects in hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. 
This suggests that coping did not account for the relationship, or explain why the 
significant relationships between perspective or due process and any of the dependent 
variables existed. 
 For Experiment 1b, a similar, inconsistent pattern of moderated coping effects 
emerged. Coping knowledge did moderate the relationship between perspective and well-
being intensity. Specifically, participants who considered the mental health court scenario 
from their own perspective anticipated a more intense negative well-being than those who 
considered the scenario from the perspective of the mental health court client. However, 
this was only the case when coping knowledge was low. When coping knowledge was 
high, there were no perspective effects. In other words, when participants are less able to 
consider how they (or another) would cope with a negative sanction, a self-perspective 
resulted in a more negative affective experience than when participants considered the 
event from the perspective of the mental health court client.  
 A similar effect emerged for the moderating effect of coping on the perspective 
and procedural fairness relationship. Under low coping, participants who considered the 
scenario from their own perspective experienced less procedural fairness than those who 
considered the scenario from the perspective of the mental health court client. Consistent 
with the above well-being effect, this suggests that when participants are less able to 
effectively consider how they (or another) might cope with a negative sanction, a self-
perspective resulted in lower experienced procedural fairness than when participants 
considered the event from the perspective of the mental health court client. 
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 Together these findings support the availability of an immune neglect (AIK) type 
of effect in these data because self-reference responses with high coping knowledge 
dampened the negative effects of the sanctioned behavior. Participants who took the 
perspective of another could have overlooked the coping ability of the other but they did 
not. As a result, the lack of an affective forecasting effect likely resulted from the 
inability of the participants to adopt the point of view of someone familiar with a 
problem-solving court.  Chapter 4 has more to say about this limitation.  
 As in Experiment 1a, coping did not mediate any of the identified effects in 
hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. This suggests that coping did not account for any significant 
relationships, between perspective or due process and any of the dependent variables.  
 Similarity. Because perceived similarity and coping could be related constructs, 
the relationships described in hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 might be confounded with a 
respondents’ perceived similarity to the assigned perspective. As such, similarity could 
either moderate or mediate the relationship between perspective or due process and 
anticipated affect. As was the case for coping, similarity provided mixed, inconsistent 
results both within and across the dependent variables, making a meaningful 
interpretation of the results difficult. 
 In Experiment 1a, similarity moderated the relationship between due process and 
positive affect duration such that for those who considered the drug court scenario in 
which due process was absent, increases in perceived similarity resulted in increases in 
anticipated positive affect duration. There was no moderated effect when due process was 
present. This suggests that in the absence of due process rights, participants who view 
themselves as more similar to the drug court client anticipate more positive feelings about 
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the sanction. This researcher did not anticipate this confusing finding. This finding 
suggests that perceived similarity only acts on feelings of positive affect when due 
process is not present. When due process is present, the relationship is attenuated, 
suggesting that one’s affiliation with or kindred feelings with the participant do not play a 
role. To the extent that the law does not condone observers to align themselves with 
defendants in problem-solving courts, this lopsided finding might be an argument for due 
process protections in problem-solving courts.  
 As was the case for coping, similarity did not mediate any of the identified effects 
in hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. This suggests that similarity did not account for the 
relationship, or explain why the significant relationships between perspective or due 
process and any of the dependent variables existed. 
 Similarity only moderated the relationship between perspective and positive affect 
intensity (as opposed to duration as in Experiment 1a) in Experiment 1b. Those who 
considered the mental health court scenario from the perspective of themselves 
anticipated greater positive affect under low similarity, compared to those who 
considered the scenario from the perspective of the mental health client. On the other 
hand, under high similarity, participants who considered the scenario from the 
perspective of the mental health court client anticipated more positive affect than those 
who considered the scenario from their own perspective.  
 As in Experiment 1b, similarity did not mediate any of the identified effects in 
hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. This suggests that similarity did not account for the relationship, 
or explain why any significant relationships existed between perspective or due process 
and any of the dependent variables. 
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  Hypothesis 4 was concerned with the possibility that coping skills might reflect 
no more than perceived similarity between the participants and their assigned perspective. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that coping and similarity acted differently on 
different dependent variables, which suggests that similarity and coping serve as 
independent constructs as they relate to the moderation of the dependent variables in this 
study. 
 Familiarity Hypothesis 4 was also concerned with the possibility that 
participants’ personal familiarity with drug use or mental health issues would moderate 
the relationship between perspective and anticipated intensity and duration. Hypothesis 4 
received no support across Experiment 1. Familiarity with drug court problems did not 
predict any of the dependent measures. While, only 37% of participants had some 
personal experience with drug use, 57% reported knowing a friend or family member 
who had used drugs. However, the number of these participants who reported problems 
as a result of this drug use was low. For that reason, the conclusions from the familiarity 
measures should be interpreted with care because of a potential power problem.  
 Experiment 1b (mental health court) revealed a significant effect of friend mental 
illness familiarity for negative affect intensity such that increases in friend mental illness 
problems resulted in a more intense negative affect. However, there was no mediation. As 
was the case for Experiment 1a, only 19% of participants reported some experience with 
mental illness while only 33% reported knowing a friend who had experienced mental 
illness. Relatively few of these participants reported problems as a result of the mental 
illness. For this reason, these results should be interpreted with care because of a potential 
power problem.  
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 Hypothesis 5a. Hypothesis 5a stated that participants who consider a scenario in 
which the offender is a mental health court client would anticipate a greater negative 
impact than participants who consider a scenario in which the offender is a drug court 
client. The researcher found partial support for hypothesis 5. 
 While there was no court type effect for positive affect, well-being, or the 
embarrassed and ashamed scales, the data showed support for negative affect, specifically 
negative affect intensity. Mental health court participants anticipated a significantly more 
negative impact for the sanctions than did drug court participants. Further, there was a 
court type effect for procedural fairness in the anticipated direction such that those in the 
mental health court condition experienced less procedural fairness than those in the drug 
court condition. These findings align nicely with Redlich et al.’s (2006) concerns for the 
use of jail time as a sanction in mental health court. While these findings may, in part, be 
confounded by the differences in fact patterns between the two case types, taken together 
these results illustrate the necessity for further research on perceived fairness and due 
process in sanction proceedings in drug and mental health courts.  
 Hypothesis 5b. Hypothesis 5b predicted a three-way interaction between 
perspective, due process, and court type. Specifically, the most negative emotional 
impact should have occurred for those who considered a mental health court scenario 
without due process from the perspective of a predictor. The researcher did not find 
support for hypothesis 5b, as there were no three-way interactions in Experiment 1 
overall involving the above variables. 
 Hypothesis 6. Finally, hypothesis 6 considered procedural fairness in two 
separate ways. First, hypothesis 6 stated that participants who consider a scenario in 
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which due process is present would report higher levels of procedural fairness. This 
hypothesis showed full support across all court types (Experiment 1a, 1b, and 1 overall). 
In addition to considering procedural fairness as a dependent variable, hypothesis 6 
anticipated that procedural fairness would mediate the relationship between due process 
and the dependent variables such that participants who experience greater procedural 
fairness would experience a less negative impact than those who experience less 
procedural fairness. Although procedural fairness was highly associated with due process 
such that the presence of due process increased feelings of procedural fairness, 
procedural fairness did not mediate the relationship between due process and any of the 
various dependent variables of interest. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 is a partial replication of Experiment 1, but also included a 
manipulation that primed participants to bring to mind the coping skills that they and 
others might use after reading about the incarceration sanction. The self-other effect and 
specifically the AIK hypothesis (Igou, 2008) follows from the theory that people 
overestimate the duration and intensity of a negative event for another person because 
they lack knowledge about or the ability to consider the other’s coping skills and 
resources (Igou, 2008). Although the researcher found inconsistent perspective effects in 
Experiment 1, asking participants to actively think about how they would cope with a 
negative sanction from their assigned perspective might still attenuate these effects. 
Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1. As theorized in Experiment 1 and consistent with the self-other 
effect that is central the affective forecasting AIK phenomenon, participants who 
reviewed a mental health court scenario from the perspective of a person unfamiliar with 
problem-solving courts and their clients (i.e., a predictor) should anticipate the longest 
duration and greatest negative affect impact after a judge incarcerated a client for failing 
to follow the court’s orders. Participants who consider the scenario from the perspective 
of a person familiar with mental health courts and their clients (i.e., an observer) will 
anticipate a shorter duration and less extreme impact than will the predictors. Those who 
assume the perspective of the court client (i.e., actor-referenced experiencer) will 
anticipate even shorter and less intense negative affect, and finally those who assume the 
perspective of him or herself, as if he or she was the person in the story (i.e., self-
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referenced experiencer) will report the shortest and least intense response. This final 
group provides the most direct comparison to Igou’s (2008) self-forecasting condition.  
 Hypothesis 2. Igou (2008) found it difficult to eliminate the self-other effect even 
when the other was similar to the self. However, he and others were able to reduce the 
effect by asking others to consider the coping skills that individuals use when faced with 
a negative outcome. For example, Schkade and Kahneman (1998) found that familiarity 
reduced a self-other effect for people who had experience a paraplegic. In addition, Igou 
(2008) speculated that it might be possible to reduce the self-other effect by 
“emphasizing that affect-reducing strategies generally exist in everyone” (p. 915). In 
other words, people who actively consider the psychological immune system for another 
person may be less likely to overestimate the impact of a negative event. Hypothesis 2 
states that participants who call to mind potential coping skills will anticipate a weaker 
and shorter negative impact than those who do not call to mind potential coping skills.  
 Hypothesis 3. Affective forecasting and the AIK hypothesis anticipate a 
perspective by coping interaction such that the greatest negative emotional impact should 
occur for participants who consider the mental health court scenario from the perspective 
of an outside observer (predictor) who does not consider coping strategies. Further, the 
least negative impact should occur for participants who consider the scenario from the 
perspective of him or herself, as if he or she was the person in the mental health court 
scenario (self-referenced experiencer), and who actively considers potential coping 
strategies.  
 Hypothesis 4. As in Experiment 1, it is possible that coping skills reflect no more 
than perceived similarity between the participants and their assigned perspectives. To 
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control for this, all participants completed a similarity measure as a potential mediator. 
Likewise, it is also possible that similarity acts as a moderator such that those individuals 
who feel more similar to their assigned perspective will show a different pattern of 
perspective and due process effects than those low in similarity. 
Finally, the participants’ familiarity with mental health issues could also moderate 
the relationship between perspective and anticipated intensity and duration. Specifically, 
those who are familiar with mental health issues might anticipate a shorter and less 
intense negative affective experience than those unfamiliar with mental health courts or 
their clients.  
Method
Participants 
 Two hundred and seventy-two people accessed the welcome page of the 
Experiment 2 website. Of those 272 potential participants, 54 did not continue past the 
welcome page or answer any questions about the study. Two hundred and eighteen 
participants recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online data collection program 
completed the study and received $1.50 each for participation.  
 The mean study completion time was 24.53 (SD = 17.18) minutes. Four 
participants took longer than 76.07 minutes (3 standard deviations above the mean 
completion time of 24.53 minutes) so the researchers eliminated their data along with  
four participants who completed the study in less than five minutes and one other who 
incorrectly answered at least one of the two built-in manipulation check questions.  This 
left a final dataset with 209 participants with a mean age of 34.81 years (SD = 10.93). 
Forty-seven percent of the participants were female and 53% were male. The sample was 
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81.8% Caucasian, 8.6 % Black, 5.7% Asian or Pacific Islander, and 2.4% Hispanic. Less 
than 1.5% identified as “other” ethnicity. The sample was primarily well educated with 
87.6% completing at least some college. The program randomly assigned these 
participants to the eight conditions in the fully crossed Experiment 2 design. Condition 
cell sizes ranged from 22-29. 
Materials 
 The stimulus materials and dependent variable measures in Experiment 2 were 
identical to those in Experiment 1b (mental health court) without any due process 
protections and with a modified reported coping strategies questionnaire. Specifically, all 
participants considered the mental health court scenario in which the judge did not award 
the defendant any due process protections at the time of the sanction proceeding. 
Participants completed the same measures as in Experiment 1b (Appendices A, C through 
H, and N through R). Participants in Experiment 2 did not complete the coping skills 
questionnaire (Appendix B).  
 Reported coping strategies questionnaire. In addition to the stimulus materials 
described in Experiment 1, half of the participants also completed a reported coping 
strategies questionnaire (in lieu of the coping skills questionnaire). Specifically, the 
instructions asked each participant to, “think for several minutes about a negative event 
that Brent [you]12 might encounter after being sentenced to 30 days in jail.” All 
participants then wrote a brief paragraph that described the negative event but only those 
participants in the coping strategies reported condition listed  “…as many strategies as 
you can that Brent [you] might use to cope with this negative event. You might consider 
the support Brent [you] receive[s] from others, how Brent [you] thought about changing 

12 Self-referenced experiencers answered these questions for themselves as the defendant. 
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the situation, or how Brent [you] could express his [your] emotions.” Participants freely 
listed up to ten coping strategies. The other half of the participants, those in the coping 
strategies not reported condition, described the negative event but did not consider or list 
potential coping strategies. See Appendix S. 
Design and Procedure 
Experiment 2 was a 4 (perspective: predictor vs. observer vs. actor-referenced 
experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer) x 2 (coping strategies: reported vs. not 
reported) between-subjects design. Participants who freely chose to participate in the 
study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk program linked to a website that randomly 
assigned them to one of the eight research design conditions. All experiment materials 
were posted to a website created through Qualtrics.  
 Upon accessing the online survey, participants completed an informed consent 
form. Then, as in Experiment 1 those in the observer and experiencer conditions (not the 
predictor condition) read the one-page problem-solving court description. Next, 
participants read and thought about the legal case summary from one of the four 
randomly assigned perspectives described in Experiment 1 (predictor, observer, actor-
referenced experiencer, or self-referenced experiencer) and considered the mental health 
court summary without due process protections. A description of the participant’s 
assigned perspective also appeared at the top of each subsequent page and section in the 
online survey to remind participants of their task. 
 Prior to completing the dependent variable measures, participants completed the 
short, manipulation-boosting paragraph about their assigned perspective (from 
Experiment 1) to encourage them to consider the dependent measures from that 
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perspective. Then, they completed the case fact questionnaire to ensure that they paid 
sufficient attention to the study materials.  
 Next, the participants completed the reported coping strategies questionnaire. Half 
of the participants only described a negative event that Brent [you] might encounter after 
the sanction hearing, whereas the other half also listed strategies that Brent [you] might 
use to cope with the negative event. Participants then completed the similarity 
questionnaire, PANAS-X scales (intensity and duration), well-being questionnaire, and 
the brief procedural fairness questionnaire. As in Experiment 1, participants considered 
each of these surveys from their randomly assigned perspective (observer, predictor, 
actor-referenced experiencer, self-referenced experiencer). Finally, participants 
completed the demographic survey.  
 Participants ended the study by reading a thank you note and a debriefing 
statement. Upon completion, the Mechanical Turk website paid the participants directly 
for their participation.  
Results
Overview
The results are organized into three sections. The first section includes an 
evaluation of the measures, scale construction, and variable construction for Experiment 
2. Section two includes tests of hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and part of 4 through basic, 
moderation, and mediation analyses similar as those in Experiment 1. Section three tests 
the relationship of familiarity with mental illness as a potential moderator for each of the 
dependent variables (hypothesis 4). 
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Section I: Measures and Variable Construction 
 Attention check. 
Case fact questionnaire. The Case Fact Questionnaire (CFQ) served as a validity 
check, to determine whether participants paid sufficient attention to the online stimulus 
materials. CFQ scores ranged from a minimum of 3 correct, to a maximum of 5 correct 
(M = 4.72, SD = .52). Thus, the study respondents answered over 94% of the questions 
correct, verifying that they had paid close attention to the study materials. 
 Of particular interest were the participants’ responses on the perspective check 
question. Only 5.3% of participants missed the perspective manipulation check question. 
Because of the small percentage of participants who incorrectly answered this 
manipulation check question and to maximize sample size across Experiment 1, they 
were included in all analyses.
 Scale construction and reliabilities. 
Similarity questionnaire. The similarity questionnaire (M = 3.34, SD = 1.58, N = 
209) demonstrated high internal reliability ( = .94). High scores indicate greater 
perceived similarity between the self and the assigned perspective. Table 14 illustrates 
reliabilities and descriptive statistics of the similarity questionnaire.
PANAS-X revised (intensity). An exploratory principal components factor 
analysis on the 16 emotion ratings collected on the PANAS-X revised intensity survey 
with a varimax rotation produced three factors with Eigen values greater than 1.00 and 
accounted for 63.54% of the variance. Applying a .60 cutoff on the loadings in the rotated 
factor matrix showed the separate emotions loading on each of three dimensions. Loading 
on the first factor, or the negative affect intensity scale were angry (.67), upset (.81), 
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scared (.81), distressed (.78), afraid (.85) and nervous (.80). The second factor, or the 
positive affect intensity scale included happy (.81), enthusiastic (.82), inspired (.78), 
relaxed (.77), and excited (.73). The emotions ashamed (.81), and embarrassed (.82) 
created a third factor. Finally, loadings for alert, surprised, and determined did not reach 
the .60 cutoff score on any single factor. Table 15 shows the factor loadings for the 
PANAS-X intensity measure. The derived positive affect intensity scale (happy, 
enthusiastic, inspired, relaxed, and excited) revealed  = .87 (M = 1.20, SD = .50, N = 
209). The derived negative affect intensity scale (angry, upset, scared, distressed, afraid, 
and nervous) resulted in an alpha reliability of .91 (M = 4.18, SD = .88, N = 209). See 
Table 14 for a summary of the means and standard deviations. 
 PANAS-X revised (duration). An exploratory principal components factor 
analysis on the 16 emotion ratings collected on the PANAS-X revised duration survey 
with a varimax rotation produced four factors with Eigen values greater than 1.00 and 
accounted for 63.54% of the variance. Applying a .60 cutoff on the loadings in the rotated 
factor matrix showed the loadings on the four dimensions. Loading on factor one, were 
scared (.84), afraid (.82), nervous (.73), distressed (.68), and upset (.60). The second 
factor consisted of happy (.77), enthusiastic (.70), excited (.68), and relaxed (.83). The 
emotions ashamed (.83) and embarrassed (.85) created a third factor. A fourth factor 
resulted from inspired (.66) and determined (.87). Finally, angry, alert, and surprised did 
not reach the .60 cutoff score on any single factor. See Table 16 for the factor loadings 
for the PANAS-X duration measure. The positive affect duration scale (happy, 
enthusiastic, excited, and relaxed) revealed  = .73 (M = 2.27, SD = 3.70, N = 209). The 
derived negative affect duration scale (scared, afraid, nervous, distressed, and upset) 
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resulted in an alpha reliability of .85 (M = 22.65, SD = 9.32, N = 209). See Table 14 for 
means and standard deviations. 
 Embarrassed and ashamed scale. As in Experiment 1, The PANAX-X factor 
analyses showed that embarrassed and ashamed (on both the intensity and duration 
scales) loaded onto an independent factor. In lieu of creating a scale of two items, the 
researcher standardized these four, highly correlated emotion measures (embarrassed 
intensity, ashamed intensity, embarrassed duration, and ashamed duration) and created an 
embarrassed and ashamed scale (M = .01, SD = .80, N = 209). See Table 17 for the 
bivariate correlation matrix among the elements of this scale. The scale resulted in an 
alpha reliability of .82. 
Well-being questionnaire (intensity). The well-being intensity questionnaire 
demonstrated an internal alpha reliability of .87 (M = 5.39, SD = 1.20, N = 209)). Higher 
scores indicate a greater anticipated negative well-being. See Table 14 for means and 
standard deviations. 
 Well-being questionnaire (duration). The well-being duration questionnaire 
demonstrated an internal alpha reliability of .86 (M = 4.89, SD = 1.26, N = 209). Higher 
scores indicate a longer anticipated negative well-being. See Table 14 for means and 
standard deviations. 
 Procedural fairness questionnaire. The procedural fairness questionnaire showed 
an internal reliability of .89 (M = 3.02, SD = 1.46, N = 209). See Table 14 for means and 
standard deviations. 
 Tests of the emotion and well-being hypotheses for Experiment 2 made use of the 
positive affect intensity, negative affect intensity, positive affect duration, negative affect 
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duration, the combined embarrassed and ashamed intensity and duration scale, well-being 
intensity, well-being duration, and procedural fairness scales described in Tables 14, 15, 
and 16. 
 Variable construction. 
Mental health familiarity and problems. As in Experiment 1b, two questions (for 
self mental illness and friend mental illness) asked whether the participants had 
experience with mental illness (had a friend who have experienced mental illness) and 
whether they (their friend) had experienced problems as a result of that mental illness. 
See Appendix H for the relevant questions.  
 The construction of the composite familiarity scale was identical to the process in 
study 1b.  Participants who noted they had not experienced mental illness in the past 
received a score of 0. All other participants received the scale value derived from the 
second question, measuring any problems with mental illness for those who admitted 
having mental health issues. Seventy-six percent of participants reported no experience 
with self-mental illness, whereas 24% reported at least some experience with mental 
illness. Creating a composite continuous variable for a measure of those whose friends 
had mental health problems followed the same format, assigning a zero to all who did not 
have friends with mental illness. All other participants received the scale value derived 
from the second question, regarding any problems that friends who had mental illness 
reported. Here, 59% of participants reported not having a friend who has experienced 
mental illness and 41% reported knowing a friend who has experienced mental illness. 
The mean scores for the derived self mental illness problems variable were 1.05 (SD = 
2.07) and 2.25 (SD = 2.92) for the friend mental illness problems variable. Table 18, 
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presents a summary of the correlations between the self and friend mental health 
problems variables and each dependent variable.13 
Section II: Basic, Moderation, and Mediation Analyses for Experiment 2  
Section two includes tests of hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and part of 4 for mental health 
court participants. Specifically, section two is organized by each dependent variable 
(positive affect duration and intensity, negative affect duration and intensity, embarrassed 
and ashamed scale, well-being duration and intensity, and procedural fairness). For each 
dependent variable, the author tested a basic general linear model to identify whether 
there was a hypothesized perspective effect (hypothesis 1), coping effect (hypothesis 2), 
or a two-way perspective by coping effect (hypothesis 3). A between-subjects 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with perspective as a four-level 
manipulated factor (predictor vs. observer vs. actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-
referenced experiencer) and coping as a two-level manipulated factor (coping present vs. 
coping absent) with each of the dependent variables in the section below is the basic 
model that tests the major hypotheses throughout Experiment 2. 
 Following the basic model tests are tests of the moderating and mediating effects 
of similarity (hypothesis 4). Mediation tests only follow where there were main effects 
for due process or perspective or the interaction between these two factors in the basic or 
moderation analyses.  
 Positive affect duration and intensity. The 4 (perspective: predictor vs. observer 
vs. actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer) by 2 (coping: present vs. 
absent) design with positive affect duration and positive affect intensity serving as 

13There was some skewness and kurtosis in the self and friend mental health issue variables, which 
suggested the need for a log transformation. The correlations did not differ between the transformed and 
untransformed variables so that Table 18 reports the original, untransformed variables.
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dependent variables revealed non-significant multivariate effects for coping, F(2, 200) = 
.77, p = .47, p2 = .01, perspective, F(6, 400) = .21, p = .97, p2 = .003, and the 
interaction, F(6, 400) = 1.17, p = .32, p2  = .02. Furthermore, the univariate effects for 
positive affect duration and positive affect intensity were not significant. See Tables 19 
and 20 for a summary of the means and standard deviations of each dependent variable 
by perspective for the coping present condition (Table 19) and the coping absent 
condition (Table 20) for Experiment 2.  
 Similarity moderation. Adding perceived similarity (a measured, continuous 
factor) along with all interactions between similarity and the manipulated factors tested 
the moderating effects. This was a 4 (perspective) x 2 (coping) general linear model with 
similarity as a continuous factor and positive affect duration and positive affect intensity 
as dependent variables. There was a significant multivariate main effect for similarity, 
F(2, 192) = 4.32, p = .02, p2 = .04, and significant univariate effects for similarity on 
positive affect duration, F(1, 193) = 4.56, p = .03, p2 = .02,  = .21, and positive affect 
intensity, F(1, 193) = 6.67, p = .01, p2 = .03,  = .24. This shows that increases in 
similarity resulted in significant increases in positive affect duration and positive affect 
intensity. 
 The coping main effect was not significant, F(2, 192) = 1.07, p = .35, p2 = .01, 
and there were no significant univariate effects for coping on positive affect duration or 
intensity. The main effect for perspective was also not significant, F(6, 384) = 1.81, p = 
.10, p2 = .03, nor were the univariate effects. 
   Similarity interacted with perspective, F(6, 384) = 2.59, p = .02, p2 = .04, to 
qualify the similarity main effect. The univariate interaction for positive affect duration 
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was significant, F(3, 193) = 2.88, p = .04, p2 = .04.  Follow up tests of the interaction 
between similarity and perspective used planned comparisons to test each of the 
manipulated perspective conditions (predictor, observer, actor-referenced experiencer) 
against the self-referenced experiencer condition and the interaction of similarity with 
each of those planned comparisons. They resulted in significant interactions between 
similarity and the observer vs. self-referenced experiencer comparison, t(193) = 2.06, p = 
.04, and the similarity and the predictor vs. self-referenced experiencer comparison, 
t(193) = -2.12, p = .04. The interaction between similarity and the actor-referenced 
experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer comparison was not significant, t(193) = .91, 
p > .05.  
 Figure 12 shows the simple slope tests (Dawson, 2014) for the interaction 
between similarity and the comparison of observer vs. self-referenced experiencer. For 
those in the self-referenced experiencer condition, ( = .63, p = .05), and those in the 
observer condition, ( = 1.31, p = .007), increases in similarity led to longer positive 
affect duration. However, the self-referenced experiencer line depicts a negative slope 
and the analyses produce a positive slope. To make further sense of these seemingly 
contradictory findings, the researcher examined the scatterplot of this interaction and 
found one participant outlier with a positive affect duration value of 31 days, which was 
greater than three standard deviations (SD = 3.19) above the mean of this group (M = 
2.14). This subject was removed from the group and the interaction of similarity by 
perspective was recalculated. The analysis showed that without this outlier, there were no 
significant interactions between similarity and the predictor vs. self-referenced 
experiencer comparison ( = -.47, p =.08), observer vs. self-referenced experiencer 
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comparison, ( = .14, p = .63), or the actor-referenced experiencer comparison ( = .30, p 
= .10). Removing the outlying participant did not change the main effects or interactions 
in the general linear model for positive affect duration. They were similar to the analyses 
reported at the beginning of this moderation section. 
 The univariate interaction for positive affect intensity was also significant, F(3, 
193) = 3.05, p = .03, p2 = .05. Follow up tests of the interaction between similarity and 
perspective used planned comparisons to test each of the manipulated perspective 
conditions (predictor, observer, actor-referenced experiencer) against the self-referenced 
experiencer condition and the interaction of similarity with each of those planned 
comparisons. They resulted in a significant interaction between similarity and the 
predictor vs. self-referenced experiencer comparison, t(193) = -2.94 p = .004. The 
interactions between similarity and the observer vs. self-referenced experiencer 
comparison, t(193) = .25 p > .05, and the actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced 
experiencer comparison, t(193) = 1.67 p > .05, were not significant. 
 The simple slope effects procedure (Dawson, 2014) further examined the  
interaction between similarity and the comparison of predictor vs. self-referenced 
experiencer. Figure 13 shows that under low similarity at one standard deviation below 
the mean,  = .25, t(101) = 1.60, p > .05, there were no differences in positive affect 
intensity between the predictor and self-referenced experiencer conditions. However, 
under high similarity at one standard deviation above the mean,  = -.41, t(101) = -2.53, p 
= .01, those in the self-referenced experiencer condition anticipated a more intense 
positive affect than those in the predictor condition.  
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 The three-way multivariate interaction between similarity, coping, and 
perspective was also significant, F(6, 384) = 2.28, p = .04, p2 = .03. The univariate 
interaction for positive affect duration was not significant, F(3, 193) = .31, p > .05. 
However, there was a significant univariate interaction for positive affect intensity, F(3, 
193) = 3.53, p = .02, p2 = .05. Follow-up analyses showed that the interaction of 
similarity and coping was non-significant for the predictor, F(1, 50) = 1.42, p > .05, and 
observer conditions, F(1, 50) = 1.18, p > .05. However, there were significant 
interactions for the actor-referenced experiencer condition, F(1, 46) = 6.80, p = .012, p2 
= .14 and the self-referenced experiencer condition, F(1, 47) = 3.96, p = .05, p2 = .08.  
Figure 14 displays the similarity by coping interaction for the actor-referenced 
experiencer perspective. Follow up tests using simple-slope analyses (Dawson, 2014) 
showed that increases in similarity led to greater positive affect intensity when coping 
was present, ( = .32, p < .001), however, the effect of similarity when coping was absent 
was not significant, ( = .03, p > .05). Further, under low similarity at one standard 
deviation below the mean, there were no significant differences between those in the 
coping present and coping absent conditions,  = -.13, t(46) = -.75, p = .45. However, 
under high similarity at one standard deviation above the mean, participants in the coping 
present condition experienced greater positive affect intensity than those in the coping 
absent condition,  = .52, t(46) = 2.95, p = .01. Figure 15 displays the similarity by 
coping interaction for the self-referenced experiencer perspective. Follow up tests using 
simple slope analyses (Dawson, 2014) showed that increases similarity led to more 
intense positive affect when coping was absent, ( = .21, p = .002), however, the effect of 
similarity when coping was present was not significant, ( = -.01, p > .05).   
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 Negative affect duration and intensity. The basic MANOVA model with 
negative affect duration and intensity as dependent variables revealed a significant 
multivariate main effect for coping, F(2, 200) = 3.27, p = .04, p2  = .03. Specifically, the 
univariate effect for coping on negative affect duration was significant, F(1, 201) = 3.74, 
p = .05, p2  = .02, such that those in the coping absent condition (M = 23.82, SD = 8.62) 
anticipated a longer period of negative affect than those in the coping present condition 
(M = 21.37, SD = 9.32).  Similarly, the univariate effect for negative affect intensity 
revealed a similar significant pattern, F(1, 201) = .4.41, p = .04, p2  = .01. Those in the 
coping absent condition reported more intense anticipated negative affect (M = 4.30, SD 
= .80) than those in the coping present condition (M = 4.05, SD = .88).  
 The multivariate main effect for perspective was not significant, F(6, 400) = 1.22, 
p = .30, p2  = .02, nor was the interaction, F(6, 400) = .57, p = .75, p2  = .01. There were 
no additional significant univariate effects for negative affect duration or intensity.  
 Similarity moderation. Adding perceived similarity to the basic MANOVA 
model to test for moderation produced non-significant multivariate main effects for 
similarity, F(2, 192) = 1.02, p = .36, p2 =  .01, coping, F(2, 192) = .82, p = .44, p2 =  
.01, and perspective, F(6, 384) = 1.74, p = .11, p2 =  .03. The univariate effects for 
negative affect duration and intensity were also not significant. 
 The multivariate interactions and univariate interaction effects were not 
significant.  
 Similarity mediation. The correlations between similarity and negative affect 
duration (r = -.03, p = .71) and intensity (r = -.02, p = .82) were not significant. 
Therefore, similarity was not a potential mediator for the coping effect.  
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 Embarrassed and ashamed scale. The basic ANOVA with the embarrassed and 
ashamed scale as the dependent variable indicated no significant main effects for coping, 
F(1, 201) = .77, p = .38, p2  =.004, perspective, F(3, 201) = 2.43, p = .07, p2  =.04, or the 
interaction, F(3, 201) = .10, p = .96, p2  =.002.   
 Similarity moderation. Adding similarity to the basic ANOVA model to test for 
moderation yielded no significant main effects for similarity, F(1, 193) = .19, p = .67, p2  
= .001, coping, F(1, 193) = 1.41, p = .24, p2   = .01, or perspective, F(3, 193) = 1.53, p = 
.21, p2  =.02. The interactions were also not significant. 
 Well-being duration and intensity. The basic MANOVA model with well-being 
duration and intensity as dependent variables revealed a significant multivariate main 
effect for coping, F(2, 200) = 6.10, p = .003, p2 = .06. Univariate effects revealed a non 
significant effect for coping on well-being duration, F(1, 201) = .48, p > .05,  and a 
significant effect for well-being intensity, F(1, 201) = 7.78, p = .01, p2 = .04. 
Specifically, those in the coping absent condition anticipated a significantly more 
negative well-being (M = 5.61, SD = 1.15) than those in the coping present condition (M 
= 5.15, SD = 1.22).  
 The multivariate main effect for perspective was not significant, F(6, 400) = .77, 
p = .59 p2 = .01, nor was the interaction, F(6, 400) = 1.48, p = .18 p2 = .02. There were 
also no additional significant univariate effects.  
 Similarity moderation. Adding similarity to the basic MANOVA model revealed 
no significant multivariate main effects for similarity, F(2, 192) = 1.11, p = .33, p2 = .01, 
coping, F(2, 192) = 2.67, p = .08, p2 = .03, or perspective, F(6, 384) = .98, p = .44, p2 = 
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.02. The univariate effects for well-being duration and intensity were not significant. The 
multivariate interactions and univariate interaction effects were also not significant. 
 Similarity mediation. The correlations between similarity and well-being duration 
(r = -.01, p = .92) and well-being intensity (r = .06, p = .39) were not significant. 
Therefore, similarity was not a potential mediator for the main effect of coping.  
 Procedural fairness. The basic ANOVA model with the procedural fairness scale 
as the dependent variable produced no effects for coping, F(1, 201) = .02, p = .88, p2  < 
.001, or perspective, F(1, 201) = 2.04, p = .11, p2  = .03. The coping by perspective 
interaction approached significance, F(3, 201) = 2.54, p = .06, p2  = .04. When coping is 
present, those in the self-referenced experiencer condition experienced significantly 
greater procedural fairness (M = 3.46, SD = 1.26) than those in the actor-referenced 
experiencer condition (M = 2.59, SD = 1.38, p = .03). There were no other significant 
pairwise comparisons. When coping was absent, those in the predictor condition (M = 
3.65, SD = 1.78) experienced significantly greater procedural fairness than those in the 
actor-referenced experiencer condition, (M = 2.72, SD = 1.01, p = .03) and the self-
referenced experiencer condition, (M = 2.56, SD = 1.56, p = .007). There were no other 
significant pairwise comparisons. Figure 16 shows the perspective by coping interaction.  
 Similarity moderation. Adding perceived similarity to the basic model revealed 
non-significant main effects for similarity, F(1, 193) = .04, p = .85, p2 < .001, coping, 
F(1, 193) = 1.12, p = .29, p2 = .06, and perspective, F(3, 193) = .62, p = .60 p2 = .01. 
The interactions were also not significant. 
 Similarity mediation. The correlation between perceived similarity and 
procedural fairness (r = .14, p = .05) was significant. Thus, similarity was a potential 
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mediator for the coping by perspective interaction. However, a 4 (perspective) by 2 
(coping) between-subjects general linear model which included procedural fairness and 
its interactions with the manipulated factors revealed a non-significant main effect for 
similarity, F(1, 200) = .25, p = .62, p2 =  .001, coping, F(1, 200) = .05, p = .82, p2 =  
.001, and perspective, F(3, 200) = 2.00, p = .41, p2 = .01. There was also no significant 
interaction, F(3, 200) = 2.47, p = .08, p2 = .04.  Mediation requires a significant 
relationship between similarity and procedural fairness after controlling for the effects of 
the manipulated variables. No further mediation analyses were necessary because there 
was no significant relationship between similarity and procedural fairness when coping 
and perspective were included in the model. 
Section III: Familiarity with Mental Illness 
Hypothesis 4 explored a potential moderating effect of familiarity with mental 
health issues on the manipulated factors as they impacted the dependent variables. More 
specifically, it is possible that participants familiar with mental health issues reacted 
differently to the dependent measures than those unfamiliar with mental health issues. 
 Self mental illness. A series of correlations between the self mental illness 
problems continuous variable and each of the dependent variables (positive affect 
duration and intensity, negative affect duration and intensity, embarrassed and ashamed 
scale, well-being duration and intensity, and procedural fairness) measured the potential 
influence of familiarity on the major dependent measures in Experiment 2.  See Table 18 
for a summary of the correlation analyses. Self mental illness problems was significantly 
correlated with well-being duration (r = .15, p = .03) and well-being intensity (r = .23, p 
= .001).  
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 The same basic MANOVA model as in the analyses above used self mental 
illness problems as a continuous factor and well-being duration and intensity as 
dependent variables. The multivariate main effect for self mental illness problems was 
not significant, F(2, 193) = 1.38, p > .05, p2 = .02. The multivariate main effect for 
coping was significant, F(2, 193) = 5.30, p = .006, p2 = .05. Specifically, the effect of 
coping on well-being intensity was significant, F(1, 193) = 8.62, p = .004, p2 = .04, such 
that those in the coping absent condition (M = 5.60, SD = .11) anticipated a significantly 
more intense negative well-being than those in the coping present condition, (M = 5.15, 
SD = .12), F(2, 192) = 6.04, p = .003, p2  = .06. The effect of coping on well-being 
duration was not significant, F(1, 193) = 1.62, p > .05. The perspective multivariate main 
effect was not significant, F(2, 193) = 94, p > .05, p2 = .02.  
 There were no significant multivariate interactions or significant univariate 
interaction effects. In short, familiarity showed no signs of moderation.  
Friend mental illness. Table 18 shows that friend mental illness was not 
significantly correlated with any of the dependent variables so the researcher did not 
conduct any further analyses involving friend mental illness problems as a familiarity 
measure. See Table 18 for a summary of the correlation analyses.  
Experiment 2 Discussion 
 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to reduce the self-other effect findings in 
Experiment 1 by encouraging participants to actively think about and list mental health 
court clients’ potential coping strategies to deal with the negative sanction.  
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Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 stated that there would be a perspective main effect, 
such that participants who reviewed the mental health court scenario from the predictor 
perspective would anticipate the longest and most intense negative impact of a sanction, 
whereas those in the self-referenced experiencer condition would anticipate the shortest 
and least intense negative impact. The researcher did not find support for hypothesis 1. 
There were no perspective effects for any of the dependent variables, providing no 
support for the self-other effect (Gilbert et al., 1998; Hsee & Hastie, 2006; Igou, 2004; 
2008; Van Boven & Lowenstein, 2003; Wiener et al., 2013) for mental health court 
clients.  
 Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 stated that participants who actively consider the 
psychological immune system for another person, that is who consider potential coping 
strategies for the negative jail sanction, would be less likely to overestimate the negative 
impact of that event. The data illustrate partial support for hypothesis 2. 
 There was no coping effect for positive affect, feelings of embarrassment and 
shame, or well-being. However, when participants actively considered the coping 
strategies that a mental health court participant might employ to effectively deal with the 
negative sanction, they anticipated a significantly less negative experience. This is unique 
in that regardless of perspective, encouraging problem-solving court players to think 
about a mental health court participant’s psychological immune system (including the 
participants themselves) might help them emotionally and more effectively deal with a 
negative sanction. Given the Cascardi et al. (2000) finding that problem-solving court 
participants who have a more positive view of the court-mandated program (i.e., do not 
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experience negative affective experiences, regardless of the source) are more likely to 
abide by the court’s treatment plan and ultimately succeed in the program, the current 
findings may have far reaching consequences. The general discussion takes up this  
positive, practical outcome in more detail. 
 Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 predicted a perspective by coping interaction such 
that the most negative impact would occur for predictors who do not consider coping 
strategies and the least negative impact would occur for self-referenced experiences who 
did consider coping strategies. There were no interaction effects for anticipated positive, 
negative, or embarrassed and ashamed feelings. While there was no support for 
hypothesis 3, there was an interesting interaction for coping and perspective on 
procedural fairness. Providing partial support for the self-other effect (Gilbert et al., 
1998; Hsee & Hastie, 2006; Igou, 2004; 2008; Van Boven & Lowenstein, 2003; Wiener 
et al., 2013), when coping was present, participants in the self-referenced experiencer 
condition perceived the scenario as more fair than those in the actor-referenced 
experiencer condition. However, for those in the coping absent condition, participants in 
the predictor condition perceived the scenario as more fair than those in the actor or self-
referenced experiencer conditions. This latter finding was in the opposite direction of the 
hypothesized self-other effect. These findings make it unlikely that procedural fairness 
judgments follow the typical pattern of emotion judgments following negative 
evaluations. 
 Hypothesis 4.  
Similarity. As in Experiment 1, there was a possibility the participants’ perceived 
similarity to the assigned perspective might qualify any perspective findings. 
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Specifically, similarity could either moderate or mediate the relationship between 
perspective and anticipated affect.  
 Perceived similarity moderated the effect of perspective on positive affect 
intensity. Specifically, under high similarity, participants who considered the mental 
health court scenario from their own point of view anticipated a more positive affective 
experience as a result of the sanction than did those who took the perspective of an 
unfamiliar other. There were no effects under low similarity. This suggests that when a 
participant perceives him or herself as highly similar to a defendant, they believe the 
experience will result in a more positive affective experience than if they viewed 
themselves as similar to an unfamiliar other.  
 As was the case in Experiment 1, the researcher found mixed, inconsistent results 
across the dependent variables and although similarity did moderate the relationship 
between perspective and positive affect intensity, the results reveal a pattern that makes a 
meaningful interpretation difficult. In short, there was no consistent agreement within or 
across dependent variables about how similarity influenced the strength of the 
relationship between perspective, coping and the other dependent variables.  
 Familiarity. Hypothesis 4 also considered the possibility that participants’ 
personal familiarity with mental health issues would moderate the relationship between 
perspective and anticipated affect. The data did not reveal support for these familiarity 
effects. Specifically, there were no moderation effects involving self-familiarity or friend-
familiarity with mental illness. 
 As was the case in Experiment 1, only 24% of participants reported some 
experience with mental illness and 41% reported knowing a friend who had experienced 
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mental illness. Few of these participants reported problems as a result of the mental 
illness and for this reason, the reader should interpret these findings with care because of 
a potential statistical power problem. 
  160
CHAPTER 4 
General Discussion 
On April 3, 2007, Brent Stewart entered the Dyer County, Tennessee Drug Court 
Program. The program’s goal was to hold Mr. Stewart accountable for his multiple 
offenses, but more importantly to provide him with the necessary treatment to overcome 
his drug addiction. Over the course of the next sixteen months, Mr. Stewart spent a total 
of nearly six months in jail as sanctions for partial noncompliance of program 
requirements. At each of the sanction hearings, the court did not provide Mr. Stewart any 
of the traditional due process protections that defendants receive in probation or parole 
revocation hearings.  As a result of the stop-and-start nature of his participation in the 
program, and specifically as a result of the six months of jail time, Mr. Stewart received a 
harsher punishment than he would have received had he chosen not to participate in the 
program at all. In other words, the therapeutic jurisprudential nature of the court was 
diminished in favor of a more punitive process. What is most unique about this case and 
similar others, however, is not the punitive nature of the sanctioning behavior but rather, 
the surprising finding that Mr. Stewart subsequently thanked the Tennessee Drug Court 
for “saving his life” (State of Tennessee v. Stewart, 2010, p. 5).   
 Although psycholegal researchers have only recently begun to investigate the 
influence of emotion on legal decision-making, this experiment advanced the research on 
the study of emotion as only one of a few to consider the self-other effect in affective 
forecasting and the first to test the AIK hypothesis (Igou, 2008) in a problem-solving 
court paradigm. 
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 The goal of this two-experiment study was to apply Igou’s (2008) AIK hypothesis 
to problem-solving courts’ practice of sanctioning in the absence of due process. 
Specifically, it is possible that observers find problem-solving courts’ lack of procedural 
due process more of a problem than do the clients themselves because of differences in 
perspective and discordant knowledge of the coping strategies that problem-solving court 
clients utilize. This research sought to test these ideas. Experiment 1 manipulated the 
perspective from which participants considered a drug or mental health court sanction 
proceeding, with or without due process present. Experiment 1 also explored the 
moderating and mediating effects of participants’ coping knowledge and similarity as it 
related to their anticipated affect and well-being as a result of the sanction. Experiment 2 
manipulated coping directly to determine whether a discordant coping knowledge would 
explain the perspective effects identified in Experiment 1. Taken together the findings of 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 provided mixed support for traditional self-other effects 
in affective forecasting (Gilbert et al., 1998; Hsee & Hastie, 2006; Igou, 2004; 2008; Van 
Boven & Lowenstein, 2003; Wiener et al., 2013) and even less support for Igou’s 
asymmetric immune knowledge hypothesis (2008). However, several legally relevant 
findings provide an opportunity to inform future psycholegal research in the area of 
procedural fairness, due process, and the inherent differences between drug and mental 
health courts and their clients. 
Theoretical Implications 
 The current research was one of the first to extend the affective forecasting 
literature and specifically, the self-other effect in affective forecasting to a legal decision-
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making paradigm. Likewise, it was the first to examine the applicability of the AIK 
(Igou, 2008) in modern problem-solving courts. 
 Although previous research has found support for self-other effects in affective 
forecasting (Brickman et al., 1978; Gilbert et al., 1998; Hsee & Hastie, 2006; Igou, 2004; 
2008; Van Boven & Lowenstein, 2003; Wiener et al., 2013), the current research did not 
find such unequivocal effects. This was the case for both the durability bias (Gilbert et 
al., 2002; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003) and the impact bias (Hsee & Hastie, 2006; Wilson & 
Gilbert, 2003). However, interesting findings emerged for anticipated feelings of 
embarrassment and shame. While the effect was in the opposite direction of the 
hypothesized effect (participants anticipated greater embarrassment and shame for 
themselves than for an unfamiliar drug or mental health court participant), this finding 
was consistent across all court types in Experiment 1.  
 Perhaps social-moral emotions such as embarrassment and shame behave 
differently than other, negatively valenced emotions, such as anger and fear, as they 
relate to self-other affective forecasts. For example, Keltner and Buswell (1996) note that 
“embarrassment follows transgressions of conventions that govern social interactions” 
and “shame follows the failure to live up to central personal expectations or those of 
significant others” (p. 157). Further, Haidt (2003) in his work on moral emotions suggests 
that in Western cultures, the evaluation that there is something improper or defective with 
one’s core self, “generally due to a failure to measure up to standards of morality…or 
competence” or that one has violated a social-conventional rule elicit feelings of shame 
and embarrassment (p. 860). In other words, these emotions typically result from a 
violation of some personal or social norm, whereas other negative emotions may not at 
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all be related to a personal experience with the event. Thus, it may not be possible to feel 
shame from the perspective of another person as one does from his or her own 
perspective, as if the perceiver violated that norm (such as drug use or disruptive 
behavior as a result of a mental illness). In short, moral emotions (Haidt, 2003; Keltner & 
Buswell, 1996) such as embarrassment and shame might operate in a way that is contrary 
and in direct opposition to the typical self-other effect.  
 This novel finding may suggest some specific boundary conditions for anticipated 
affect effects for problem-solving court paradigms. Specifically, one theoretical 
interpretation of these findings may be that affective forecasting for the usual positive 
and negative emotions does not exist, or at least does not occur in a straightforward 
manner in scenarios such as those presented in these experiments. On the other hand, the 
findings for shame and embarrassment may represent a specific boundary condition for 
anticipated emotion effects for these moral emotions in problem-solving court paradigms. 
Future research should study this interesting, novel possibility. 
Another surprising finding was that perceived similarity between the self and the 
assigned perspective did not mediate the relationship between perspective and the 
dependent variables. Even when similarity moderated the relationship between 
perspective and affective experience, the findings were inconsistent and often spurious. 
Unfortunately for the theoretical underpinnings of the current project, this was also the 
case for coping, as both a measured variable (Experiment 1) and a manipulated variable 
(Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, coping did not mediate the relationship between 
perspective and any of the dependent variables and when coping moderated this 
relationship, the findings were also inconsistent and they varied dramatically among the 
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dependent measures of interest. In Experiment 2 where participants actively listed 
potential coping strategies to deal with the negative sanction, participants did anticipate 
longer and more intense negative affect when they did not consider coping strategies. 
This finding, which is in line with previous coping research (Gilbert et al., 1998; Hoerger 
et al., 2009; Igou, 2004; 2008; Wilson et al., 2000), suggests that encouraging mental 
health court clients as well as people unaffiliated with mental health courts to consider 
coping strategies to deal with a legal sanction reduces the anticipated negative experience 
of that sanction. However, the finding that participants anticipated more negative well-
being when they actively listed potential coping strategies than when they did 
complicates this finding.  
 The lack of a consistent, hypothesized coping effect may also be due in part to the 
weak perspective-taking manipulation, further discussed in the limitations section below. 
Because participants presumably did not fully embrace their assigned perspectives, they 
in turn may not have utilized their psychological immune systems to adjust their 
emotional forecasts in a predictable way (Gilbert et al., 1998; Hoerger et al., 2009; Igou, 
2008; Wiener et al., 2013). For the above reasons, it is difficult to make definitive 
conclusions about the application of the AIK (Igou, 2008) in these experiments, as the 
prerequisite perspective differences did not materialize to determine whether participants 
identified coping strategies would mediate, or reduce the self-other effect. 
 Finally, the data suggest that not all dependent variables operated similarly across 
(or within) the Experiments. Specifically, each dependent variable (positive affect, 
negative affect, embarrassed and ashamed, well-being, and procedural fairness) mapped 
onto “negative impact” quite differently. The negative affect scales, for example 
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measured how badly the participant may feel, drawing to mind specific but subjective 
negative emotional experiences whereas the well-being scales measured more tangible, 
concrete events the participant might experience, such as financial and social burdens. 
Therefore, it is reasonable and understandable that different effects emerged for different 
dependent constructs, each as an independent measure of a “negative impact” of a legal 
sanction. The variety of scales provided a thorough evaluation of a number of ways a 
legal sanction my impact an individual.  Unfortunately, broadly developed theoretical 
constructs were problematic in this project because of the lack of consistent findings 
across constructs between and even within experiments.   
Legal Implications 
 Adopting a therapeutic jurisprudential approach (Wexler & Winick, 1991; Winick 
& Wexler, 2002; 2003) to drug and mental health courts and their clients, this research 
has a number of practical, legal implications for these special court systems. Although a 
common sense discovery, the fact that participants experienced greater procedural 
fairness across drug and mental health courts when due process was present is an 
important finding. In both scenarios, the client experienced a sanction of 30 days in jail 
for noncompliance. While this unequivocally “bad” event would likely upset all clients,  
the simple inclusion of the opportunity for the client to engage in a brief conversation 
with the judge about his noncompliance before the judge sanctioned him to 30 days in jail 
resulted in greater evaluations of fairness and a shorter anticipated negative affective 
experience.  
This significant procedural fairness finding is important because as previous 
research has found (Cascardi et al., 2000; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Poythress et al., 2002; 
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Tyler, 2003), high levels of reported procedural fairness positively influences compliance 
with the law and court ordered treatment plans. Although, this study did not test problem-
solving court outcomes or compliance, these findings in conjunction with other results in 
the literature suggest that providing problem-solving court participants with due process 
might indirectly result in greater compliance with court treatment plans and ultimate 
success in the program.
 These basic due process protections, also awarded to those on probation or parole 
(Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 1973; Morrissey v. Brewer, 1972) are not particularly onerous and 
in these experiments, they resulted in greater fairness evaluations of the profoundly 
negative event (jail time). If drug and mental health courts truly operate under a T.J. 
framework, and the costs of the inclusion of due process protections do not outweigh the 
benefits of their imposition, it would be prudent for these court systems to adopt a due 
process practice at sanction proceedings that protects the client’s legal and psychological 
well-being.   
 The current research also provides some confirmation for psycholegal scholars’ 
concerns about the use of incarceration as a sanction in mental health courts (Redlich et 
al., 2006).  Although the use of jail time as a sanction in drug courts is fairly routine, 
commentators have been increasingly concerned about the moral and ethical use of 
incarceration as a sanction for mental health court offenders because it may do nothing 
less than punish them for their mental illness (Odegaard, 2007; Redlich et al., 2006).  The 
current research provides some empirical support for these concerns. Specifically, mental 
health court participants (or observers) experienced less procedural fairness and 
anticipated a more intense negative affective experience than drug court participants (or 
  167
observers) as a result of 30 days in jail. This finding requires additional, empirical 
consideration in the field with actual clients engaged in problem-solving court programs. 
 In summary, although the major hypotheses in this dissertation research sought 
evidence for the self-other in a problem-solving court context, these major procedural due 
process findings, coupled with the fairness and negative affect differences for mental 
health and drug court clients provide important information for psycholegal scholars who 
hope to further understand how problem-solving court clients evaluate and subsequently 
respond to their experiences. 
Limitations 
The major limitation in these experiments was the research design perspective-
taking paradigm. Although previous researchers have successfully utilized perspective-
taking procedures in self-other research for a variety of negative events (Van Boven & 
Loewenstein, 2003, Wiener et al., 2013), those events were typically occurrences that the 
participant could easily imagine experiencing, such as feeling extreme thirst (Van Boven 
& Loewenstein, 2003), losing a football game (Gilbert et al., 1998), breaking up with a 
partner (Igou, 2008), and performing poorly on an exam (Igou, 2008). It is possible that 
the problem-solving court scenario in this research was too far outside the realm of the 
participants’ imagination for them to fully consider their assigned perspective. According 
to Van Boven and Loewenstein (2003), emotional perspective taking requires two 
judgments. The first is how the self would feel in another person’s situation. The second 
is how the self adjusts these predictions to accommodate the difference (or similarity) 
between the self and the other. This research asked participants to assume the role of a 
drug or mental health court client or somebody moderately familiar with problem-solving 
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courts. Although the study provided multiple manipulation boosts to encourage 
participants to fully embrace their assigned perspective, as well as a variety of 
manipulation checks to confirm that participants considered the scenario and dependent 
measures from the assigned perspective, the participants may not have successfully 
adjusted their predictions to accommodate the inherent differences between the self and 
the other.  
 Further, the study not only required participants to actively take the perspective of 
an unfamiliar other, but also required them to consider the affective experiences from that 
other’s perspective—a very intimate and personal process.  The lack of an overall, 
consistent, and hypothesized perspective effects across both experiments may have 
resulted because of this ineffective emotional perspective taking.  
Wiener et al. (2013) effectively utilized an emotional perspective-taking 
procedure and found novel, significant self-other effects, consistent with the findings of 
Igou (2008) and others. However, the major distinction between their procedures and the 
current study is the actual experiences of the participants. Specifically, the participants in 
Wiener et al.’s (2013) sexual objectification research actually participated in mock 
interviews where a male researcher gazed at the participant’s chest for several seconds. In 
this manner, the participants experienced, at a variety of levels depending on perspective, 
how objectification actually feels. This allowed the participants to experience a 
straightforward, personal perspective-taking experience. In the current research, the 
participants did not have an opportunity to experience the sanctioning events. 
 Even if the participants did have the ability or motivation to fully consider and 
embrace the negative sanction scenario from their assigned perspective, they may have 
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been intentionally (or unintentionally) reluctant to take the perspective of a drug user or 
somebody who commits crimes as a result of his or her mental illness because of the 
inherently aversive nature of that person or scenario. Thus, participants may not have 
fully embraced the aversive and off-putting perspective that the study asked them to take 
on board, especially compared to some of the more benign, everyday negative events 
utilized in previous research.  Finally, participants may not have embraced the 
perspective-taking manipulation because the perceived “self-inflicted” and stigmatized 
nature of the behavior in the scenario (drug use, mental illness) may have discouraged 
participants from embracing the defendant’s character. So although researchers such as 
Brickman et al. (1978) found that people unfamiliar with paraplegics overestimated the 
negative effect of paralysis on a paraplegic’s well-being, the paralysis that a paraplegic 
experiences is outside that individual’s control and is not a choice in the way that drug 
use may be.  
 Another potential limitation of the current research was the low numbers of 
participants who had experience with, or knew somebody who had experience with drug 
use or mental health issues and the even fewer participants who had experienced 
problems as a result of drug use or mental health issues. Although Schkade and 
Kahneman (1998) found that people overestimate negative affective experiences for an 
unfamiliar other, the current experiments did not find such unequivocal results. 
Specifically, familiarity with drug problems or mental health issues was not predictive of 
any of the dependent variables. This may have been, in part due to a small sample of 
individuals who had experienced drug use or mental illness either directly or even 
indirectly.   
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 Notwithstanding the methodological limitations, this work represents theoretical 
advances and legal implications for understanding how the self-other effect in affective 
forecasting operates in the absence of due process in drug and mental health courts. 
Future Directions 
This series of experiments serves as a catalyst for future research to further 
narrow the boundaries of the self-other effect in affective forecasting (Gilbert et al., 1998; 
Hsee & Hastie, 2006; Igou, 2004; 2008; Van Boven & Lowenstein, 2003; Wiener et al., 
2013), as well as the AIK hypothesis (Igou, 2008). Future self-other forecasting research 
in problem-solving courts should utilize a more effective perspective-taking paradigm. 
For example, researchers could conduct an in-lab manipulation where participants act as 
the court client, a social worker, or as themselves in a role-play scenario. While more 
arduous than an online data collection design, this approach would likely elicit a stronger 
perspective manipulation and thus, provide a greater opportunity to identify any existing 
AIK effects in a problem-solving court paradigm. An even more desirable perspective-
taking approach would include participants familiar with drug or mental health courts or 
better yet, actual problem-solving court clients and court players. This latter suggestion is 
most ideal, as the clients, social workers, judges, and outside observers have a deeper 
understanding of the courts’ functions as well as a deeper understanding of their own 
coping strategies and motivations for court compliant and noncompliant behavior. 
 An additional area for further inquiry is the type, or source of coping skills that a 
person experiences. The researcher acknowledges that there are two distinct types of 
coping skills. The first includes coping skills that are inherent to an individual who has 
experienced drug or mental health problems and has interacted with the legal system. The 
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second source is coping skills that any individual has which forecasters overlook (Igou, 
2008). The current research concerned the latter as opposed to the former. The researcher 
recognizes the difference between the two and acknowledges that future studies should 
examine the naturalistic coping skills of a drug or mental health court offender as he or 
she interacts with the legal system. 
 Future research should also examine the experienced emotions of drug and mental 
health court clients, in addition to forecasted emotions. Affective forecasts do not 
necessarily translate to affective experiences and in fact, research has shown the 
durability and impact biases are resilient and consistent across many paradigms (Georges 
& Wiener, 2013; Gilbert et al., 2000; 2004; Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Wiener et al., 2014). 
We also know that actual affective experiences are typically shorter and less intense than 
the predictor anticipates them to be (Gilbert et al., 1998; Gilbert et al., 2004; Wilson & 
Gilbert, 2003; 2005). In short, while future research should further examine the 
boundaries of affective forecasting in problem-solving courts, it should also examine the 
role of experienced emotions as it relates to offender experience and subsequent program 
compliance. 
Based on the consistent, albeit contradictory self-other effect for anticipated 
feelings of shame and embarrassment, emotion research should also identify how and 
under what circumstances these social-moral emotions operate differently from other 
negatively valenced emotions (Haidt, 2003; Keltner & Buswell, 1996).  
 Finally, the current research focused exclusively on procedural due process (and 
subsequently procedural fairness) in problem-solving courts. While there has been 
significant research in the area of client compliance as it relates to recidivism in problem-
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solving courts, a future line of research should examine client affective experiences as it 
relates to these outcomes. The findings in the current research suggest that when clients 
experience due process, they perceive the overall sanction experience as more fair. More 
importantly, psycholegal researchers have noted that a fair evaluation of the process 
translates into increased compliance with a court-ordered program (Cascardi et al., 2000; 
Lind & Tyler, 1988; Poythress et al., 2002; Tyler, 2003), Perhaps positive affective 
experiences in the presence of due process operate in a similar way, which creates a 
stronger argument for due process protections for problem-solving court clients. In other 
words, if the inclusion of basic due process protections leads to a more therapeutic 
jurisprudential practice for the court client and in turn, the court client succeeds in the 
program (and thus, recidivates less), it is in the courts’ fiscal, social, and practical 
interests to implement such protections. This is an important empirical question worthy 
of future discovery. 
Conclusions
 This project integrated the affective forecasting literature in social psychology 
with the current practices of modern problem-solving courts in the United States. 
Specifically, the current work applied the self-other effect in affective forecasting to the 
practice of sanctioning in the absence of due process in drug and mental health courts.  
While psycholegal researchers have only recently begun to study the influence of 
emotion on legal decision-making (see Wiener, Bornstein, & Voss, 2006) this experiment 
advances the research on the study of emotion by testing the boundaries of the self-other 
effect in affective forecasting in a novel, legal paradigm. By establishing a deeper 
understanding of these effects, legal practitioners can ensure that problem-solving court 
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clients receive as much due process as is necessary to uphold the rigor of the justice 
system, but also maintain the flexibility of a nonadversarial system to ensure a 
therapeutic outcome. 
 Although the research questions were not completely supported, the findings 
demonstrated that while drug and mental health court clients, such as Stewart (State of 
Tennessee v. Brent R. Stewart, 2010) may be satisfied with the outcome of their time in 
the program, the inclusion of basic due process rights may better serve these clients 
(Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 1973; Morrissey v. Brewer, 1972). Further, mock drug and mental 
health court clients experienced sanctioning practices quite differently, suggesting further 
research into whether a drug court model can be (or should be) evenly applied in mental 
health courts. The lack of a hypothesized self-other effect and weak support for Igou’s 
asymmetric immune knowledge hypothesis (2008) do not negate the argument for due 
process protections in problem-solving courts. On the contrary, while there is likely an 
alternative explanation for clients’ satisfaction with the processes and outcomes in these 
courts (see Berman & Feinblatt, 2005; Cosden et al., 2005; Freeman, 2002; Gover et al., 
2007; Poythress et al., 2002), Bruce Winick’s persistent and notable belief that legal 
actors should protect the clients’ interests to every extent reasonable possible still rings 
true.  
 Finally, as the number of problem-solving courts, and the variety of these types of 
courts (e.g., veterans court, homeless court, family court, etc.) continue to increase in the 
United States, it is important to fully understand and implement best practices as they 
relate to both processes and outcomes for the client, the court team, and the community. 
This research provides one such step towards that understanding.
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Table 2 
Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation for the PANAS-X Intensity Scale—
Experiment 1 
  Factor 
Emotion 1 2 3 4 
Angry .76 -.12 -.05 .07 
Upset .74 -.25 .26 .13 
Surprised .70 .13 .01 -.14 
Scared .63 -.19 .54 .10 
Distressed .62 -.32 .27 .29 
Afraid .60 -.03 .57 .09 
Nervous .59 -.10 .53 .05 
Happy -.13 .79 -.14 -.09 
Enthusiastic -.02 .78 .03 .07 
Inspired -.11 .78 .06 .01 
Relaxed -.21 .74 -.16 .01 
Excited .06 .50 .08 .29 
Ashamed .09 -.08 .87 .07 
Embarrassed .14 .12 .82 .09 
Alert .14 -.04 .04 .83
Determined -.06 .40 .19 .57 
Note. Entries in the table are factor loadings with a cutoff of .60.  
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Table 3 
Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation for the PANAS-X Duration Scale—
Experiment 1 
  Factor 
Emotion 1 2 3 4 5 
Scared .86 -.05 17 .10 .09 
Afraid .85 -.01 .19 .11 .02 
Nervous .81 -.01 .08 .12 -.05 
Distressed .60 -.10 .12 .36 .05 
Happy -.04 .84 -.01 -.05 .11 
Enthusiastic -.02 .81 .04 -.05 .11 
Excited .10 .74 .01 -.11 .02 
Relaxed -.19 .68 -.05 .07 .09 
Surprised .35 .36 .07 .35 -.11 
Embarrassed .21 .05 .91 .06 .08 
Ashamed .22 -.04 .90 .08 .07 
Angry .11 -.01 .01 .85 -.09 
Upset .31 -.13 .11 .75 .02 
Determined -.09 .09 .15 -.05 .83
Inspired -.03 .24 -.05 -.25 .66
Alert .30 -.01 .05 .26 .51 
Note. Entries in the table are factor loadings with a cutoff of .60.  
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Table 4 
Bivariate Correlations Between Embarrassed and Ashamed Intensity and Duration—
Experiment 1  
Item 1 2 3 4 
1.   Embarrassed Intensity - .66 .49 .48 
2.   Ashamed Intensity - .52 .56 
3.   Embarrassed Duration - .76 
4.   Ashamed Duration       - 
Note. All correlations are significant at p < .001. 
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Table 5 
Correlations between Self and Friend Drug Problems and the Dependent Measures—
Experiment 1a 
  Self Drug Problems Friend Drug Problems 
Dependent Variable r p   r p 
Positive Affect Intensity .12 .10 .01 .87 
Negative Affect Intensity -.02 .82 .12 .10 
Positive Affect Duration .04 .60 .01 .94 
Negative Affect Duration -.07 .36 .08 .29 
Embarrassed and Ashamed -.11 .14 -.004 .96 
Wellbeing Intensity -.05 .53 .08 .27 
Wellbeing Duration -.10 .17 .01 .91 
Procedural Fairness .01 .87   .01 .17 
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Table 8 
MANOVA Results of the Effect of Due Process on Each Dependent Variable – 
Experiment 1a (Drug Court) 
Due Process  
Present Absent  
Dependent Variable M SD   M SD F(1, 201) p 
Positive Affect Intensity 1.16 .39 1.12 .33 .51 .48 
Negative Affect Intensity 3.52 .74 3.54 .77 .06 .81 
Positive Affect Duration 1.91 2.70 2.16 3.37 .32 .57 
Negative Affect Duration 18.73 8.18 21.11 9.08 3.82 .05 
Embarrassed and Ashamed -.04 .87 .04 .81 .42 .52 
Wellbeing Intensity 4.93 1.47 5.20 1.13 2.07 .15 
Wellbeing Duration 4.42 1.27 4.67 1.12 2.03 .16 
Procedural Fairness 4.85 1.35   3.58 1.46 41.47 .00 
 
Note. The embarrassed and ashamed scale is in standardized Z scores. 
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Table 9 
The Indirect Effects of Procedural Fairness on Negative Affect Duration Due to Due 
Process – Experiment 1a (Drug Court) 
95th Percent Confidence Interval 
    
Mediation Source Indirect Effect S.E.
Lower 
Boundary 
Upper 
Boundary 
Procedural fairness -.74 .55 -1.86 .31 
 
Note. The coefficient and standard of error come from the bootstrap method.  
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Table 10 
Correlations between Self and Friend Mental Health Problems and Dependent 
Measures—Experiment 1b (Mental Health Court) 
  
Self Mental Illness 
Problems 
Friend Mental Illness 
Problems 
Dependent Variable r p  r p 
Positive Affect Intensity -.08 .26 -.12 .09 
Negative Affect Intensity .14 .07 .20 .01 
Positive Affect Duration .01 .94 -.06 .44 
Negative Affect Duration .06 .42 .13 .08 
Embarrassed and Ashamed .07 .33 .04 .56 
Wellbeing Intensity .04 .58 .01 .94 
Wellbeing Duration -.01 .85 -.07 .34 
Procedural Fairness -.01 .85  -.11 .14 
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Table 13 
MANOVA Results of the Effect of Due Process on Each Dependent Variable – 
Experiment 1b (Mental Health Court) 
Due Process  
Present Absent  
Dependent Variable M SD  M SD F(1, 191) p 
Positive Affect Intensity 1.12 .25 1.14 .46 .11 .74 
Negative Affect Intensity 3.63 .88 3.80 .77 2.13 .15 
Positive Affect Duration 1.72 2.09 2.92 5.74 3.58 .07 
Negative Affect Duration 18.86 8.70 21.11 9.26 3.01 .08 
Embarrassed and Ashamed -.02 .81 .02 .81 .42 .72 
Wellbeing Intensity 5.11 1.17 5.28 1.40 .89 .35 
Wellbeing Duration 4.47 1.11 4.81 1.44 3.25 .07 
Procedural Fairness 4.51 1.48  3.29 1.59   30.5 .00 
 
Note. The embarrassed and ashamed scale is in standardized Z scores. 
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Table 14 
Alpha Reliabilities, Means, and Standard Deviations for Experiment 2 Scales 
  Overall 
Scale  M SD 
Similarity Scale .94 3.34 1.58 
Positive Affect Intensity .87 1.20 .50 
Negative Affect Intensity .91 4.18 .88 
Positive Affect Duration .73 2.27 3.70 
Negative Affect Duration .85 22.65 9.32 
Embarrassed and Ashamed .82 .01 .80 
Wellbeing Intensity .87 5.39 1.20 
Wellbeing Duration .86 4.89 1.26 
Procedural Fairness .89 3.02 1.46 
 
Note. The embarrassed and ashamed scale is in standardized Z scores 
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Table 15 
Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation for the PANAS-X Intensity Scale—
Experiment 2 
  Factor 
Emotion 1 2 3 
Afraid .85 -.19 .10 
Scared .81 -.23 .15 
Upset .81 -.29 .05 
Nervous .80 -.26 .12 
Distressed .78 -.32 .08 
Angry .67 -.20 .19 
Surprised .56 .14 .31 
Alert .38 .34 .21 
Enthusiastic -.03 .82 .04 
Happy -.30 .81 -.05 
Inspired -.24 .78 -.08 
Relaxed -.39 .77 .07 
Excited .09 .73 -.14 
Embarrassed .33 -.09 .82
Ashamed .32 -.15 .81
Determined -.24 .43 .45 
Note. Entries in the table are factor loadings with a cutoff of .60.  
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Table 16 
Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation for the PANAS-X Duration Scale—
Experiment 2 
  Factor 
Emotion 1 2 3 4 
Scared .84 -.09 .04 -.003
Afraid .82 -.09 .08 .05
Nervous .73 -.08 .16 .13
Distressed .68 -.10 .28 -.05
Upset .60 -.03 .52 -.07
Angry .49 -.04 .42 -.15
Surprised .37 .22 .23 .11 
Relaxed -.12 .83 -.09 .04
Happy -.14 .77 -.06 .13
Enthusiastic -.12 .70 .14 .01 
Excited .23 .68 -.12 .01
Embarrassed .20 -.02 .85 .12
Ashamed .21 -.07 .83 .11
Determined .03 .04 .06 .87
Inspired -.17 .30 .05 .66
Alert .39 -.02 .07 .51 
 
Note. Entries in the table are factor loadings with a cutoff of .60.  
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Table 17 
Bivariate Correlations Between Embarrassed and Ashamed Intensity and Duration—
Experiment 2  
Item 1 2 3 4 
1.   Embarrassed Intensity - .71 .48 .41 
2.   Ashamed Intensity - .39 .47 
3.   Embarrassed Duration - .79 
4.   Ashamed Duration       - 
 
Note. All correlations are significant at p < .001. 
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Table 18 
Correlations Between Self and Friend Mental Health Problems and Dependent 
Measures—Experiment 2 
  
Self Mental Illness  
Problems 
Friend Mental Illness  
Problems 
Dependent Variable r p  r p 
Positive Affect Intensity -.09 .19 -.10 .16 
Negative Affect Intensity .10 .14 .10 .16 
Positive Affect Duration .05 .45 .08 .26 
Negative Affect Duration .12 .09 .05 .49 
Embarrassed and Ashamed .03 .63 .09 .20 
Wellbeing Intensity .23 .001 .10 .16 
Wellbeing Duration .15 .03 .03 .66 
Procedural Fairness -.05 .45  -.03 .64 
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Figure 1. Similarity by due process interaction for positive affect duration – Experiment 
1a (drug court). The positive affect duration scale ranges from 0-35. A truncated scale is 
presented for clarity. Similarity mean centered, +/- 1 SD. 
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Figure 2. Coping by due process interaction for the predictor perspective for well-being 
duration – Experiment 1a (drug court). The well-being duration scale ranges from 1-7. 
Coping mean centered, +/- 1 SD. 
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Figure 3. Coping by due process interaction for the actor-referenced experiencer 
perspective for well-being duration – Experiment 1a (drug court). The well-being 
duration scale ranges from 1-7. Coping mean centered, +/- 1 SD. 
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Figure 4. Coping by due process interaction for the predictor perspective for procedural 
fairness – Experiment 1a (drug court). The procedural fairness scale ranges from 1-7. 
Coping mean centered, +/- 1 SD. 
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Figure 6. Similarity by due process interaction for positive affect intensity – Experiment 
1b (mental health court). The positive affect intensity scale ranges from 1-7. A truncated 
scale is presented for clarity. Similarity mean centered, +/- 1 SD. 
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Figure 7. Similarity by the predictor vs. self-referenced experiencer perspective 
comparison interaction for positive affect intensity – Experiment 1b (mental health 
court). The positive affect intensity scale ranges from 1-7. A truncated scale is presented 
for clarity. Similarity mean centered, +/- 1 SD. 
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Figure 8. Similarity by the actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer 
perspective comparison interaction for positive affect intensity – Experiment 1b (mental 
health court). The positive affect intensity scale ranges from 1-7. A truncated scale is 
presented for clarity. Similarity mean centered, +/- 1 SD. 
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Figure 9. Similarity by the predictor vs. self-referenced experiencer perspective 
comparison interaction for negative affect duration – Experiment 1b (mental health 
court). The negative affect duration scale ranges from 0-35. A truncated scale is 
presented for clarity. Similarity mean centered, +/- 1 SD. 
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Figure 10. Coping by the actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer 
perspective comparison interaction for well-being intensity – Experiment 1b (mental 
health court). The well-being intensity scale ranges from 1-7. A truncated scale is 
presented for clarity. Coping mean centered, +/- 1 SD. 
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Figure 11. Coping by the actor-referenced experiencer vs. self-referenced experiencer 
perspective comparison interaction for procedural fairness – Experiment 1b (mental 
health court). The procedural fairness scale ranges from 1-7.  Coping mean centered, +/- 
1 SD. 
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Figure 12. Similarity by the observer vs. self-referenced experiencer perspective 
comparison interaction for positive affect duration – Experiment 2. The positive affect 
duration scale ranges from 0-35. A truncated scale is presented for clarity. Similarity 
mean centered, +/- 1 SD. 
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Figure 13. Similarity by the predictor vs. self-referenced experiencer perspective 
comparison interaction for positive affect intensity – Experiment 2. The positive affect 
intensity scale ranges from 1-7. A truncated scale is presented for clarity. Similarity mean 
centered, +/- 1 SD. 
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Figure 14. Similarity by coping interaction for the actor-referenced experiencer condition 
for positive affect intensity– Experiment 2. The positive affect intensity scale ranges from 
1-7. A truncated scale is presented for clarity. Similarity mean centered, +/- 1 SD. 
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Figure 15. Similarity by coping interaction for the self-referenced experiencer condition 
for positive affect intensity– Experiment 2. The positive affect intensity scale ranges from 
1-7. A truncated scale is presented for clarity. Similarity mean centered, +/- 1 SD. 
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Appendix A 
 
Case Fact Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: Please respond to the following questions about the case summary you just 
read. 
 
1. The client in the legal case summary was a (an): 
a. drug court client 
b. mental health court client 
c. arsonist 
 
2. From which perspective did you read and think about the legal summary? 
a. a random person who is unfamiliar with court clients 
b. a person who interacts frequently with court clients (such as a social 
worker or case worker) 
c. Brent, the client portrayed in the legal case 
d. yourself, as if you were the client in the legal case 
 
3. The client was afforded due process at the time of the review hearing 
 
a) True   b) False 
 
4. The client was sanctioned to ___ days in jail 
 
a) 00  b) 30  c) 90 
 
5. Please choose ‘true’ for the following question if you have read and paid 
sufficient attention up to this point. 
 
a) True   b) False 
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Appendix B 
 
Coping Skills Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: Please complete the following scale about Brent’s [your] coping skills and 
how Brent [you] would cope with the experience after the judge announced the sanction 
of 30 days in jail. 
 
 
1. Do you know how Brent [you] would deal with this experience emotionally? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Do not 
know 
  Moderately 
know 
  Know 
very well 
 
2. Do you know how Brent [you] would deal with this experience psychologically?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Do not 
know 
  Moderately 
know 
  Know 
very well 
 
3. Do you know how Brent [you] would deal with this experience socially?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Do not 
know 
  Moderately 
know 
  Know 
very well 
 
4. Do you know how Brent [you] would deal with this experience financially?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Do not 
know 
  Moderately 
know 
  Know 
very well 
 
 
5. Do you know how Brent [you] would deal with this experience practically? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Do not 
know 
  Moderately 
know 
  Know 
very well 
 
6. Can you indicate the degree to which you know what Brent [you] does[do] in such a 
situation? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all   Moderately   Much 
   
 
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Appendix C 
 
Similarity Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: Please answer each question in the next section based upon your 
knowledge of yourself in your daily life during the last six months. How similar do you 
think you are (that is, during your daily life) to [insert assigned perspective]? 
 
Answer by circling the number that best represents your own response to each item. 
 
1. Physical characteristics
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
dissimilar 
  Moderately 
similar 
  Very 
similar 
 
2. Personality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
dissimilar 
  Moderately 
similar 
  Very 
similar 
 
3. Emotional reactions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
dissimilar 
  Moderately 
similar 
  Very 
similar 
 
4. Motivations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
dissimilar 
  Moderately 
similar 
  Very 
similar 
 
5. Social life
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
dissimilar 
  Moderately 
similar 
  Very 
similar 
 
6. Overall
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
dissimilar 
  Moderately 
similar 
  Very 
similar 
  
   
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Appendix D 
 
PANAS-X revised (intensity) 
 
Instructions:  From [your assigned perspective], please think about how Brent [you] 
would feel about the sanction outcome (jail time) described in the above scenario. Please 
complete the following scale, which consists of a number of feelings and emotions. 
Please indicate the extent Brent [you] would feel each emotion after the judge announced 
his [your] 30 day jail-time sanction. Use the following scale to record your answers.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
 
 
_____ Inspired 
_____ Distressed 
_____ Alert 
_____ Scared 
_____ Excited 
_____ Nervous 
_____ Enthusiastic 
_____ Upset 
_____ Determined 
_____ Afraid 
_____ Happy 
_____ Angry 
_____ Surprised 
_____ Embarrassed 
_____ Relaxed 
_____ Ashamed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
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Appendix E 
 
PANAS-X (duration) 
 
Instructions:  Now we would like you to go back to each of these emotions and indicate, 
from [your assigned perspective] how long you think the experience of that emotion 
would last for Brent [you] after the judge announced the sanction outcome (jail time). 
 
Indicate how long in days you believe Brent [you] would feel each emotion after the 
judge announced his sentence in the scenario that you just read. Your answer could range 
anywhere from 0 days (the emotion would last less than a day) to 35 days (the emotion 
would last even after Brent [you] were released from jail).   
 
 
_____ Inspired 
_____ Distressed 
_____ Alert 
_____ Scared 
_____ Excited 
_____ Nervous 
_____ Enthusiastic 
_____ Upset 
_____ Determined 
_____ Afraid 
_____ Happy 
_____ Angry 
_____ Surprised 
_____ Embarrassed 
_____ Relaxed 
_____ Ashamed 
 
  
   
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Appendix F 
 
Well-Being Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: From [your assigned perspective], think about how Brent [you] would feel 
about the situation and outcome (jail time) described in the legal summary. Please answer 
the following questions 
 
Well-Being Intensity 
 
1. As you think about the legal summary from the perspective of [insert assigned 
perspective], how intensely would Brent’s [your] emotional well-being be negatively 
influenced by this experience? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
  Moderately   Extremely
 
2. As you think about the legal summary from the perspective of [insert assigned 
perspective], how intensely would Brent’s [your] psychological well-being be negatively 
influenced by this experience? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
  Moderately   Extremely
 
3. As you think about the legal summary from the perspective of [insert assigned 
perspective], how intensely would Brent’s [your] social well-being be negatively 
influenced by this experience? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
  Moderately   Extremely
 
4. As you think about the legal summary from the perspective of [insert assigned 
perspective], how intensely would Brent’s [your] financial well-being be negatively 
influenced by this experience? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
  Moderately   Extremely
 
   
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5. As you think about the legal summary from the perspective of [insert assigned 
perspective], how intensely would Brent’s [your] overall well-being be negatively 
influenced by this experience? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
  Moderately   Extremely
 
6. Please choose the value ‘4,’ or Moderately to ensure you have read this question. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
  Moderately   Extremely
 
Well-Being Duration 
 
7. As you think about the legal summary from the perspective of [insert assigned 
perspective], how long would Brent’s [your] emotional well-being be negatively 
influenced by this experience? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very short 
amount of 
time or not 
at all 
  Moderate 
amount of 
time 
  Very long 
time 
 
8. As you think about the legal summary from the perspective of [insert assigned 
perspective], how long would Brent’s [your] psychological well-being be negatively 
influenced by this experience? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very short 
amount of 
time or not 
at all 
  Moderate 
amount of 
time 
  Very long 
time 
 
9 As you think about the legal summary from the perspective of [insert assigned 
perspective], how long would Brent’s [your] social well-being be negatively influenced 
by this experience? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very short   Moderate   Very long 
   
 
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amount of 
time or not 
at all 
amount of 
time 
time 
 
 
10. As you think about the legal summary from the perspective of [insert assigned 
perspective], how long would Brent’s [your] financial well-being be negatively 
influenced by this experience? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very short 
amount of 
time or not 
at all 
  Moderate 
amount of 
time 
  Very long 
time 
 
 
11. As you think about the legal summary from the perspective of [insert assigned 
perspective], how long would Brent’s [your] overall well-being be negatively influenced 
by this experience? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very short 
amount of 
time or not 
at all 
  Moderate 
amount of 
time 
  Very long 
time 
 
 
12. How many days would Brent’s [your] well-being be negatively influenced by this 
experience?  
  _______ days 
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Appendix G 
 
Procedural Fairness Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: Please use the following scale to indicate the extent to which Brent [you]: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All   Moderately   A great 
deal 
 
1. ____was [were] treated with respect by the Judge 
2. ____had the opportunity to share information about Brent’s [your] personal and 
legal situation 
3. ____thought the Judge seemed genuinely interested in Brent [you] as a person 
4. ____was [were] treated fairly by the judge 
5. ____was [were] satisfied with how the judge treated Brent [you] dealt with the 
case. 
 
6. As you consider the case as a whole, should Brent be [are you] satisfied with the 
judge’s decision today to sanction Brent [you] to thirty days in jail? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All   Moderately   Definitely
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Appendix H 
 
Demographic Survey and Problem-Solving Court Familiarity Questionnaire 
 
1.  What is your age?                          ____________  Years   
 
 2.  What is your gender?     Check one:            Male              Female   
 
3. Which of the following categories best reflects your ethnic/racial identity? (check 
only one)  
 
_____   African American  _____ Asian/Pacific Island 
                                                              
       _____   Caucasian: Non-Hispanic _____ Hispanic 
 
  _____   Native American  _____  Other 
 
4. What is the highest education level you have completed?  
 
       _____ less than high school graduate          _____  graduated college 
 
_____ high school graduate      _____  some graduate or professional  
             school 
                                                              
       _____ some college       _____  finished graduate or professional  
                         school   
 
 5. What is your religious preference (if any)? 
 
_____ Protestant _____ Islamic  _____ Catholic 
    
_____   Hindu  _____ Jewish  _____ Atheist 
 
  _____  Agnostic    _____ Other 
                                                                                                                                   
6.  What is your current work status? Check one: 
 
           Employed full time              Employed part time              Unemployed     _______ 
Retired  
 
 7. What is your occupation?  _____________________________________                                              
 
 8. What is your current marital status?   Check one: 
 
           Single                      Married                       Divorced                       Widowed 
       
   
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9.   Do you have any children?        _____   Yes           _____  No 
 
a. If yes,  how many __________ 
 
 
10. Which of the following best describes your overall ideology? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongl
y 
Liberal 
Moderatel
y Liberal 
Weakl
y 
Libera
l 
Centrist/Midd
le of the Road 
Weakly 
Conservativ
e 
Moderately 
Conservativ
e 
Strongly 
Conservativ
e 
 
 
11. Which of the following best describes your views on economic issues? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongl
y 
Liberal 
Moderatel
y Liberal 
Weakl
y 
Libera
l 
Centrist/Midd
le of the Road 
Weakly 
Conservativ
e 
Moderately 
Conservativ
e 
Strongly 
Conservativ
e 
 
 
12. Which of the following best describes your views on social issues? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongl
y 
Liberal 
Moderatel
y Liberal 
Weakl
y 
Libera
l 
Centrist/Midd
le of the Road 
Weakly 
Conservativ
e 
Moderately 
Conservativ
e 
Strongly 
Conservativ
e 
 
 
13. Have you used drugs in the past? 
 
   ______ Yes   ______ No 
 
If yes, have you experienced problems as a result of your drug use? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No 
problems 
  Moderate 
amount of 
problems 
  Many 
problems 
 
14. Has a close friend or family member used drugs in the past? 
 
   _____Yes   ____No 
   
 
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 If yes, has a close friend or family member experienced problems as a result of their drug 
use? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No 
problems 
  Moderate 
amount of 
problems 
  Many 
problems 
 
 
15. Have you experienced mental illness in the past?  
 
   ______ Yes   ______ No 
 
If yes, have you experienced problems as a result of your mental illness? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No 
problems 
  Moderate 
amount of 
problems 
  Many 
problems 
 
16. Has a close friend or family member experienced mental illness in the past? 
 
   _____Yes   ____No 
 
If yes, has a close friend or family member experienced problems as a result of their 
mental illness? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No 
problems 
  Moderate 
amount of 
problems 
  Many 
problems 
 
17. Have you personally been involved with a drug court? 
 
_____Yes _____No 
 
 If yes, in what capacity (e.g., client, social worker, 
etc.)?________________________ 
 
18. Have you personally been involved with a mental health court? 
 
_____Yes _____No 
 
 If yes, in what capacity (e.g., client, social worker, 
etc.)?________________________ 
   
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19. Have you ever served as a juror? Check one: 
 
           Yes              No 
 
 
20. State of residence ____ 
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Appendix I 
 
Drug Court Description 
Instructions: Please read the following description carefully. It describes a typical drug 
court in the United States. Soon, you will see a number of questions about a specific drug 
court case. This information will help you understand that case.  
 
What is a Drug Court? 
 
A drug court is a problem-solving court that handles cases involving substance abuse and 
drug addiction. Drug courts offer offenders who face criminal charges and who have a 
drug abuse problem the opportunity to voluntarily enter a substance abuse treatment 
program, instead of going through the traditional criminal court system. There are 
currently more than 2,100 drug courts in the United States. Each court functions a bit 
differently, however the goal is to address the underlying cause of illegal behavior—drug 
use. 
 
A drug court is more informal than a criminal court. For example, the teams refer to the 
offenders as “clients,” and the judge often speaks directly with the client, as opposed to 
his attorney. The drug court creates a treatment team to work with the client to remedy 
his drug abuse. Specifically, this treatment team might include a judge, prosecutor, 
defense attorney, educational and vocational experts, drug counselors, and social 
workers. While the client participates in the drug court treatment plan, the client attends 
frequent meetings or “check-ins” with the treatment team. This team supports the client, 
but also holds the offender accountable when he does not follow the court’s guidelines. 
 
While clients voluntarily participate in drug-court (instead of going to criminal court), 
they are: 
 provided with intense treatment and services to get and stay clean and sober 
 held accountable by the drug court treatment team 
 regularly and randomly tested for drug use 
 required to frequently appear in court so the team may review client progress and  
 rewarded for doing well or sanctioned when they do  not meet program 
requirements 
 
Drug courts recognize that recovery from a drug addiction is a process and thus, expect 
setbacks. When a setback occurs, such as a positive drug test, the judge sanctions the 
client to increased drug testing, additional counseling visits, or occasionally to brief 
periods of jail time.  The ultimate goal is for the client to successfully complete the drug 
court program to overcome drug addiction and thus, not commit future crimes.  
 
If a client successfully completes the program, the court often drops the charges against 
the offender. However, after repeated violations of the treatment program, the court may 
choose to send the case back to traditional criminal court. In this situation, the criminal 
court will settle the case as usual and the offender will be eligible for the full range of 
   
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punishments the law traditionally applies (e.g., conviction, probation, jail time, etc.). For 
this reason, an offender has a strong incentive to voluntarily participate in drug court and 
meet the expectations of the treatment team to successfully complete the drug court 
program.  
  
   
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Appendix J 
 
Participant Perspective Instructions 
 
Instructions: You have just read some important information about drug courts and their 
purpose and approach to drug abuse. Next, you will be asked to read and think about a 
legal case, State of Nebraska v. Kahler (2012). As you consider the following scenario, 
please read and think about it from the perspective of: 
 
Predictor: A random person who is unfamiliar with drug court clients 
Observer: A person who interacts frequently with drug court clients (this could be a 
social worker or case worker)
Actor-Referenced Experiencer: Brent, the drug court client portrayed in the legal case
Self-Referenced Experiencer: Yourself, as if you are the drug court client portrayed in 
the legal case 
 
Please take several minutes before you move on to put yourself in the place of this person 
and think about what he may be like. 
 
 
  
   
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Appendix K 
 
Legal Case Summary 
State of Nebraska v. Brent Kahler (2012) 
 
Drug Court Summary 
 
Instructions: Please read the following summary of the State of Nebraska v. Brent R. 
Kahler [you] (2012) from the perspective of [insert previously assigned perspective]. 
Please read the summary carefully as you will answer questions about this case at the end 
of the study. 
 
 
Brent R. Kahler is a thirty-two year old who was recently charged with theft of property 
of over $1,000—a felony. On April 17, 2011, Brent entered a local YMCA and took three 
wallets out of a number of unlocked lockers. A criminal court found Brent guilty of theft 
and sentenced him to probation. Six months later, on October 20, 2011, while still on 
probation, Brent entered the open garage of a home and stole a number of expensive 
tools. The police subsequently charged Brent with burglary.  
 
Brent began using drugs at the age of 23 and experienced a number of negative 
consequences because of his drug use, including failed relationships with family and 
friends, an inability to keep a job, and most recently trouble with the law. Brent had 
wanted to quit using drugs for a long time, however, because of his recent legal trouble, 
he now feels particularly motivated to do so. 
 
Based on the facts of Brent’s burglary charge as well as Brent’s history of drug abuse, 
Judge Zubrod, the presiding judge in the case, gave Brent the option to voluntarily have 
his case diverted to the local drug court. If Brent complied with the court’s expectations 
and successfully completed the treatment program, the court would drop the charges 
against him. Brent was excited and grateful for the opportunity to kick the drug addiction, 
but he was equally excited to see the case handled out of the criminal court.  
 
As part of his voluntary agreement in the drug court program, Brent read and signed a 
waiver that described the rules and obligations of the program. Specifically, the court 
required Brent to abstain from using drugs and alcohol, attend weekly meetings with the 
treatment team, attend weekly Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, and provide 
regular and random samples for drug testing.  
 
Brent also signed a document that stated any violation of the court’s treatment plan would 
result in a variety of sanctions, including but not limited to increased drug testing, 
additional court appearances, and potentially brief periods of incarceration.  
 
He was particularly motivated to do well in the program because if the judge believed 
Brent repeatedly failed to comply with the program, he could send Brent’s case back to 
   
 
242
the criminal court, where he likely would be convicted and sentenced to jail time for the 
burglary offense. 
 
During Brent’s time in the drug court program, he struggled to comply with the basic 
program requirements. On December 15, 2011 and again on January 18, 2012, Brent 
failed to appear for scheduled weekly meetings. As a sanction, Judge Zubrod increased 
the frequency of Brent’s required meetings from every week to every five days. 
Additionally, Brent tested positive for drugs during random drug tests on December 28, 
2011, January 30, 2012 and again on February 9, 2012. In an effort to deter Brent from 
using drugs, Judge Zubrod required Brent to submit to scheduled weekly drug tests, in 
addition to random testing.  
 
Two days ago, the drug court team heard that Brent missed a required weekly drug test 
and scheduled a review hearing for today.  
 
This morning, Brent came before Judge Zubrod and the treatment team for review. The 
Judge explained that he was disappointed in Brent’s performance in the program and was 
also disappointed that he had not taken the opportunity to create a better life for himself. 
For Judge Zubrod, missing the most recent scheduled drug test was the last straw. 
However, Brent insisted that the court scheduled the drug test for the following day and 
thus, he did not believe there was evidence that he missed a scheduled drug test. Brent 
explained that he wrote down the date and time of the scheduled drug test on a card, 
which indicated the test was tomorrow, and Brent could show the court if the judge 
allowed him to retrieve it and present it as evidence. He also wanted to tell his side of the 
story about why he had missed and failed previous drug tests. 
 
[INSERT DUE PROCESS DESCRIPTION HERE] 
 
Brent explained his desire to continue in the program and promised Judge Zubrod that he 
would see improvement if he gave him another chance. Based on Brent’s rocky history in 
the program, and most importantly because Brent missed a scheduled drug testing 
appointment (although Brent disagrees), Judge Zubrod determined that Brent violated the 
drug court agreement. As a consequence, Judge Zubrod sentenced Brent to thirty days in 
jail as a sanction. Brent was immediately taken into custody and would be released after 
serving his thirty-day sentence. 
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Appendix L 
 
Due Process Description 
 
Due Process Rights Awarded 
 
At this time, Judge Zubrod enacted several protections to honor Brent’s [your] due 
process rights. Specifically, the judge gave Brent [you] a written notice of the claimed 
violations of the program and a written disclosure of the evidence against him [you].  The 
statement explained that Judge Zubrod was seeking jail time for Brent [you] to help him 
[you] appreciate the seriousness of the violated drug court agreement.  At that point, 
Judge Zubrod left the bench and a different, neutral judge presided over the remainder of 
the hearing. The new judge called several drug court staff to testify that Brent [you] had 
failed drug testing and did not show up for one of the drug testing sessions. The judge 
then allowed Brent to question the drug court staff, show the judge his [your] 
appointment card with the next day’s date written on it, and give a statement about why 
he [you] failed previous drug tests. 
 
Due Process Rights Not Awarded 
 
In drug court, judges do not give clients the same due process rights as they would in a 
criminal court.  Judge Zubrod did not provide Brent [you] with a written notice of the 
claimed violations of the program or a written disclosure of the evidence against him 
[you].  The judge gave no reason why he was seeking jail time for Brent [you] other than 
that Brent [you] had failed the drug tests and failed to attend a drug testing session. 
Several drug court staff members reported to the judge that Brent [you] had failed several 
drug tests and did not show up for one of the drug testing sessions. Judge Zubrod did not 
allow Brent [you] to question the drug court staff, he did not examine Brent’s [your] 
appointment card, or allow a statement about why Brent [you] failed previous drug tests. 
   
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Appendix M 
 
Perspective Manipulation Booster 
 
Instructions: In the space provided, please answer the following question. 
 
Predictor: Please put yourself in the place of a random person, who is unfamiliar with 
drug courts. From this perspective, briefly write about what you know about drug courts 
and the services they provide.
Observer: Please put yourself in the place of a person who interacts frequently with drug 
court clients (this could be a social worker or case worker). From this perspective, briefly 
write what you do know about drug courts and the services they provide.
Actor-Referenced Experiencer: Please put yourself in the place of Brent, the drug court 
client portrayed in the legal case. From this perspective, briefly write about what Brent 
knows about drug courts and the services they provide. 
Self-Referenced Experiencer: From your perspective, as if you were the drug court 
client portrayed in the legal case, briefly write about what you know about drug courts 
and the services they provide. 
 
 
   
   
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Appendix N 
 
Mental Health Court Description 
Instructions: Please read the following description carefully. It describes a typical 
mental health court in the United States. Soon, you will see a number of questions about a 
specific mental health court case. This information will help you understand that case.  
 
What is a Mental Health Court? 
 
A mental health court is a problem-solving court that handles cases involving mental 
illness and related disorders. Mental health courts offer offenders who face criminal 
charges and who have a diagnosed mental illness the opportunity to voluntarily enter a 
mental health treatment program, instead of going through the traditional criminal court 
system. There are currently more than 240 mental health courts in the United States. Each 
court functions a bit differently, however the goal is to address the underlying cause of 
illegal behavior—mental illness. 
 
A mental health court is more informal than a criminal court. For example, offenders are 
known as “clients,” and the judge often speaks directly with the client, as opposed to his 
attorney. The mental health court creates a treatment team to work with the client to 
facilitate a long-term treatment plan for the client’s mental illness and related issues. 
Specifically, this treatment team might include a judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, 
educational and vocational experts, trained mental health professionals, counselors, and 
social workers. While the client participates in the mental health court treatment plan, the 
client attends frequent counseling sessions and meetings or “check-ins” with the 
treatment team. This team supports the client, but also holds the offender accountable 
when he does not follow the court’s guidelines. 
 
While the clients voluntarily participate in mental health court (instead of going to 
criminal court), they are:  
 
 provided with intense treatment and services (such as counseling and medication) 
to treat the mental illness and any related issues (such as drug or alcohol use) 
 held accountable by the mental health court treatment team 
 regularly and randomly tested for drug use (if substance abuse is suspected) 
 required to frequently appear in court so the team may review client progress and  
 rewarded for doing well or sanctioned when they do not meet program 
requirements 
 
Mental health courts recognize that successful treatment of any mental illness is a process 
and thus, expect setbacks. When a setback occurs, such as missed counseling sessions or 
non-compliance with medication, the judge sanctions the client to increased check-ins, 
additional counseling visits, or occasionally to brief periods of jail time.  The ultimate 
goal is for the client to successfully complete the mental health court program to decrease 
the negative impact of his mental illness and thus, not commit future crimes. 
   
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If a client successfully completes the program, the court often drops the charges against 
the offender. However, after repeated violations of the treatment program, the court may 
choose to send the case back to traditional criminal court. In this situation, the criminal 
court will settle the case as usual and the offender will be eligible for the full range of 
punishments the law traditionally applies (e.g., conviction, probation, jail time, etc.). For 
this reason, an offender has a strong incentive to voluntarily participate in a mental health 
court and meet the expectations of the treatment team to successfully complete the mental 
health court program.  
  
   
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Appendix O 
Participant Perspective Instructions 
 
Instructions: You have just read some important information about mental health courts 
and their purpose and approach to resolving mental health issues that lead to criminal 
activity. Next, you will be asked to read and think about a legal case, State of Nebraska v. 
Kahler (2012). As you consider the following scenario, please read and think about it 
from the perspective of: 
 
Predictor: A random person who is unfamiliar with mental health court clients 
Observer: A person who interacts frequently with mental health court clients (this could 
be a social worker or case worker)
Actor-Referenced Experiencer: Brent, the mental health court client portrayed in the 
legal case
Self-Referenced Experiencer: Yourself, as if you are the mental health court client 
portrayed in the legal case 
 
Please take several minutes before you move on to put yourself in the place of this person 
and think about what he may be like. 
   
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Appendix P 
Legal Case Summary 
State of Nebraska v. Brent Kahler (2012) 
 
Mental Health Court Summary 
 
Instructions: Please read the following summary of the State of Nebraska v. Brent R. 
Kahler [you] (2012) from the perspective of [insert previously assigned perspective]. 
Please read the summary carefully as you will answer questions about this case at the end 
of the study. 
 
Brent R. Kahler is a thirty-two year old who was recently charged with theft of property 
of over $1,000—a felony. On April 17, 2011, Brent entered a local YMCA and took three 
wallets out of a number of unlocked lockers. A criminal court found Brent guilty of theft 
and sentenced him to probation. Six months later, on October 20, 2011, while still on 
probation, Brent entered the open garage of a home and stole a number of expensive 
tools. The police subsequently charged Brent with burglary.  
 
Brent began experiencing signs of mental illness at the age of 23 and experienced a 
number of negative consequences because of his mental illness (specifically bipolar 
disorder and related mental illnesses), including failed relationships with family and 
friends, an inability to keep a job, and most recently trouble with the law. Brent had 
wanted to get help for his mental illness for a long time, however, because of his recent 
legal trouble, he now feels particularly motivated to do so. 
 
Based on the facts of Brent’s burglary charge as well as Brent’s history of mental illness, 
Judge Zubrod, the presiding judge in the case, gave Brent the option to voluntarily have 
his case diverted to the local mental health court. If Brent complied with the court’s 
expectations and successfully completed the treatment program, the court would drop the 
charges against him. Brent was excited and grateful for the opportunity to gain 
appropriate treatment for his mental illness, but he was equally excited to see the case 
handled out of the criminal court.  
 
As part of his voluntary agreement in the mental health court program, Brent read and 
signed a waiver that described the rules and obligations of the program. Specifically, the 
court required Brent to attend regular psychological counseling sessions, adhere to a 
prescribed medication regimen, attend weekly National Alliance on Mental Illness 
(NAMI) support group meetings, take regular drug and alcohol tests, and attend weekly 
meeting with the court treatment team.  
 
Brent also signed a document that stated any violation of the court’s treatment plan would 
result in a variety of sanctions, including but not limited to increased psychological 
counseling sessions, additional court appearances, and potentially brief periods of 
incarceration.  
 
   
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He was particularly motivated to do well in the program because if the judge believed 
Brent repeatedly failed to comply with the program, he could send Brent’s case back to 
the criminal court, where he likely would be convicted and sentenced to jail time for the 
burglary offense. 
 
During Brent’s time in the mental health court program, he struggled to comply with the 
basic program requirements. On December 15, 2011 and again on January 18, 2012, 
Brent failed to appear for scheduled weekly meetings. As a sanction, Judge Zubrod 
increased the frequency of Brent’s required meetings from every week to every five days. 
Additionally, Brent failed to attend his psychological counseling sessions on December 
28, 2011, January 30, 2012 and again on February 9, 2012. In an effort to encourage 
Brent to continue taking his medication, Judge Zubrod required Brent to submit to 
scheduled medical weekly check-ins to ensure he adhered to his prescribed medication 
regimen.  
 
Two days ago, the mental health court team heard that Brent missed a required weekly 
medical check-in and scheduled a review hearing for today.  
 
This morning, Brent came before Judge Zubrod and the treatment team for review. The 
Judge explained that he was disappointed in Brent’s performance in the program and was 
also disappointed that he had not taken the opportunity to create a better life for himself. 
For Judge Zubrod, missing the most recent medical check-in was the last straw. However, 
Brent insisted that the court scheduled the check-in for the following day and thus, he did 
not believe there was evidence that he missed a scheduled evaluation. Brent explained 
that he wrote down the date and time of the scheduled evaluation on a card, which 
indicated the test was tomorrow, and Brent could show the court if he was allowed to 
retrieve it. He also wanted to tell his side of the story about why he had missed previous 
counseling sessions. 
 
[INSERT DUE PROCESS DESCRIPTION HERE] 
 
Brent explained his desire to continue in the program and promised Judge Zubrod that he 
would see improvement if he gave him another chance. Based on Brent’s rocky history in 
the program, and most importantly because Brent missed a scheduled medical check-in 
appointment (although Brent disagrees), Judge Zubrod determined that Brent violated the 
mental health court agreement. As a consequence, Judge Zubrod sentenced Brent to 
thirty days in jail as a sanction. Brent was immediately taken into custody and would be 
released after serving his thirty-day sentence. 
  
   
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Appendix Q 
 
Due Process Description (Mental Health Court) 
 
Due Process Rights Awarded 
 
At this time, Judge Zubrod enacted several protections to honor Brent’s [your] due 
process rights. Specifically, the judge gave Brent [you] a written notice of the claimed 
violations of the program and a written disclosure of the evidence against him [you].  The 
statement explained that Judge Zubrod was seeking jail time for Brent [you] to help him 
[you] appreciate the seriousness of the violated mental health court agreement.  At that 
point, Judge Zubrod left the bench and a different, neutral judge presided over the 
remainder of the hearing. The new judge called several mental health court staff to testify 
that Brent [you] had missed scheduled counseling sessions and did not show up for one 
of the required weekly medical check-ins. The judge then allowed Brent [you] to question 
the mental health court staff, show the judge his [your] appointment card with the next 
day’s date written on it, and give a statement about why he [you] missed previous 
counseling sessions. 
 
 
Due Process Rights Not Awarded 
 
In mental health court, judges do not give clients the same due process rights as they 
would in a criminal court.  Judge Zubrod did not provide Brent [you] with a written 
notice of the claimed violations of the program or a written disclosure of the evidence 
against him [you].  The judge gave no reason why he was seeking jail time for Brent 
[you] other than that Brent [you] had missed scheduled counseling sessions and did not 
show up for a required weekly medical check-in. Several mental health court staff 
members reported that Brent [you] had missed counseling sessions and missed a medical 
check in. Judge Zubrod did not allow Brent [you] to question the mental health court 
staff, he did not examine Brent’s [your] appointment card, or allow a statement about 
why Brent [you] missed previous counseling sessions.  
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Appendix R 
 
Perspective Manipulation Booster (Mental Health Court) 
 
Instructions: In the space provided, please answer the following question. 
 
Predictor: Please put yourself in the place of a random person who is unfamiliar with 
mental health courts. From this perspective, briefly write about what you know about 
mental health courts and the services they provide. 
 
Observer: Please put yourself in the place of a person who interacts frequently with 
mental health court clients (this could be a social worker or caseworker). From this 
perspective, briefly write what you do know about mental health courts and the services 
they provide. 
 
Actor-Referenced Experiencer: Please put yourself in the place of Brent, the mental 
health court client portrayed in the legal case. From this perspective, briefly write about 
what Brent knows about mental health courts and the services they provide.  
 
Self-Referenced Experiencer: From your perspective, as if you were the mental health 
court client portrayed in the legal case, briefly write about what you know about mental 
health courts and the services they provide.  
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Appendix S 
 
Reported Coping Strategies Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: From [assigned perspective], think for several minutes about a negative 
event that Brent [you] might encounter after being sentenced to 30 days in jail.  
 
Please briefly describe that negative event. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please list up to 10 strategies that Brent [you] might use to cope with this negative 
event. You might consider the support Brent [you] receive[s] from others, how Brent 
[you] thought about changing the situation, or how Brent [you] could express Brent’s 
[your] emotions.  
1.   
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
6.   
7.   
8.   
9.   
10.   
